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1Chapter 1 Introduction
With the increased number of mobile devices and applications available, security vulner-
abilities at the application-level can lead to the exposure of confidential information such as
authentication credentials, location history, and private pictures for a large number of users.
To mitigate these threats, a user typically downloads applications available from reputable
application stores tied to vendors, and installs up-to-date security software on the device.
Vendors use a vetting process to find security vulnerabilities in applications released in their
stores [41]. Still, security vulnerabilities continue to be reported in both applications and
frameworks [43]. The applications are often developed using object-oriented code; therefore,
object-oriented legacy code has high business value [57]. The cost of fixing vulnerabilities
can be reduced when a security analysis finds vulnerabilities early during the development
life cycle, ideally before the application is released.
This thesis proposes a semi-automated approach to support Architectural Risk Analysis
(ARA) [86, 121] and finds security vulnerabilities at the architectural level. To achieve
its goals, the approach approximates runtime architecture as a sound, hierarchical abstract
object graph extracted from code with annotations, where the abstract graph has dataflow
edges that refer to objects. To find vulnerabilities, security architects write queries in terms
of the hierarchical location, reachability, and provenance of an abstract object. Based on the
query results, the architects can reason about the application security and write expressive
constraints.
In the rest of this chapter, Section 1.1 discusses why finding vulnerabilities is challenging.
Section 1.2 introduces the existing solutions and their limitations. Section 1.3 introduces
the proposed approach to support architects in finding vulnerabilities. Section 1.4 lists the
requirements the approach meets. Section 1.5 presents the thesis statement, hypotheses and
the contributions of this thesis, and Section 1.6 outlines the thesis.
21.1 Finding Architectural Flaws is Challenging
Software defects can be categorized as architectural flaws that are in the design of the
application, or coding bugs in the implementation. There is an overlap between the two
categories, but categorizing defects is useful because finding defects in each category require
a different solution. Finding an architectural flaw may require additional information that
is only implicit in the code.
Although 50% of security vulnerabilities are architectural flaws [86] such as information
disclosure or misuse of cryptography, they receive less attention from existing static analyses
that focus on finding coding bugs such as a hard-coded password or IP address [36]. Find-
ing architectural flaws is difficult because it requires global reasoning about a higher-level
representation of the program and not about the code. Finding an architectural flaw such
as information disclosure requires reasoning about the context in which confidential infor-
mation is used. On the other hand, a coding bug can be found by analyzing one class or
one method at a time. Approaches focusing on coding bugs can find up to 80% of security
vulnerabilities [33]; however, by using only few of the uncovered vulnerabilities, an attacker
may compromise the whole system. Moreover, architect still has to manually interpret a
reported coding bug and decide if an actual vulnerability exists. For example, an analysis
may simply report a vulnerability if an application creates a temporary file that is untrusted,
but this is not a vulnerability unless the application stores confidential information such as
an IP address or a password into the temporary file.
This thesis proposes an approach (Scoria) that targets architectural flaws that are difficult
to find by using existing approaches. Scoria is thus complementary to existing approaches
and can be used before the release of a system to analyze the parts that are prone to security
vulnerabilities.
31.2 Architectural Risk Analysis
One solution to find architectural flaws is to use Architectural Risk Analysis, also known
as Threat Modeling [121]. ARA is one of the three pillars of building secure systems, together
with code review and penetration testing [86, Chap. 5]. During ARA, security architects1 use
a forest-level view of the application that allows global reasoning about security from the
perspective of an attacker by assigning security properties to component instances and by
checking security constraints.
The forest-level view shows runtime components and connectors that reflect how the
system works, rather than code entities such as packages and classes that show how the
code is organized. Therefore, a code architecture is often insufficient for finding design
flaws [86, Chap. 5]. In object-oriented code, a runtime component can be approximated
as an abstract object2 that represents multiple runtime objects of the same type that have
the same conceptual purpose. Two runtime components can be of the same type, but serve
different conceptual purposes. Similarly, an abstract object graph can have different abstract
objects of the same type.
This thesis proposes to use as a forest-level view a runtime architecture that has compo-
nents and connectors. A connector is more than just a simple relation between components
and often shows what information the connector communicates. One goal of this thesis is
to approximate the runtime architecture as a graph in which a node represents an abstract
object and an edge shows the communicated object.
1For brevity, in the rest of this thesis, we refer to a security architect simply as an architect.
2This thesis uses object with the meaning of an “abstract object”. I will use “runtime object” when I
mean a location in the heap. The term abstract object is also used in composite terms such as “object
identity” to mean “the identity of an abstract object”.
41.2.1 Limitations of Architectural Risk Analysis
Currently, ARA is manual and informal with limited support from reverse engineering
tools. The tools for extracting runtime architectures are immature [70, 40] compared to the
ones for code architecture [91]. Architects draw a diagram representing a runtime archi-
tecture manually after interviewing developers and from existing documentation. Since it
is difficult for developers to remember all the details, the architecture may miss important
components or connectors that exist at runtime. A missed connector such as a dataflow
communication may lead to a security vulnerability. For example, a connector that passes
confidential information to an untrusted destination may lead to information disclosure. On
the other hand, an untrusted connector that has a trusted destination and passes unsanitized
information may lead to tampering [121].
1.2.2 Object Graph Extraction
When reasoning about security, ARA considers the worst-case of possible component
communication. The analysis results are valid only if they are based on a sound architec-
ture that reveals all objects and relations that may exist at runtime, in any program run.
Soundness means that there is a mapping such that a unique representative for every run-
time object exists, and if a runtime relation exists between two runtime objects, the sound
architecture must show an edge between their corresponding representatives. Moreover, if a
runtime relation refers to a runtime object, the corresponding abstract relation must refer
to the representative of this runtime object. Soundness requires a static analysis to ex-
tract the architecture from source code in a way that covers any possible execution, rather
than a dynamic analysis, which by definition considers only a finite number of program
runs [112].
Soundness also means that the extracted graph has a unique representative for every
runtime element. In the code, multiple variables may alias the same runtime object and
5the same variable may alias multiple runtime objects. Aliasing enables expressing design
that would not be possible otherwise, but at the same time aliasing can make reasoning
about security difficult [58]. Soundness can be proven formally and guarantees that no one
runtime element has two different representatives in the abstract object graph. Various static
analyses were proposed to compute a may-alias relation, and in general, the more precise a
may-alias analysis is, the less it scales. Aliasing can also be described using ownership types.
In Ownership Domains [10] for example, objects are in named, conceptual groups, and two
variables that refer to objects in different groups cannot alias, but the ones that refer to
objects in the same domain may alias.
A runtime architecture needs to fit in one page so that it conveys a high-level under-
standing of the system [86, Chapter 5], and shows how the system can be decomposed into
subsystems. Therefore, another requirement of a sound runtime architecture used for secu-
rity is hierarchical decomposition. In plain Java code, a hierarchical organization of objects
that conveys architectural abstraction is not directly available.
The solution is provided by Ownership Domains annotations [4, 5] that architects can add
to express design intent as local, modular hints about architectural tiers, logical containment
and strict encapsulation that is unavailable in plain Java code. Then, a static analysis uses
abstract interpretation of code with annotations and extracts a hierarchical object graph,
where an abstract object has zero or more domains, where a domain is a named, conceptual
group that in turn has one or more objects. The architects can refine the design intent to
increase the precision of the extracted graph. However, the existing static analysis [4, 5]
extracts only edges representing points-to relations, i.e., a persistent relation based on the
field reference between two objects. In addition, an edge needs to track data flow, i.e., a
transient relation at runtime that represents dataflow communication between objects. The
abstract object graph shows any possible communication that may occur at runtime, and the
architects can reason how confidential data may flow between components, and in particular,
if confidential data crosses trust boundaries.
6Dataflow edges that refer to abstract objects
This thesis proposes an analysis that extracts dataflow communication edges where an
edge label is the identifier of an abstract object that can be anywhere in the abstract object
graph. In that case, we say that an edge refers to an abstract object that is being communi-
cated. This enables a security constraint to check if an abstract object flows from a source to
a destination. I use dataflow communication to mean a particular kind of relation between
abstract objects due a method invocation, field read, and field write expression. I use value
flow to mean a data flow between variables.
1.2.3 Security Constraints and Properties
Security policies and constraints are only informally described in the documentation of
applications, frameworks, or security protocols a framework or a library implements. To
check these constraints automatically, architects can formalize the security specification as
machine-checkable constraints and find vulnerabilities. Related work includes static taint
analyses [48, 49, 126] that track values from sources to sinks, and tainting type systems [37,
92] that allow architects to enhance types with security properties. In these approaches, the
constraints are not clearly separated from the analysis or from the type system, which makes
their evolution difficult when new vectors of attack are discovered.
An approach such as Scoria that separates security constraints from extraction is extensi-
ble. By using dataflow edges that refer to objects, the architects can write machine-checkable
constraints in terms of object provenance where the same object that a first dataflow edge
refers to cannot be referred from a second dataflow edge. Since the abstract object graph is
hierarchical, a constraint can be written in terms of descendants and ancestors of abstract ob-
jects such that it checks if a dataflow edge with an untrusted destination refers to an ancestor
of an object representing confidential data. By using object hierarchy, a constraint can also






















Figure 1.1: A runtime architecture representing a chat application. Object provenance checks that the
same abstract object that flows from AChat to the FindFriend Service does not flow from an external client
to FindFriend Service. Contact information is disclosed although no transitive information flow exists from
Contacts to the External Client. Another constraint uses indirect communication to check that AChat does
not send pictures to a data stream nested into the Unencrypted Channel.
object. Architects may also consider other types of communication like points-to edges and
creation edges. A constraint can check if the dataflow with an untrusted destination refers
to another object from which the confidential data is reachable (object reachability).
As an example of an object provenance constraint, consider a chat application (AChat)
that allows users to search for their friends that use the same app based on the phone number
stored on the device. All the instances of AChat running on different devices use a service
available online that is provided by the designers of the app. A constraint that uses object
provenance can check that the same abstract object representing the phone number can flow
from the app to the service, but cannot flow from an external client to the service. Otherwise,
the external client can conduct a brute force attack and try to guess all the phone numbers
in an area code to find all the users of AChat in the area, although there is no direct or
transitive information flow from the AChat to the external client (Fig. 1.1).
AChat provides two communication channels, one that provides encryption for sending
pictures, and one without encryption for instant messaging. The application does not com-
municate directly to the channel, but rather to a data stream nested in the communication
channel. Hence, a constraint needs to use indirect communication and check that pictures
are sent only to descendants of a channel that provides encryption.
81.3 The Scoria Approach
Scoria3 is a semi-automated approach that uses a static analysis called ScoriaX to support
the architects to find security vulnerabilities that are caused by architectural flaws. Scoria
assumes the source code is available and supports architects to find security vulnerabilities by
querying an abstract object graph that the static analysis extracts from the source code. The
object graph is sound and hierarchical, and has dataflow edges that refer to objects.
Scoria separates the constraints from the extraction by allowing architects to execute
constraints on the results of querying the extracted object graph. The architects can also
assign security properties to abstract objects and edges. Scoria is thus extensible and allows
architects to adapt to different vectors of attack that the designers of the security analysis
might not have considered. Due to first having dataflow edges that refer to objects and second
having a unique representative for every runtime object, the architects can write constraints
in terms of object provenance (check if an object that flows from a source to a destination
also flows from another source to another destination) and indirect communication (check if
confidential data flows to an object nested in an untrusted component).
The thesis includes end-to-end evaluations to show that Scoria can find vulnerabilities in
systems by executing machine-checkable constraints. The thesis also compares Scoria with
taint analyses based on a benchmark in terms of precision and recall. The results show
that by adding annotations and writing constraints Scoria can find vulnerabilities that other
approaches miss and avoid false positives. The thesis also extends the benchmark with new
test cases that require reasoning about object provenance to find security vulnerabilities and
reasoning about object hierarchy and indirect communication to avoid false positives.
Scoria meets the requirements of ARA. The next two sections distinguish requirements
of ARA approaches from the requirements of extraction. Throughout the thesis, I explain
how Scoria meets these requirements by design or based on the empirical results.
3Scoria stands for Security Constraints On RuntIme Architecture.
91.4 Security Analysis Requirements
SC1: Use a runtime architecture. ARA requires a runtime architecture that is con-
sistent with the code and shows components of the same type that have different
conceptual purposes, and possibly different security properties. Connectors show all
types of communication including dataflow communication that shows “what” data is
being communicated from one component to another.
SC2: Support automation. Security constraints are often formulated informally in the
documentation. An ARA approach needs to provide tool support for the architects to
execute machine-checkable constraints to enforce the informal constraints.
SC3: Extensibility of constraints and properties. To defend a system against mali-
cious users, an ARA approach should be extensible so that architect can adapt and
write constraints separately from the extraction of the runtime architecture. Security
design intent may not always be available in the code and architects need flexibility
in assigning security properties.
1.5 Thesis Statement
Finding security vulnerabilities that require reasoning about dataflow communica-
tion is challenging for architects. A static analysis can extract dataflow commu-
nication edges that refer to abstract objects in a sound, hierarchical object graph
such that the architects can find vulnerabilities by writing machine-checkable con-
straints in terms of object provenance and indirect communication through hier-
archy and reachability of abstract objects.
1.5.1 Hypotheses
To support the thesis statement, I evaluate two hypotheses:
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H1. For an object-oriented program, the architect adds annotations and uses a static analysis
to extract dataflow communication edges that refer to objects in a sound, hierarchical object
graph that approximates the runtime architecture of the program, and meets the following
extraction requirements.
a) Express design intent: the annotations express local, modular hints about architectural
tiers, logical containment and strict encapsulation; the architect can refine the annotations
to increase the precision of the extraction analysis, as needed;
b) Support legacy code: the architect adds only annotations to the code and any libraries
in use while using existing tools and development environments. The analysis supports
extraction without requiring architects to re-engineer the code in a specific programming
language or using a specialized library.
c) Sound object graph: the architect assumes that the object graph shows all possible objects
and edges that may occur in any possible program run;
d) Sound object graph with respect to aliasing: the architect does not encounter any situation
where the same runtime object is represented by multiple abstract objects in the object
graph, so he cannot assign multiple security properties to the same runtime entity;
e) Precise object graph: while a sound object graph is inherently going to have false positives,
ideally, the architect should not have to frequently investigate too many false positive
objects or edges that do not exist in any program run;
f) Summarization: By summarizing multiple runtime objects of the same type to a pair
(type, domain) corresponding to an abstract object, the analysis allows the architect to
express that multiple runtime objects have the same conceptual purpose or the same
security property, even if they are created in different locations in the code. Then, the
architect does not need to frequently distinguish between runtime objects that have the
same corresponding abstract object in the object graph;
g) High-level view: the architect visually inspects the hierarchically laid out object graph
frequently in order to better understand how to refine the annotations, set the properties,
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or refine the constraints;
h) Scalability: the extraction analysis needs to scale to real-world applications of at least
a few thousands lines of code. Tradeoffs needs to be considered: the more precise the
extraction analysis is, the less scalable it is.
H2. Based on a sound, hierarchical, abstract object graph with dataflow edges that refer
to objects, the architect writes machine-checkable constraints in terms of one or more of
the following Scoria features to effectively (high recall and precision) to detect security
vulnerabilities.
a) Object provenance: check if the same abstract object that flows from a first source to a
first destination also flows from a second source to a second destination;
b) Object transitivity: track the flow of potentially shared objects through the system;
c) Object hierarchy: identify protected data is nested within abstract objects that ought to
carry only unprotected data;
d) Object reachability: identify when protected data may be reachable via unexpected com-
munication paths;
e) Traceability: by using the traceability between abstract objects and edges and the code,
the constraints can use information such as subtyping between classes, method names of
interest, or file names, among others.
f) Indirect communication: identify when protected data is sent to an abstract object nested
within an untrusted sink.
g) Security property: enhance the abstract object graph with security design intent that the
extraction analysis does not extract from the code;
1.5.2 Contributions to Research and Practice
The thesis makes the following contributions and focuses on extracting the internal rep-
resentation of the runtime architecture and on finding security vulnerabilities. The thesis
deemphasizes the role of visual inspection in finding security vulnerabilities, focusing instead
12
on security constraints. I assume that the extracted graph can be integrated in existing visu-
alization approaches, and be used for architectural conformance [4], but these contributions
are not in the scope of this thesis.
• A more formal and rigorous ARA process that uses an abstract object graph that is
consistent with the code instead of manually drawn diagrams;
• Semi-automated support for extracting dataflow edges that refer to abstract objects in
a sound, hierarchical object graph that architects can use to reason about security;
• Semi-automated support for reasoning about security by querying the abstract object
graph and by writing machine-checkable constraints that make ARA more repeatable
and rigorous compared to an informal process;
• Expressive constraints in terms of object provenance and indirect communication that
identify when data is trusted or protected based on its origin, and identify when pro-
tected data is sent to a component nested within an untrusted sink.
1.6 Outline
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows, where each chapter discusses how Scoria
meets the identified requirements. Chapter 2 describes informally the extraction analysis
ScoriaX. Chapter 3 formalizes ScoriaX and proves that the analysis is sound for programs
written in a Java-like language. Chapter 4 evaluates ScoriaX and discusses precision and
scalability. Chapter 5 describes more precisely the Scoria process and the queries the ar-
chitects can write on the extracted model. Chapter 6 evaluates Scoria by implementing
informal constraints, by finding vulnerabilities in an Android application, and by comparing
Scoria with other approaches based on a benchmark. Next, Chapter 7 presents related work,
and Chapter 8 discusses some limitations of Scoria, presents directions for future work, and
concludes.
13
Chapter 2 Extraction of Object Graph
This chapter1 describes informally how Scoria uses a static analysis (ScoriaX) to meet the
extraction requirements (Section 1.5.1, page 10) and why a runtime architecture is needed.
During Architectural Risk Analysis (ARA) [61, 86], security architects find vulnerabilities
by analyzing a forest-level view of the program rather than reading code. This forest-level
view is a representation of the runtime architecture [124], which is a collection of runtime
components and connectors. A runtime architecture can have multiple component instances
of the same type that serve different conceptual purposes or have different security properties.
A connector has a direction and shows “what” data is communicated from one component to
another. To find security vulnerabilities, the architects assign security properties and write
constraints. For example to find information disclosure, architects assign confidentiality and
trust level to components and connectors and check that no confidential data flows into an
untrusted component.
ScoriaX extracts dataflow edges in a sound, hierarchical object graph from object-oriented
code with annotations. At runtime, an object-oriented program can be represented as a
Runtime Object Graph (ROG). A node in an ROG corresponds to a runtime object and an
edge corresponds to a relation between runtime objects such as a points-to or a dataflow
communication. The goal of ScoriaX is to extract an abstract object graph that approximates
all ROGs in any program run and meet the extraction requirements (Section 1.5.1, page 10).
The first section describes what kind of program representations can be used in ARA. Next,
Section 2.2 gives an informal definition of dataflow edges that ScoriaX extracts. Then, for
each requirement, the rest of the sections describe the solution ScoriaX adopts and the
alternatives considered.
1An earlier version of this analysis appeared in [131]. The current version appeared in [132] and [133].
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1 class Main {
2 EActivity eAct = new EActivity();
3 }
4 class EActivity extends Activity {
5 Service service = new Service("ENCRYPT");
6 void onCreate(){
7 FileManager fm = (FileManager)getManager("FILE");
8 LocationManager lm = (LocationManager)getManager("LOCATION");
9 Location loc = lm.getLastLocation();
10 File tempFile = fm.read("history");
11 if (tempFile.find(loc)) {
12 File encrypted = service.encrypt(tempFile);
13 Intent i = new Intent(ACTION_SEND);
14 i.putExtra(EXTRA_STREAM,encrypted);





20 class ViewActivity extends Activity { ... }
21 class Activity {
22 Intent mIntent;
23 void startActivity(Intent intent) {
24 mIntent = intent;
25 }
26 Manager getManager(String name) {




31 void putExtra(String name, Object value) { ... }
32 }
Figure 2.1: CryptoApp: Code fragments.
2.1 Extracting a Runtime Architecture
This section gives an overview of ARA and uses a running example to explain the main
concepts. It then describes alternative representations of a runtime architecture and how
they can be used in ARA.
2.1.1 Running Example
The running example is an Android application (CryptoApp) that searches in the log
history of the device looking for location data. If the current location is found, CryptoApp
15
encrypts the log file to prevent disclosure of the location to malicious applications. The
code fragments of CryptoApp (Fig. 2.1) show the classes EActivity and ViewActivity that
both extend the class Activity of the Android framework. The object of type EActivity
communicates with an object of class Service that encrypts the content of a file. The
code uses the standard communication mechanism in Android based on objects of type
Intent.
To access the location information, which is confidential, CryptoApp asks the user to
explicitly grant security permissions when the application is installed. The request seems
legitimate since the application needs to search for the current location in the files. Once
permissions are granted, nothing prevents CryptoApp from saving the location in clear text
in a temporary file. The information is disclosed because other applications installed on the
device can read temporary files.
Notation. I use the italic font for component instances, and the fixed width font for
code entities and objects. An object labeled obj:T indicates a reference obj of type T, which
we then refer to either as the “object obj” or the “T object” to mean “an instance of the T
class”.
2.1.2 As-Designed Runtime Architecture
ARA requires a runtime architecture, which is a collection of runtime components and
connectors, their properties and constraints on their interactions. In a runtime architecture,
a component represents runtime—rather than code—entities [86]. One style of runtime ar-
chitecture used in ARA is a Data Flow Diagram (DFD), which describes how data enters,
leaves, and traverses the system (Fig 2.2). It shows data sources and destinations, relevant
processes that data goes through, and trust boundaries in the system. A DFD allows archi-
tects to find security vulnerabilities without having to search through the source code.
Data-Flow Diagram. A DFD has several component types: a Process (circle), a High-
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External
Interactor Boundary
Figure 2.2: As-designed runtime architecture using Data-Flow Diagram style shows an Android application
that follows the State-Display-Logic architecture.
parallel horizontal lines). A Process is a component that processes data and performs some
actions based on the data. A DataStore represents a repository such as a file or a database.
An ExternalInteractor represents a component that exists outside the system such as a web
service or a user interacting with the system. The connector DataFlow represents data
transferred between components where the label describes information content. A DFD
used in ARA often separates components that have different privilege levels using a Bound-
ary (dashed line). For example, a boundary can describe locations where an attacker can
access, or a machine or process boundary [80, p. 90]. A DFD Boundary is a TrustBound-
ary (the base type), ProcessBoundary, MachineBoundary or OtherBoundary. Alternatively,
Boundary can also be a runtime tier that is a group of conceptually related component
instances. In a DFD, two component instances of the same type can serve different concep-
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tual purposes. The DFD shows multiple instances of the same component type such as a
DataStore representing a file, and the instances can serve different purposes. For example,
a file that contains a history log serves a different conceptual purpose than a file that stores
permissions granted by the user.
DFD constraints. To find vulnerabilities such as information disclosure, the architects
assign security properties such as TrustLevel to components and connectors. Then architects
write and execute constraints such that no connector passes confidential information from a
trusted source to an untrusted destination. For CryptoApp, Permissions File is considered
trusted while History file is considered untrusted. The constraint ensures that no connector
passes location information in clear text to an untrusted file.
2.1.3 Code vs. Runtime Structure
A diagram that shows methods, classes and packages represents the code structure and
is easier to extract than a diagram that represents the runtime structure. A code structure
diagram shows how the code of the program is organized rather than a view of the program at
runtime and is unsuitable for ARA. Examples of code structure diagrams are class diagram
and call graph, while an example of a runtime structure diagram is the object diagram [123].
Next, I give examples of security constraints that can be written on each diagram and discuss
advantages and limitations.
Class diagram. In a class diagram, a node represents a class with field and method
signatures (Fig. 2.3). A common relation in a class diagram is inheritance. With inheritance,
a class diagram shows the responsibility of an object divided into multiple classes. For
example, the method onCreate is partially implemented by EActivity, while the default
responsibilities are implemented by the base class Activity (Fig. 2.1). A class diagram also
shows only one class but different instances of the same class can serve different conceptual
purposes.
Class diagram constraints. If the architects were to use a class diagram to write con-
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Figure 2.3: Class diagram of CryptoApp extracted using ObjectAid [95].
straints, they would be unable to assign different security properties to different instances
of the same class. They may also be misled by multiple classes that correspond to the same
instance, since they can assign different security properties to classes in an inheritance hi-
erarchy. In CryptoApp, the client code DBase uses two instances of type Service, one for
encryption and one for decryption (Fig. 2.4). In turn, each instance of Service uses its own
instance of Cipher. While a class diagram shows one box for the class Service and one
for the class Cipher, the architects needs to distinguish between different instances of these
classes and identify the instance that decrypts information and returns confidential informa-
tion in clear text, which is not to be disclosed into an untrusted sink such as a temporary
file.
Call graph. In a call graph, a node represents a method declaration and an edge indicates
that the source method invokes the destination method. At runtime, the same method can
be used in different contexts. Distinguishing between contexts allows architects to avoid false
positives. The code fragments in Figure 2.4 show the implementation of the class Service,
where the method run sends the text to an object of type Cipher, which transforms the
text and sends the result to the client. Depending on the receiver of the method, i.e., the
object in the context of which the method is invoked, the method run encrypts or decrypts
data.
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1 class DBase {
2 Service eService = new Service("ENCRYPT");
3 Service dService = new Service("DECRYPT");
4 File encrypt(File src) {
5 File dst = new File(src.getName());
6 String mydata = getBytesFromFile(src);
7 String dd = dService.run(mydata);
8 String eData = eService.run(dd);




13 class Service {
14 Cipher cipher;
15 Service(String cType) {
16 cipher = new Cipher(cType);
17 }




22 class Cipher { ... }
Figure 2.4: CryptoApp: Code fragments continued from Fig. 2.1.
Call graph constraints. The architects need to ensure that only encrypted data can
flow into a temporary file. Assigning security properties may be possible using method
declarations such that the architects can select methods that return confidential information
(sources), and methods that disclose information (sinks). However, a call graph does not
allow architects to write constraints in terms of dataflow communication.
Architects may use other representations such as a System Dependence Graph (SDG),
which has both control and data flow edges [126]. The constraint then checks if a SDG
contains a path from a source to a sink. Selecting a method declaration as a source or sink
can be however imprecise when the method returns both confidential and non-confidential
information, as it is the case for the method run of class Service. Section 7.1.2 (page 152)
discusses SDG and other program representations in more detail.
Manually drawn object diagram. One diagram of object-oriented programs that rep-
resents runtime structure is an object diagram [123]. An object diagram shows multiple



















Figure 2.5: Manually drawn object diagram (left) shows too many instances that have the same conceptual
purpose. An abstract object graph (right) merges such instances into canonical abstract objects.
shows two instances of Service and the field declaration Cipher c in the class Service
corresponds to a points-to relation from eService:Service to an object of type Cipher.
It is not clear only from a field declaration in the code if multiple objects of type Service
share the same object of type Cipher, or if multiple objects of type Cipher exist. The object
diagram clarifies this situation and shows two objects of type Cipher, one for each object of
type Service. One disadvantage of an object diagram is that it also shows multiple instances
of the same class that serve the same conceptual purpose. For an object of type HashMap, an
object diagram shows for example three objects of type Entry that each refers to a key and
a value. In the general case, however, the object diagram can have an unbounded number of
objects and edges. Consider for example a server that maps a password with an access token.
As the server runs indefinitely, it creates an unbounded number of entries in the map.
Object diagram constraints. If architects were to use an object diagram to write con-
straints, they would be able to distinguish between different instances of the same class, and
reason about the presence and the absence of communication. There might be, however,
too many instances on such a diagram that serve the same conceptual purpose (Fig. 2.5).












Figure 2.6: An object graph is sound if there is a mapping from any runtime object graph to the abstract
graph. If two runtime edges have the same source and destination (runtime objects), but refer to two runtime
objects that have distinct representatives in the abstract graph, then the runtime edges have two distinct
representative abstract edges in the abstract graph.
2.2 Dataflow Edges that Refer to Objects
A related approach [5, 7] proposes a static analysis that extracts an abstract object
graph to approximate a runtime architecture [7]. In an abstract object graph, an abstract
object corresponds to multiple runtime objects that have the same conceptual meaning. The
abstract objects are organized in groups, where an abstract object can also have groups such
that the graph is hierarchical (Fig. 2.6). An abstract object and its substructure corresponds
to a Process in a DFD. A dataflow edge corresponds to a DataFlow connector that refers
to a component instance representing the information being sent, such as a message, rather
than a type or a method invocation [124].
The approach makes a simplistic assumption about dataflow edges, namely that the pres-
ence of dataflow communication can be approximated by a points-to edge. Reasoning about
security requires more than just reasoning about the absence or the presence of communica-
tion. Architects reason about confidential data that is disclosed to an untrusted destination,
or tainted data that flows to a trusted destination without being sanitized. Therefore, a con-
nector of the runtime architecture is more than just a simple relation between components.
For object-oriented code, a connector corresponds to a dataflow edge for method invocation,
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main : Main



































Figure 2.7: In an object graph a node is an abstract object that traces to code to an object allocation
expression. An edge represents dataflow communication that refer to objects. Dataflow edges traces to code
to field read, field-write and method invocation expressions.
field read, and field write expressions in the code. To show what information is flowing,
this thesis enriches the representation of a connector and makes a dataflow edge refers to
an object, which can be different from the source and the destination of the dataflow edge
(Fig. 2.6).
Definition: Dataflow communication that refers to an object. An object a:A has a
reference to an object o:O and passes it to an object b:B, or an object a:A has a reference to
an object b:B and receives a reference to an object o:O. The objects a:A and b:B represent
the source or destination objects, and o:O is a dataflow object that the dataflow edge refers
to. To capture the directionality of the flow, the object graph distinguishes import and export
edges. An import dataflow edge exists due to the return value of a method invocation or
a field read expression. An export dataflow edge exists due to an argument of a method
invocation or a field write expression (Fig. 2.7).
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Alternatives considered
If the architects were to use an object graph with points-to edges [5, 7], they would be
able to distinguish between objects of the same type, but would miss dataflow communi-
cation edges that may lead to security vulnerabilities. In CryptoApp, the architects would
distinguish the objects Service and Cipher that encrypts information. However, the graph
shows no points-to edge from db:DBase to pw:PrintWriter (Fig. 2.8(a)) because pw is a
local variable, not a field (Fig. 2.4, line 9).
An early version of this work proposes dataflow edges that refer to types [131]. In Cryp-
toApp, only based on the type it is unclear if the dataflow communication from db:DBase
to pw:PrintWriter refers to encrypted or decrypted information for (Fig. 2.8(b)). This
thesis proposes a solution where the architects can establish abstract object identity based
on conceptual groups (dashed rectangles in Fig. 2.8(c)) in addition to types.
2.3 The Extracted Object Graph is Sound
Security requires reasoning about the worst-case because one security vulnerability can
compromise the whole system. Thus, an analysis needs to extract a sound approximation
of the runtime architecture. For object-oriented code, an abstract object graph needs to
represent all objects and relations that may exist at runtime because any object or relation
can introduce security vulnerabilities. An edge on a sound object graph means “a dataflow
may exist at runtime” rather than “a dataflow must exist at runtime”. In fact, the dataflow
might not even correspond to an actual runtime communication, due to possible false posi-
tives in the object graph when the static analysis considers all possible paths in the program,
including the infeasible ones. On a sound object graph, the absence of an edge is also impor-
tant because the absence means that there must be no direct communication between the







































(a) A fragment of the hierarchical object graph
with points-to edges [5] shows communication
from eService:Service to cipher:Cipher, but






































(b) A fragment of the hierarchical object graph
with dataflow edges that refer to types [131].
Since several edges refer to the type String, it
is unclear if the object of type String that flows
from db:DBase to pw:PrintWriter represents en-







































(c) Dataflow that refer to objects show that
encrypted information flow from db:DBase to
pw:PrintWriter
Figure 2.8: Object graphs with points-to edges and dataflow edges that refer to types are not enough.
Architects need dataflow edges that refer to objects.
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Soundness
The extracted abstract object graph is sound if a mapping exists between ROG in any
program run and the mapping satisfies the following conditions:
• Object soundness. Every runtime object has as a unique representative abstract
object in the abstract graph. While one abstract object can represent multiple runtime
objects, the same runtime object cannot map to two separate abstract objects. It would
be misleading to have one runtime entity appear as two components in a runtime
architecture. For example, one could assign the two components different values for
the TrustLevel property and obtain invalid analysis results and a false sense of security.
• Edge soundness. Every runtime edge between two runtime objects has a corre-
sponding abstract edge between the representatives of the two objects. For a runtime
dataflow edge that refers to a runtime object, the corresponding abstract dataflow edge
refers to the representative of the runtime object (Fig. 2.6).
An approximation of a heap snapshot is unsuitable to reason about worst-case.
A dynamic analysis could conceivably extract a DFD using a snapshot of the heap. However,
such a snapshot is likely to have too many details for reasoning about security. In a naive
approach, an analysis could delete nodes and edges, but the resulting diagram may miss some
important details, and is unsound. In contrast, a sound approach could soundly summarize
the heap, ensuring that every element on the heap has a representative in the summarized
diagram [83]. Such a diagram would still approximate one execution, when in fact, security
analysis is a worst-case analysis that needs to consider all possible executions.
2.4 ScoriaX Considers Aliasing
Soundness also means that no one runtime object has distinct representatives in the object
graph. Therefore, another challenge for the extraction analysis is to consider aliasing and
determine all the objects that a variable in the code may alias. For a variable is an argument
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of a method invocation, considering aliasing means identifying the abstract objects that the
dataflow edge refers to. If the analysis finds different abstract objects for the same argument,
it creates multiple dataflow edges from the same source to the same destination (Fig. 2.6).
To preserve edge soundness, three abstract objects identify a dataflow communication edge:
the source, the destination, and the abstract object the edge refers to.
One solution for supporting aliasing is to use a separate may-alias analysis provided by
a static analysis framework such as SOOT [72] and WALA [65]. A may-alias analysis is
fully automated, but does not scale for a large number of variables. Another solution is
to use type systems such as Ownership Domains [10]. A type system is a semi-automated
solution and requires type annotations. This solution is scalable because annotations are
local, modular and can be checked by analyzing one class at a time. This section describes
each solution in more details and discusses why ScoriaX uses a type system.
2.4.1 Using Type Systems
Many ownership type systems have been proposed for reasoning about object structures
and aliasing [29, 34, 38, 94]. One such type system, Ownership Domains [10], further sep-
arates aliasing policy from its mechanism. Since there are multiple ways to express design
intent, there are multiple ways to annotate a system. Ownership Domains provides the
flexibility needed for architectural extraction [5].
Ownership Domains. An ownership domain is a conceptual group of objects with an
explicit name and explicit policies that govern how it can reference objects in other domains.
Each object is in one ownership domain that does not change at runtime. This thesis
deemphasizes the explicit policies (domain links), and focuses on the aliasing mechanism.
Two variables declared in different domains cannot alias. For CryptoApp, the developer
declares two domains in the class Main, DATA and LOGIC, and places objects in these domains.
A typechecker ensures that no variable declared in DATA is assigned to a variable declared in
LOGIC. Otherwise, the typechecker returns a warning for the architect to address.
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Domain Parameters. Domain parameters propagate ownership information of objects
outside the current object. A type declaration has a class name and a list of formal do-
main parameters. By convention, the first element of the list is the owner domain. To bind
formal domain parameters to actual domains, the code that instantiates the class supplies
the actual domains. In this way, domain parameters allow objects to share state. Typically,
a factory object does not own the objects it creates. Instead, the factory object refer-
ences them through domain parameters. This way, eAct:EActivity can create the object
service:Service in the domain DATA and the object is shared between eAct:EActivity
and act:ViewActivity.
The domain shared. The type system also supports the domain shared, which has objects
that can be aliased globally. Little aliasing reasoning can be done about variables declared
shared. For example, the variable m of type Main is declared shared.
Ownership Domains in Java. Featherweight Domain Java (FDJ) is an extension of the
core Java language that excludes advanced features such as generics, static code, exceptions,
and includes domain declarations and ownership types. In FDJ, an ownership type2 has a
name of a class C and a list of domains p, where p is a domain parameter α, a declared
domain n.d or shared (Fig. 2.9).
2.4.2 Using a Separate May-Alias Analysis
Existing static analysis frameworks, such as Soot [72] or WALA [65], provide may-alias
analyses that determine all the objects that a variable may refer to. Sensitivity determines
the precision of such analyses, which can be, for example, flow-sensitive or context-sensitive.
A flow-sensitive analysis considers the order in which methods are called. In a context-
sensitive analysis, the context is either a method call-site (call-site context-sensitive) or an
abstract object (object-sensitive) that the receiver of a method may alias. An analysis is
call-site context-sensitive if it analyzes a method invocation r.m(a) multiple times based on
2This thesis distinguishes between a class C of a variable and the type C<p> of a variable.
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cdef ::= class C<α, β> [extends C ′<α>]
{ dom; T f ; C(T ′ f ′, T f)
{super(f ′); this.f = f ; } md } class declaration
dom ::= [public] domain d; domain declaration
md ::= TR m(T x) Tthis {return eR; } method declaration
e ::= x | new C<p>(e) | e.f | e.f = e′
| e.m(e) | ` | ` . e expressions
n ::= x | v values or variable names
p ::= α | n.d | SHARED domain name
T ::= C<p> type: class and list of domains
v, `, θ ∈ locations
S ::= ` → C<`′.d>(v) location store
Σ ::= ` → T store typing
Γ ::= x → T type environment
Figure 2.9: Simplified FDJ abstract syntax [10].
the call-stack of method invocations that led to r.m(a). In contrast, an analysis is object-
sensitive if it uses object allocation expressions to distinguish between different objects that
the receiver r may alias [117]. In general, the precision of a call-site context-sensitive analysis
is not comparable to that of an object-sensitive analysis [114].
Object-sensitivity. In terms of aliasing precision, the state-of-the-art analysis is object-
sensitive [123, 87]. Such an analysis works well for on-demand based approaches that refine
the references analyzed [118], but does not scale for a large number of references. Since in the
presence of recursion, the size of the call-stack is unbounded, the analysis is parameterized
with a constant k, which determines the maximum size of a sequence of object allocation
expressions considered to identify an abstract object. In practice, analysis frameworks im-
plement object-sensitive analyses for k = 1 or k = 2. For example, the Soot framework
implements the object-sensitive analysis of Milanova et al. [87] for k = 1. That is, the imple-
mentation considers one abstract object corresponding to each object allocation expression.
Smaragdakis et al. implement the 2full-1heap object-sensitive analysis [114] with k = 2 by
also keeping track of the call-site context. Although the precision increases, the 2full-1heap
analysis does not scale. As an alternative, they proposed an analysis that abstract objects
based on types, rather than object allocation expressions, and keeps track of the type of the
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1 class Main<owner> {
2 domain DATA,LOGIC;
3 EActivity<LOGIC,LOGIC,DATA> eAct = new EActivity();
4 }
5 class EActivity<owner,L,D> extends Activity<owner,L,D> {
6 Service<D> service = new Service();
7 void onCreate(){
8 FileManager<D> fm = (FileManager)getManager("FILE");
9 LocationManager<L> lm = (LocationManager)getManager("LOCATION");
10 Location<lent> loc = lm.getLastLocation();
11 File<lent> tempFile = fm.read("history");
12 if (tempFile.find(loc)) {
13 File<unique> encrypted = service.encrypt(tempFile);
14 Intent<unique> i = new Intent(ACTION_SEND);
15 i.putExtra(EXTRA_STREAM,encrypted);





21 class ViewActivity<owner,L,D> extends Activity<owner,V,D> { ... }
22 class Activity<owner,L,D> {
23 domain MSG;
24 Intent<MSG> mIntent;
25 //cannot use lent here because the parameter is stored in a field
26 void startActivity(Intent<MSG> intent) {
27 mIntent = intent;
28 }
29 Manager<unique> getManager(String<shared> name) {




34 void putExtra(String<shared> name, Object<owner> value) { ... }
35 }
Figure 2.10: CryptoApp: Code fragments with ownership types
calling context. The result is a type-sensitive analysis that scales and has a precision similar
to 2full-1heap.
2.4.3 ScoriaX is Domain-Sensitive
Seeking a trade-off between soundness and precision, the ScoriaX considers domains
(groups of objects) as contexts and distinguishes between objects of the same type that are in
different domains. Therefore, ScoriaX is domain-sensitive and object- and flow-insensitive.
The same way that an object-sensitive analysis looks for the receiver, a domain-sensitive
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analysis uses the domain of the receiver to distinguish between method invocations. For
example, a domain-sensitive analysis distinguishes between the receivers c1 and c2 if the do-
main DOM1 of c1 is different from the domain DOM2 of c2 (Fig. 2.11 lines 9 and 10). However,
a domain-sensitive analysis does not consider the object allocation expressions to make this
distinction, and is independent of the parameter k to handle recursion. One consequence
of using a predefined k is that the extracted object graphs has a predefined depth (i.e., the
graph is flat for k = 1). Instead, a domain-sensitive analysis extracts a hierarchical object
graph, where the depth of the graph is not predefined. The object hierarchy may contain
cycles for recursive type declarations. Since a domain-sensitive analysis uses the aliasing
precision provided by the ownership types rather than a stand-alone may-alias analysis, it
avoids the scalability problems in a style similar to a type-sensitive analysis.
Domain- vs. object-sensitivity. A may-alias analysis typically merges all the objects
created at the same object creation expression into one equivalence class, attaching an object
label h at each object creation expression new C() (line 2.1). The domain-sensitive analysis
labels an object creation expression with L (line 2.2). Compared to the label h of a standard
may-alias analysis, the label L is different as follows. First, multiple object creation expres-
sions of the type C can still be represented by the same L label if the analysis maps the
domain parameters to the same actual domains, whereas a basic may-alias analysis creates
1 class FileMngr<owner> {
2 File<owner> makeFile(String<shared> s) {
3 return new File(s);
4 }
5 }
6 class Main<owner> {
7 String<shared> s1 = "a.txt";
8 String<shared> s2 = "b.txt";
9 FileMngr<DOM1> c1 = new FileMngr();
10 FileMngr<DOM2> c2 = new FileMngr();
11 File<DOM1> f1 = c1.makeFile(s1);
12 File<DOM1> f2 = c1.makeFile(s2);
13 File<DOM2> f3 = c2.makeFile(s1);
14 }
Figure 2.11: Differences between object- type- and domain-sensitivity
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multiple h labels. Second, if the analysis context maps the domain parameters to n different
domains, then one object creation expression of type C may create n different L labels.
For example, for the same object allocation expression new File() in class FileMngr
(Fig. 2.11 line 3), the domain-sensitive analysis maps the owner domain parameter to the
DOM1 domain in the context of c1, and then to DOM2 in the context of c2. Therefore, the
domain-sensitive analysis creates two abstract objects of type File for the same object
allocation expression whereas a basic object-sensitive analysis (k = 1) creates one abstract
object.
newh C() (2.1)
newL C<powner, pparams...>() (2.2)
Domain- vs. type-sensitivity. A type-sensitive analysis for k = 2 identifies the objects
based on three types: the type of the allocated object, the type of allocator object, and the
type of the receiver that instantiates the allocator object. For example, the type-sensitive
analysis would distinguish between different objects of type File only if FileMngr were
to be instantiated in different classes Main1 and Main2. For one class Main with at least
two domains, e.g., DOM1 and DOM2, the domain-sensitive analysis is more precise than the
type-sensitive analysis.
2.5 ScoriaX Supports Legacy Code
Legacy code can have a high business value, and vulnerabilities in legacy code are expen-
sive [57]. ARA needs to support legacy code instead of requiring programs to be re-engineered
to a radical language that guarantees some property by construction [11]. Re-engineering
is usually non-trivial, and research languages do not enjoy the same level of tool support
and libraries as mainstream programming languages. Another option is for the program to
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be implemented with specific libraries, or to generate code from a detailed model such as
SecureUML [80]. The later might be problematic because as the system evolves developers
are required to maintain consistency between the model and the code.
One limitation of the current ARA process is that developers manually draw DFDs.
Since it is difficult for a developer to remember all the details, a manually drawn DFD
may miss important components or connectors that may exist at runtime, and a security
vulnerability related to a missed connector may not be exposed. Instead, ARA needs to use
a sound approximation of a runtime architecture and one way to achieve soundness is to use
a static analysis that automatically extracts a sound approximation from the code. ScoriaX
supports legacy code, requiring only annotations. Fig. 2.12 shows the code of CryptoApp
using Ownership Domain annotations implemented using Java 1.5 annotations where the
annotations values are provided as string constants and are typechecked to ensure that
annotations are consistent with each other and with the code [4, Appendix A]. The rest of
the thesis uses the less verbose FDJ syntax (Fig. 2.9).
2.5.1 The Extracted Object Graph has Traceability to Code
On a manually drawn architecture, the architects spend additional effort reading the code
and investigating each potential architectural flaw they find. This effort can be reduced if
the architectural model has traceability to code. Finding a vulnerability using the extracted
object graph allows the architects to trace directly to the corresponding lines of code that
may introduce the vulnerability. The extracted object graph is consistent with code and
every node and edge has traceability information. Architects can trace from each abstract
object to one or more object allocation expressions, and from each dataflow edge to one or
more field read, field write or method invocation expressions in the code.
Since the architects may need more than one expression to understand a reported vulner-
ability, ScoriaX also keeps track of traceability paths. A traceability path is a sequence of




3 class Main {





9 class EActivity extends Activity {
10 @Domain("D") Service service = new Service();
11 void onCreate(){
12 @Domain("D") FileManager fm = (FileManager)getManager("FILE");
13 @Domain("L") LocationManager lm = (LocationManager)getManager("LOCATION");
14 @Domain("lent") Location loc = lm.getLastLocation();
15 @Domain("lent") File tempFile = fm.read("history");
16 if (tempFile.find(loc)) {
17 @Domain("unique") File<unique> encrypted = service.encrypt(tempFile);
18 @Domain("unique") Intent i = new Intent(ACTION_SEND);
19 i.putExtra(EXTRA_STREAM,encrypted);











31 class Activity {
32 @Domain("MSG") Intent mIntent;
33 //cannot use lent here because the parameter is stored in a field
34 void startActivity(@Domain("MSG") Intent intent) {
35 mIntent = intent;
36 }
37 @Domain("unique") Manager getManager(@Domain("shared") String name) {





43 class Intent {
44 void putExtra(@Domain("shared") String name, @Domain("owner") Object value) { ... }
45 }
Figure 2.12: CryptoApp: Code fragments with Ownership Domain annotations.
path allows architects to understand why the analysis creates an abstract object and why
a vulnerability exists. Since ScoriaX does not use a precomputed call graph, the sequence
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External
Interactor Boundary
Figure 2.13: Data-Flow Diagram supports hierarchical decomposition and shows details of the high-level
process Encryption Service.
traceability path starts with a sequence of object allocation expressions and ends with a
method invocation, a field read or a field write expression.
2.6 The Extracted Object Graph is Hierarchical
ARA requires a diagram that fits on one page [86, Chapter 5]. To satisfy this requirement,
a runtime architecture uses hierarchical decomposition. Hierarchy enables high-level under-
standing and detail such that in a Level-i DFD a HighLevelProcess can be expanded into a
Level-(i+1) DFD to show more details. For example, by expanding the component Service,
the CryptoApp DFD-L2 (Fig 2.13) shows two distinct components of the same type: the
Encryption Cipher that encrypts data, and the Decryption Cipher that decrypts data.
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2.6.1 Flat Object Graph
Without a hierarchical organization of objects, a flat object graph mixes low-level objects
that are data structures such as HashMap with architecturally relevant objects from the ap-
plication domain such as eAct:EActivity. The architects have no easy way to distinguish
between these objects. One reason that most analyses extract flat object graphs is that
architectural hierarchy is not readily observable in code that is written in a general purpose
programming language. Existing approaches that extract flat object graphs are either un-
sound [67, 116], sound but with only points-to edges [96], or show no labels on the dataflow
edges [87].
Flat object graph constraints. If architects were to reason about security based on a
sound, flat object graph with dataflow edges that refer to objects, the best architects can
express is objects that transitively flow from a source to a destination and object reachability
(Section 5.2, page 108). Object hierarchy increases the precision and allows architects for
example to distinguish objects of the same type based on the substructure of an object. For
example, SocketOutputStream that is in the substructure of socket:Socket has the same
type as another object in the substructure of sslSocket:SSLSocket. If the communication
is provided by an object of type Socket that does not provide encryption, the confidential
data is vulnerable to eavesdropping (Fig. 2.14). A constraint that checks direct communi-
cation to the object of type Socket does not find this vulnerability because the password
is sent indirectly to a descendant. If the architects were to assume that all objects of type
SocketOutputStream are untrusted, the approach would return a false positive for the object




2 Socket socket = new Socket("localhost", 9999);
3 SSLSocket sslSocket = ...;
4 void sendPassword1(String pwd) {
5 OutputStream sout = socket.getOutputStream();
6 PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(sout, true);
7 out.println(pwd);
8 }
9 void sendPassword2(String pwd) {
10 OutputStream sout = sslSocket.getOutputStream();









































Figure 2.14: By using indirect communication, Scoria reports that sending the password to a descendant of
an object of type Socket makes the password vulnerable to eavesdropping. The password should be sent
using an object of type SSLSocket.
2.6.2 Object Hierarchy with Ownership Domains
In the abstract object hierarchy, an abstract object can have domains, and in turn, each
domain can have abstract objects. A domain is declared on a class, but is treated like a field
in the sense that a fresh domain is created for each instance of that class. For a domain MSG
declared on a class Activity, and two instances o1 and o2 of type Activity, the domains
o1.MSG and o2.MSG are distinct for distinct o1 and o2. An object does not have child objects
directly. Instead, an object has domains, which in turn have objects.
The data type OGraph describes the representation of an abstract object graph that Sco-
riaX extracts (Fig. 2.15). The OGraph has nodes that represent abstract objects (OObjects)
and group of objects (ODomains), and edges that represent dataflow communication between
abstract objects (OEdges). The OGraph has a set of abstract objects DO. To represent the
hierarchy, the OGraph uses a mapping DD from a domain declaration in the context of an
37
G ∈ OGraph ::= 〈 Objects = DO, DomainMap = DD, Edges = DE 〉
D ∈ ODomain ::= 〈 Id = Did, Domain = C::d 〉
O ∈ OObject ::= 〈 Type = C<D> 〉
E ∈ OEdge ::= 〈 From = Osrc, To = Odst, Label = Olabel,Flag = Imp |Exp 〉
DD ::= ∅ | DD ∪ { (O,C::d) 7→ D }
DO ::= ∅ | DO ∪ { O }
DE ::= ∅ | DE ∪ { E }
Υ ::= ∅ | Υ ∪ { C<D> }
Figure 2.15: Data type declarations for the abstract object graph (OGraph).
OObject (O,C::d) to an abstract domain D. To keep track of the OObjects created from the
root of the OGraph, the analysis uses a stack Υ. This stack ensures that the analysis termi-
nates in the presence of recursive types (Section 2.8.1). The OGraph is a multi-graph, where
multiple edges with different labels might exists between the same source and destination.
The OGraph also has a set of dataflow edges DE, where each OEdge is identified using a
source, a destination, the OObject that the dataflow refers to, and a directionality flag. The
import flag indicates that an object reads data from a known source, while the export flag
indicates that an object writes data to a known destination.
Several key features of Ownership Domains are crucial for expressing design intent in code.
The first is having explicit “contexts” or domains. Other ownership type systems implicitly
treat all objects with the same owner as belonging to one implicit context [111]. For architec-
tural extraction, explicit domains are useful, because developers can define multiple domains
per object to express their design intent. For CryptoApp, the architects define two top-level
domains or tiers, DATA and LOGIC and places objects in these domains (Fig. 2.10).
Second, Ownership Domains support pushing any object underneath any other object
in the ownership hierarchy. A child object may or may not be encapsulated by its parent
object. Ownership Domains defines two kinds of object hierarchy: logical containment using
public domains and strict encapsulation using private domains.
For HashMap, its representation is an array table of elements of type Entry. The array
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1 //K, V generic types
2 class Entry<OWNER K<DOMKEY>, V<DOMVALUE>> {
3 K<DOMKEY> key; // Virtual field
4 V<DOMVALUE> value; // Virtual field
5 }
6 class HashMap<OWNER, K<DOMKEY>, V<DOMVALUE>> {
7 domain OWNED;
8 public domain ENTRIES,VALSET,KEYSET;
9 Entry<ENTRIES,K<DOMKEY>,V<DOMVALUE>> entry;
10 Entry<OWNED[ENTRIES,DOMKEY,DOMVALUE]>[] table;
11 Collection<VALSET V<DOMVALUE>> values() { ... }
12 Set<KEYSET K<DOMKEY>> keySet() { ... }
13 Set<ENTRIES Entry<ENTRIES K<DOMKEY>, V<DOMVALUE>>> entrySet() { ... }
14 }
Figure 2.16: An object of type HashMap has a private domain that protects its representation and several
public domains to store the entries, keys and values accessible by clients.
is in the private domain OWNED because the object table:Entry[] should never be directly
referenced from outside its owner because if the map grows, the array is replaced with a
different larger array. On the other hand, the method entrySet returns a set of objects of
type Entry that is in the public domain ENTRIES. The client code needs access to this set if
it were to copy the content of the map (Fig. 2.16).
OGraph graphical notation. Figure 2.17 shows a fragment of an OGraph such that archi-
tecturally relevant objects are shown near the top of the figure and implementation details
further down. A filled rectangle represents an object, a thin dashed rectangle represents a
public domain, and a thick dashed rectangle represents a private domain. For edges, a thin
dashed edge represents a parent-child relation, a thick edge represents a dataflow, and a thin
edge represents a points-to relation.
OGraph Visualization A hierarchical representation allows expanding or collapsing the























































Figure 2.17: The CryptoApp OGraph shows a hierarchy of objects and domains, and dataflow edges between
objects. Using nested boxes can make the visualization less cluttered.
the substructure of act:ViewActivity and result:LocationManager is visible, while the
substructures of eAct:EActivity and result:FileManager are collapsed (Fig. 2.17(b)). A
(+) symbol indicates than an object has a collapsed substructure. While collapsing, the
visualization also lifts any edge that might be incoming to or outgoing from a child object,
i.e., the edge is recursively lifted to the nearest visible ancestor of the child object. The
nested box visualization can show only the objects at the top level, which makes the graph
less cluttered. This thesis focuses on the underlying representation of the abstract graph
and constraints. Lifting edges and collapsing objects are related to visualization [120] and
are addressed elsewhere [4, Sec. 2.4.3].
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2.7 ScoriaX Supports Extensions of Ownership Do-
mains
The result of the analysis is a sound, hierarchical object graph with dataflow edges (in
addition to the previously extracted points-to edges) which can be used to find security
vulnerability such as information disclosure. In the OGraph, each abstract object is in a
named, conceptual group. Extensions of Ownership Domains allow an object to be borrowed
from one domain to another, and the declaration of the variable that aliases this object is
annotated lent. If only one variable can alias an object at a time (an object is passed
linearly), then these variables are annotated unique. Previous work [5, 4] extracted only
points-to edges and did not handle lent and unique. To extract dataflow edges, the analysis
needs to handle expressions that involve local variables or method parameters. ScoriaX
resolves lent and unique using a domain-sensitive value flow analysis and attempts to place
borrowed objects and objects passed linearly to an ODomain. If it fails, it creates special
domains and creates flow objects.
If the analysis were to ignore the extensions of Ownership Domains, the analysis would
fail to show representatives for some of the runtime objects and edges and the extracted
graph would be unsound. Consider for example the method getManager (Fig. 2.12, line 29)
that returns a value of type Manager<unique>. When the analysis traverses the code of
class Activity, which declares the method, the domain is unknown and depends on the
context in which the method is invoked. The method getManager is invoked twice in the
class EActivity where the return value is assigned to a variable of type FileManager<D>.
Hence, the analysis needs to resolve unique to D and create the object result:FileManager
in DATA. For the second invocation, the return value is assigned to LocationManager<L> and
the analysis needs to resolves unique to L and create the object result:LocationManager
in LOGIC. I will now discuss how the analysis works in more detail.
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CT ::= cdef table of class declarations
cdef ::= class C<α, β> extends C ′<α>
{ dom; TA f ; C(T ′A f
′, TA f)
{super(f ′); this.f = f ; } md } class decl.
dom ::= [public] domain d; domain decl.
md ::= TA ret m(TB x) Tthis {ret = eR; return ret; }
method decl.
e ::= | x = new C<A, p>(y)
| x = y.f | x.f = y | x = y | x = r.m(y)
| ` | ` . e expressions
n ::= x | v values or variable names
p ::= α | n.d | SHARED domain name
A ::= unique | p domain may be unique
B ::= lent | A domain may be lent or unique
T ::= C<p> precise type
TA ::= C<A, p> owner domain may be unique
TB ::= C<B, p> owner domain may be lent or unique
v, `, θ ∈ locations
x, y, r, a ∈ variables
S ::= ` → C<`′.d>(v) location store
Σ ::= ` → T store typing
Γ ::= x → TB type environment
Figure 2.18: Three-address code version of the FDJ syntax extended using lent and unique [12]
2.7.1 Extensions of Ownership Domains
This section provides a revised abstract syntax of FDJ (Fig. 2.18) that supports the
Ownership Domain extensions, gives an informal definition of flow objects, discusses precision
tradeoffs, and describes the algorithm ScoriaX uses to extract the OGraph.
The unique annotation. A variable declared unique refers to an object to which there is
only one reference, and can be passed linearly from one domain to another. For example in
the factory method getManager, only the client code knows the actual domain of the object
created by the factory (Fig. 2.10, line 29). Therefore, the method returns unique objects
of various types that extend Manager. Next, the client code in EActivity assigns these
objects to the domain parameter D for FileManager object and L for LocationManager
object (Fig. 2.10, line 8, 9). The analysis uses the type of the sink variable to resolve unique
to D or L.
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The lent annotation. A variable declared lent refers to an object that is temporarily
borrowed from one domain to another as long as an object in the second domain does not
create a persistent reference to the borrowed object, e.g., by storing it in a field. Only method
formal parameters and local variables can be lent. For example, local variable tempFile
(line 11), and the formal parameter x (line 13) are declared lent.
2.7.2 Other Flow Objects
The core of the analysis uses the ownership types to find objects that a dataflow refers to.
In the extension of Ownership Domains, a method invocation may involve variables declared
lent and unique. Therefore, some of the objects are in a domain that does not correspond to
a domain declaration, while other objects may be borrowed between domains. The extraction
analysis tracks the value flow and attempts to find an actual domain from where the object
is borrowed, or an actual domain where the object flows into. If it succeeds, we say that
the analysis resolves lent and unique to an actual domain. Otherwise, the analysis creates
a special domain as a child of the creator OObject with an automatically generated name
and without a domain declaration. Then, the analysis creates a flow object in this special
domain. An example of a flow object is the abstract object l:Location which flows from
result:LocationManager to eAct:EActivity (Fig. 2.17).
2.7.3 Value Flow Graph
The analysis may also encounter the annotations lent and unique from extensions of
Ownership Domains [12], which do not map directly to actual domains. The annotation
lent is used when an object is borrowed from one domain to another. A variable with any
type of annotation can be assigned to a variable declared lent, which is a universal sink.
ScoriaX keeps track of assignments between variables to resolve lent to the domain of the
source. The annotation unique is used when an object is passed linearly from one domain
to another without having more than one persistence reference to it. A variable declared
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unique is a universal source and can be assigned to a variable with any type of annotation.
ScoriaX resolves unique to the domain of the destination.
To resolve lent and unique, the analysis builds a domain-sensitive value flow graph that
has different nodes and edges than the abstract object graph. A value flow node is a triplet
composed of a variable, the type of the variable with the owner domain and the abstract
object that represents the context in which a variable is used. By considering O as a part of
the value flow node, the value flow analysis is also domain-sensitive and has different nodes
for the same variable x analyzed in different contexts. The analysis attempts to resolve
lent and unique to a declared domain, a domain parameter or shared. To resolve lent,
the analysis finds the node of the variable x in a given context O and goes one step backward
in the value flow. To resolve unique, the analysis goes one step forward in the value flow. If
the analysis fails to resolve lent or unique, it generates a special domain as a child of the
creator object, and places the object in this special domain. We call such an object a flow
object. The intuition behind such an object is that it flows only along edges and does not
always reside in one domain.
A value may flow through several consecutive assignments, and the analysis uses a tran-
sitive flow to resolve lent and unique. Computing a simple transitive closure of the value
flow graph provides a sound but imprecise solution. To achieve precision and keep track
of call-site context sensitivity [76, 75], the value flow analysis uses labels on the value flow
edges. For assignments and field reads, • means no label. For method invocations, the
analysis generates a fresh value of i for an invocation x = y.m(a) in the context of Othis.
To be call-site context-sensitive, the analysis matches the parentheses with the same value
of i to summarize the effect of a method invocation. The analysis adds value flow edges
to track the assignments of arguments to formal method parameters and the assignment of
the return value to the left-hand-side of the method invocation expression. For field write
expressions, the analysis uses the ? label that cancels the effect of a (i label because a method
mi can store a value passed as an argument into a field, and the value can be returned by
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FG ::= ∅ | FG ∪ { (Osrc, x, Bsrc)
label
 (Odst, y, Bdst) }Value Flow Graph
label ::=(i | )i | • | ? value flow labels
x = y.m(a) (Othis, x, Bx)
(i
 (Oy, this, owner)
(Othis, a, Ba)
(i
 (Oy, fa, Bfa)
(Oy, ret, Br)
)i
 (Othis, x, Bx)
i ::= freshi(Othis, x = y.m(a))
x = y.f (Oy, f, Bf)
•
 (Othis, x, Bx)
x.f = y (Othis, y, By)
?
 (Ox, f, Bf)
x = y (Othis, x, Bx)
•
 (Othis, y, By)
1 // this 7→ Othis
2 domain DOM;
3 y = new C<DOM>();
4 X<Bx> x = y.m(a);
5 class C<owner> {
6 //this 7→ Oy
7 //(Oy , C::owner) 7→ DOM




Figure 2.19: ScoriaX tracks assignments and extracts the value flow graph (FG)
another method mj (Fig. 2.19). The analysis then uses a worklist algorithm and the labels
to compute the transitive flow and concatenates two value flow edges where the first edge
has the same destination and the source of the second edge (Section 3.3.4, page 81).
2.7.4 ScoriaX Algorithm
Since the analysis uses an OObject as a part of the value flow node, the constructions of
the value flow graph and OGraph are inter-dependent. Therefore, the analysis does multiple
iterations over the code starting from the root expression, and builds up upon the OGraph
and flow graph created in the previous pass. At each iteration, the analysis starts from the
root expression and stops at a fixed point when it can no longer add nodes or edges in the
flow graph and OGraph. After initialization, the analysis first creates objects, domains and
dataflow edges, and extracts the value flow graph FG. Next, the analysis computes the
transitive flow FGP only for the references declared lent and unique. In the last iteration,
the analysis uses the transitive flow to extract more edges and flow objects (Fig. 3.18).
Instead of a transitive closure of FG the value flow analysis uses the most precise type
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Initialization:
DO = DO0, DD = DD0
DE = DE0 FG = FG0, Γ = ∅, Υ = ∅
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 G′ = 〈DO′, DD′, DE ′〉
G′ ⊆ G⇔ DO′ ⊆ DO ∧DD′ ⊆ DD ∧DE ′ ⊆ DE
Pass1: Extract OObjects (DO), ODomains, and construct DD
Pass2: Extract dataflow edges (DE) and value flow graph (FG)
Pass3: Summarize value flow graph and compute transitive flow
FG∗ = summarize(FG)
FGP = propagateAll(FG)
Pass4: Attempt to resolve lent and unique using transitive flow (FGP )
Extract more dataflow edges OEdges in DE and flow objects in DO
At every pass:
Start from eroot in the context of Oworld
Stop when a fixed point is reached
Figure 2.20: The analysis iterates multiple times and stops at a fixed point
of the variables to create the transitive flow graph. In the running example (Fig. 2.12), the
analysis needs to resolve unique for objects of type FileManager and LocationManager
in the context of the object eAct:EActivity (Oe). The value flow graph contains edges
from (Oe, result, unique) to (Oe, ret, unique) and further to (Oe, lm, L), where the class
of result and lm is LocationManager, and of ret is Manager (Fig. 2.21(a)). To find the
actual domain, the analysis resolves unique to the domain parameter L going forward in
the transitive flow graph (Fig. 2.21(b)) and creates the object result:LocationManager in
LOGIC because the domain parameter L maps to LOGIC in DD. Similarly, the analysis creates
the object result:FileManager in DATA. If the analysis were to simply create the transitive
closure, it would have resolved unique to L and D and would have consequently created
two false positive objects, result:FileManager in LOGIC and result:LocationManager in
DATA, which might have further led to a spurious number of false positive edges.
2.7.5 Value Flow Analysis is Domain-Sensitive
The value flow analysis is domain-sensitive and creates multiple value flow nodes for the
same variable. If ScoriaX were to use a domain-insensitive value flow graph, the object























(b) Transitive flow (FGP )
Figure 2.21: . Fragments of value flow graph the analysis uses to resolve unique for variable of type Manager.
The analysis does not simply create the transitive closure of FG, but uses the declared type of variables to
create the transitive flow.
reported by constraints. The code fragments in Fig. 2.22 are from an application that uses
encrypted account information from a file. The method copy reads the content of the file,
decrypts the information, and creates an encrypted backup. The method uses a service
that has both an encryption and a decryption cipher. To ensure that the password is not
stored in clear text, the architect formulates the constraint: the same object that flows
from the decryption cipher to the encryption service does not flow to a file in clear text.
The code uses unique annotations for the return types of encrypt and doFinal. Sco-
riaX extracts the object eCipher:Cipher used for encryption and dCipher:Cipher used
for decryption because they are in different domains. A domain-sensitive value flow shows
that only encrypted data flows into the parameter obj of the method write in the context
of fos:FileOutputStream (Fig. 2.23(a)). The decrypted data only flows to the parame-
ter obj in the context of is:ByteInputStream. On the other hand, a domain-insensitive
value flow graph excessively merges value flow nodes for the variable encByt in the method
doFinal, and shows a false positive transitive flow as if decrypted data is written in a file
(Fig. 2.23(b)).
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1 class Service<owner> {
2 domain ENC,DEC;
3 Cipher<ENC> eCipher = new Cipher();
4 Cipher<DEC> dCipher = new Cipher();
5 String<unique> encrypt(String<lent> t) {
6 return eCipher.doFinal(t);
7 }
8 String<unique> decrypt(String<lent> t) {
9 return dCipher.doFinal(t);
10 }
11 class Cipher<owner> {
12 String<unique> doFinal(String<lent> t){
13 String<unique> encByt = new String();




18 class DBase<owner,L> {
19 domain SRC,DST;
20 Service<L> service = new Service();
21 void copy(File<lent> src, File<lent> dst) {
22 String<SRC> mydata = readContent(src);
23 String<lent> dd = service.decrypt(mydata);
24 InputStream<owner> is = new ByteInputStream(dd);
25 ...
26 OutputStream<DST> fos = new FileOutputStream(dst);
27 String<owner> data = ...;




Figure 2.22: Object provenance: the object of type Service has two ciphers one for encryption one for
decryption. Encrypted and decrypted data corresponds to the same object allocation expression in the code.


















(a) A domain-sensitive value flow distinguishes be-
tween encrypted and decrypted data created by















(b) A domain-insensitive value flow graph excessively
merges value flow nodes and shows that a decrypted
value may flow to the method OutputStream.write.
Figure 2.23: Fragments of the value flow graph for the code in Fig. 2.22.
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2.8 ScoriaX Summarizes Runtime Object Graphs
If the architects were to reason about security based on an object diagram or a runtime
object graph, they would need to apply the same constraint on many similar instances. The
challenge is to summarize an unbound representation, such as an ROG, with an abstract
object graph that is finite. In the OGraph, an OObject is a canonical object that merges n
possible runtime objects of the same class, where n is unbounded. By addressing the sound-
ness challenge, the analysis ensures that every runtime object has a unique representative in
the OGraph.
2.8.1 Recursive Types
The analysis must handle recursive types that would otherwise lead to an unbounded
number of nodes. To get a finite OGraph and ensure that the analysis terminates, the
analysis could stop expanding the OGraph after a certain depth. Truncating the recursion
at an arbitrary depth may omit objects or edges beyond the cutoff depth, which would be
unsound. Instead, to preserve soundness, the analysis creates a cycle in the OGraph when it
encounters a domain declaration (C::d), already analyzed in the context of the same OObject
OC .
A domain declaration may be analyzed multiple times using different contexts. As a
result, the OGraph has multiple ODomains for the same domain declaration. On the first
pass, the analysis creates the OObject OC = C<D>, adds it in the stack Υ, and performs a
lookup in the domain map DD. If the pair (OC, C::d) is not found, it creates a new ODomain
and a new entry for the pair in DD. On the second pass, the analysis finds the same pair
and reuses the existing ODomain. So the analysis creates a cycle in the OGraph, and the
reused ODomain appears as the child of two OObjects. This justifies an ODomain not having
a unique owning OObject (Fig. 2.15). On the next pass, the analysis encounters the same
C<D> in Υ and does not recurse any further.
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1 Main<SHARED> main = new Main<SHARED>();




6 this.aQT = new QuadTree<this.OWNED>();
7 }
8 }




13 this.nwQT = new QuadTree<this.OWNED>();
14 }
15 }
Figure 2.24: Handling recursive types, revised from [4, Figure 2.22].
1 Main<SHARED> main = new Main<SHARED>();




6 this.aQT = new QuadTree<this.OWNED>();
7 }
8 }
9 class QuadTree<M> {




14 this.left = new QuadTree<this.LEFT>();
15 this.right = new QuadTree<this.RIGHT>();
16 }
17 }
Figure 2.25: Handling recursive types, for a binary tree data structure.
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As an example, consider a class QuadTree, which declares a field nwQT of type QuadTree
in its OWNED private domain (Fig. 2.24). The analysis does four passes over the domain
declaration QuadTree::OWNED. In the first two passes, the analysis creates two new OObject
instances while interpreting the object allocation expressions newQuadTree (Fig 2.24 line 1
and line 6) and two new ODomain instances while interpreting the domain declarations
(Fig 2.24 line 3 and line 10).
In the third pass, the analysis creates the OObject QuadTree<main.OWNED.aQT.OWNED>,
but while interpreting the domain declaration QuadTree::OWNED, the analysis reuses the
existing ODomain main.OWNED.aQT.OWNED created during the second pass. By detecting the
same ODomain, the analysis can make the OObject QuadTree<main.OWNED.aQT.OWNED> to
be both the parent and the child of an ODomain, thus creating a cycle. In the last pass, the
analysis just ensures the existence of the OObject QuadTree<main.OWNED.aQT.OWNED> and
the ODomain main.OWNED.aQT.OWNED. Since the OGraph remains unchanged, the analysis
terminates.
If the class QuadTree were to declare two different domains LEFT and RIGHT (Fig. 2.25,
line 10), the analysis would traverse the stack Υ, looking for an existing ODomain that is
child of an OObject in the stack and that can be reused. The stack Υ thus ensures the
termination of the analysis.
2.9 Extracted Object Graph is Precise
For security, the extraction analysis must not merge objects excessively. For example, an
OGraph that represents all the runtime objects with one abstract object or an OGraph that is
fully connected is sound but very imprecise. Ideally, an OGraph must have no more OEdges
than soundness requires. Like any result of a sound static analysis, however, an OGraph is
likely to have false positives and show OObjects or OEdges that do not correspond to runtime
objects or runtime relations.
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2.9.1 Architects can Fine-Tune Precision with Annotations
To support reasoning about the content of communication, a dataflow edge refers to an
abstract object rather than a class. Two edges with the same source and destination can
refer to distinct abstract objects that have the same type, but different conceptual meaning.
For example, if an application writes in the log a constant of type String representing
a constant tag and a password, the OGraph has two distinct edges, where only one refers
to confidential data. The analysis merges objects of type String that are in the same
domain and both dataflow edges refer to the same object. Then, the architects cannot
distinguish between objects representing confidential and non-confidential information. An
imprecise object graph may have one representative object s:String for all these instances
(Fig. 2.26(b)). The precision of such an object graph is similar to the one provided by
a class diagram (Fig. 2.26(a)). Architects can create a wrapper class of String and the
analysis would distinguish between the two objects in the same domain based on their class
(Fig. 2.26(c)). However, the later solution implies non-trivial code refactoring. Instead, the
architects can refine the annotations and place objects of the same class in different domains
(Fig. 2.26(d)).
For a variable in the code, ScoriaX needs to determine the objects on the OGraph that
the variable refers to. Without annotations, the analysis would determine the set of objects
in the OGraph such that an object in the set has the same type as the variable or a subtype
thereof. Instead, by using annotations, the analysis achieves precision and determines only
a subset of these objects, i.e., only those objects that are in the domains that correspond to
the annotation.
2.9.2 ScoriaX is Flow-Insensitive
A static analysis is flow-sensitive if the conditional statements and the order of the state-













































(d) More precise OGraph, by refining annotations.
Figure 2.26: Placing objects of the same type in different domains
an object graph that approximates all possible executions, which include the worst-case
scenario. The object graph can be extracted by a flow-insensitive analysis because such a
precision seems sufficient for a worst-case approximation. ScoriaX safely assumes that all
the classes that have a corresponding new expression in the code are instantiated, and all the
methods of these classes can be invoked in an arbitrary order. This assumption is particu-
larly useful for handling callbacks, i.e., methods invoked by a framework, and multi-threaded
programs where the order in which statements are executed can be arbitrary. In such cases,
a partially flow-sensitive analysis may be unsound [126].
For example in the Android framework, the method onCreate of the class Activity is
invoked every time the user rotates the device (Fig. 2.27). The method onCreate discloses
the value of the field into an object of type Log and, in the last statement, the method assigns
confidential data to the field. Therefore, information disclosure occurs only at the second
invocation. Similarly, another method, onResume assigns confidential value of the field and
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1 class Main<owner> {
2 domain LOGIC, STATE;
3 MyApp<LOGIC,STATE> app = new MyApp();
4 }
5 class MyApp<owner,S> extends Activity {
6 domain OWNED;
7 TelephonyManager<S> tm = ...;
8 Log<S> log = ...;
9 Datacontainer<OWNED,S> data = new Datacontainer();
10
11 void onCreate(Bundle<owner> b){
12 String<S> imei = tm.getDeviceId(); //source
13 log.i("INFO", data1.value); //sink
14 data.value = imei;
15 }
16 void onResume() {


























Figure 2.27: The device id flows from an object of type TelephonyManager to a an object value:String
after this object flows to an object of type Log. A flow-insensitive approach reports an information disclosure.
the vulnerability exists when events are triggered in a particular order, i.e., the user resumes
the application and rotates the device. Without a careful modeling of the lifecycle of objects
of type Activity, the analysis may miss these security vulnerabilities.
2.9.3 Imprecision of ScoriaX
ScoriaX is a domain-sensitive, object- and flow-insensitive analysis that is over-
conservative and favors soundness over precision. Architects can fine-tune the precision
of ScoriaX using annotations and use a type checker to ensure that annotations are consis-
tent with each other and with the code. Imprecision may occur in the presence of inheritance
and collections.
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Imprecision in the presence of inheritance
In the presence of inheritance, the static analysis may introduce false positives. First,
the analysis may create false positive objects if a base class has methods that are never
invoked. This is due to the over-conservative assumption of ScoriaX that all methods of
an instantiated class may be invoked. Other approaches use a pre-computed call graph,
but such a graph is challenging to construct in the presence of callbacks, and often requires
parsing configuration files. Another imprecision may be due to an invoked method of a super
class. For two variables of a general type that are declared in the same domain, the analysis
cannot distinguish between objects of the same type that are in the same domain.
Consider for example, two variables a and b of type Base that alias. ScoriaX extracts
the abstract objects m:Main, a:A, b:B and c:B, and edges from m:Main to both a:A and b:B
that refer to c:C (Fig. 2.28). Only the method run of type B is invoked at runtime (line 9),
and the dataflow edge from m:Main to a:A is a false positive. The method unreachable
(line 14) of the class Base is not invoked, however ScoriaX extracts two abstract domains
a.DOM and b.DOM, and two abstract objects ret:C in these domains. The objects ret:C and
the edges from a:A and b:B to these objects that are false positives.
Imprecision due to flow-insensitivity
ScoriaX is flow-insensitive and safely assumes that statements may be executed in an
arbitrary order, which may lead to false positive objects or edges. For the code in Fig. 2.28
(line 7), the null value is assigned to the variable a. Since the analysis is flow-insensitive,
the analysis considers that a may-alias the object a:A and extracts a false positive dataflow
edges from m:Main to a:A that refers to the abstract object c:C.
Imprecision with collections
With respect to collections, ScoriaX does not distinguish between specific elements of a
collection, and considers that all the elements are in the same domain. The assumption is
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1 Main<shared> m = new Main();
2 class Main<owner> {
3 void run(){
4 Base<ADOM> a = new A<ADOM>();
5 Base<ADOM> b = new B<ADOM>();
6 C<ADOM> c = new C<ADOM>();
7 a = null;





13 void run(C<owner> c){ ... }
14 void unreachable(){




19 class C {























Figure 2.28: Imprecision due to the invocation of a method in a super class and unreachable code.
common in static analysis research [39, 48] and may lead to imprecision when a collection
has both confidential and non confidential information. A collection has domain param-
eter to specify the domain of its elements, but all the elements are in the same domain
(Fig. 2.5).
2.10 Scalability of ScoriaX
Traditionally, scalability of a static analysis is reported to the size of the program that
is measured in lines of code. However, to discuss the scalability of ScoriaX one needs to
consider not only the lines of code, but also the number of object allocation expressions that
the code has. ScoriaX uses abstract interpretation and traverses the code starting from a
root class specified by the architects. The analysis then traverses each class declaration that
is instantiated in the code multiple times.
In practice, classes that belong to libraries and frameworks are often instantiated mul-
tiple times. To improve scalability, ScoriaX accepts summaries of these library classes as
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input where each summary includes a class declaration with field and method signatures
without the method bodies. Although incomplete summaries may introduce unsoundness,
summaries have advantages besides scalability. For example, the library code may not al-
ways be available to be annotated, and often the application uses only a small part of the
library.
The main bottleneck in using ScoriaX on large systems is the process of adding annota-
tions, which is manual with limited aid of tools that provide boilerplate annotations. Related
work measured the effort of adding annotations to be 1hour/KLOC [6]. Since annotations
leverage a type system, they are amenable to automatic inference [64] that would reduce the
effort and improve scalability. Inference works well with for strictly encapsulated objects in
private domains, but not for objects in public domains.
2.11 Summary
This chapter informally describes a static analysis that extracts an approximation of the
runtime architecture as a sound, hierarchical object graph with dataflow edges that refer
to object. Achieving soundness (H1c) of the abstract graph requires a static analysis, but
a hierarchical organization of objects (H1a) is unavailable in code written in mainstream
programming languages. To support legacy code (H1b), the static analysis uses annotations
that are consistent with each other and with the code. Chapter 3 describes the analysis
formally, proves the soundness theorems and discusses how by design the analysis considers
aliasing (H1d) and supports summarization(H1f). Chapter 4 evaluates the implementation of
the analysis focusing on achieving precision (H1e) for reasoning about security and discusses
the scalability (H1h) of the analysis.
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Chapter 3 Formalization of Extraction
To show that ScoriaX meet the extraction requirement (H1c), this chapter1 formalizes the
analysis and proves object soundness and edge soundness. The analysis considers aliasing
(H1d) using the Ownership Domains type system [10] and is domain-sensitive. The analysis
leverages Ownership Domains annotations in order to extract a hierarchical organization of
objects (H1a), where an object can have several domains.
Extensions of Ownership Domains allow an object to be borrowed from one domain to
another, or to be passed linearly between domains without keeping a persistent reference to
it. To support extensions of Ownership Domains, the analysis keeps track of the value flow
and attempts to resolve from which domain an object is borrowed, and what is the domain
to which an object is passed linearly.
I split the formalization in two parts. In the first part, Section 3.1 formalizes the extrac-
tion analysis on Ownership Domains and, Section 3.2 introduces the soundness theorems.
In the second part, Section 3.3 focuses on the value flow analysis. Since the value flow anal-
ysis and the extraction analysis are inter-dependent, some repetitions in the formalization
occur, but the explanations focus on the value flow analysis. Next, Section 3.4 discusses the
implementation of the analysis and extraction of other types of edges such as creation edges
and control flow edges. Finally, Section 3.5 discusses differences with previous versions of
the analysis and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.1 Formalization on Ownership Domains
The formalization is based on a Java-like program semantics with Ownership Domain
annotations. Section 3.1.1 presents the syntax of the language used in the formalization.
Section 3.1.2 defines the data types of the OGraph. Section 3.1.3 formalizes the extraction
1Parts of the formalization appeared in the informal proceedings of FOOL13 [132].
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analysis. Section 3.1.4 presents instrumentation of dynamic semantics, which are required
by the soundness proof.
3.1.1 Abstract Syntax
I formalize the extraction static analysis on Featherweight Domain Java (FDJ), which
models a core of the Java language with Ownership Domains [10]. To keep the language
simple and easier to reason about, FDJ ignores Java language constructs such as interfaces
and static code. From the FDJ abstract syntax, I exclude cast expressions and domain links,
which are part of FDJ, but not crucial to our discussion (Fig. 3.1).
In FDJ, C ranges over class names; T ranges over types; f ranges over field names; v
ranges over values; d ranges over domain names; e ranges over expressions; x ranges over
variable names; n ranges over values and variable names; S ranges over stores; ` and θ range
over locations in a store; θ represents the value of this; a store S maps locations ` to their
contents; the set of variables includes the distinguished variable this of type Tthis used to
refer to the receiver of a method; the result of the computation is a location `, which is
sometimes referred to as a value v; S[`] denotes the store entry of `; S[`, i] denotes the value
of ith field of S[`]; S[` 7→ C<`′.d>(v)] denotes adding an entry for location ` to S; α and β
range over formal domain parameters; m ranges over method names; p ranges over formal
domain parameters, actual domains, or the special domain SHARED; the expression form ` . e
represents a method body e executing with a receiver `; an overbar denotes a sequence; the
fixed class table CT maps classes to their definitions; a program is a tuple (CT , e) of a class
table and an expression; Γ is the typing context; and Σ is the store typing.
3.1.2 Object Graph
The analysis extracts a hierarchical object graph (OGraph) with nodes that represent
abstract objects (OObjects) and group of objects (ODomains), and edges that represent
dataflow communication between abstract objects (Fig. 3.10). The OGraph is a triplet G =
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CT ::= cdef class table
cdef ::= class C<α, β> extends C ′<α>
{ dom; T f ; C(T ′ f ′, T f)
{super(f ′); this.f = f ; } md } class declaration
dom ::= [public] domain d; domain declaration
md ::= TR m(T x) Tthis {return eR; } method declaration
e ::= x | new C<p>(e) | e.f | e.f = e′
| e.m(e) | ` | ` . e expressions
n ::= x | v values or variable names
p ::= α | n.d | SHARED domain name
T ::= C<p> type: class and list of domains
v, `, θ ∈ locations
S ::= ` → C<`′.d>(v) location store
Σ ::= ` → T store typing
Γ ::= x → T type environment
Figure 3.1: Simplified FDJ abstract syntax [10]. For readability, repeated from Fig. 2.9.
〈DO,DD,DE〉, where DO is a set of OObjects, and DE is a set of OEdges. Each OEdge is a
directed edge from a source Osrc to a destination Odst. The label of an OEdge is the OObject
that the dataflow refers to. The flag distinguishes between OEdges that represent import
and export dataflow communication. The OGraph is a multi-graph, where multiple edges
that refer to different OObjects might exists between the same source and destination. To
construct the object-domain hierarchy, the analysis uses DD which maps a pair (O,C::d) to
an ODomain D and is also used to keep track of domain parameters. To ensure termination,
the analysis uses the stack Υ, that records combination of class and actual domains C<D>
analyzed.
ScoriaX meets the aliasing requirement and relies on the precision about aliasing that
Ownership Domains offer, and avoids merging object excessively. The Ownership Domains
type system guarantees that two objects in different domains cannot alias. The analysis
only merges two objects of the same class if all their domains are the same. The analysis is
domain-sensitive and distinguishes between different instances of the same class C that are
in different domains, even if created at the same new expression in the program. In addition,
the analysis treats an instance of class C with actual parameters p differently from another
instance that has actual parameters p′. Hence, the data type of an OObject uses C<D>.
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G ∈ OGraph ::= 〈 Objects = DO, DomainMap = DD,Edges = DE 〉
D ∈ ODomain ::= 〈 Id = Did, Domain = C::d 〉
O ∈ OObject ::= 〈 Type = C<D> 〉
E ∈ OEdge ::= 〈 From = Osrc, To = Odst,Label = Olabel,Flag = Imp |Exp 〉
DD ::= ∅ | DD ∪ { (O,C::d) 7→ D } ∪ { (O,C::α) 7→ D }
DO ::= ∅ | DO ∪ { O }
DE ::= ∅ | DE ∪ { E }
Υ ::= ∅ | Υ ∪ { C<D> }
H ::= ∅ | H ∪ { ` 7→ O }
K ::= ∅ | K ∪ { `.d 7→ D }
LI ::= ∅ | LI ∪ { (`src, `dst) 7→ {E}}
LE ::= ∅ | LE ∪ { (`src, `dst) 7→ {E}}
Figure 3.2: Data type declarations for the OGraph.
The formalization follows the FDJ convention and considers an OObject’s owning ODomain
as the first element D1 of D.
The OGraph is hierarchical and has implicit ownership edges in addition to the OEdges
that have source and destination OObjects. The OGraph is also well-formed with respect to
the ownership relations declared in the code using the annotations. The data type declaration
of the OGraph implicitly captures the object-domain hierarchy using the DD map without
defining directly a set of ownership edges. An ownership edge states that an OObject O =
〈C<D>〉 is a child of D1, or that O owns a domain D. Given a mapping {(O,C
′::d) 7→ D} in
DD where C ′::d is a domain declaration, D is a child of O. Since domains are inherited from
a base class to a subclass [10], the class C of O can be a subclass of C ′ where d is declared.
The analysis also uses DD to map formal domain parameters C::α to actual domains.
Although a domain d is declared by a class C, each runtime instance of type C gets its
own runtime domain `.d. For example, if there are two distinct object locations ` and `′
of class C, then `.d and `′.d are distinct. Since an ODomain represents a runtime domain
`i.di, one domain declaration d in the code can create multiple ODomains Di in the OGraph
and the fresh identifier Did ensures that multiple ODomains can be created for the same
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domain declaration C::d. Since no class declares the SHARED domain, the analysis qualifies
it as ::SHARED.
The analysis starts by creating a global ODomain Dshared, the root of the OGraph. A
developer picks a root class, Croot, and the analysis creates Oroot in Dshared. The analysis
also requires an initial context that is a dummy OObject Oworld, which does not correspond
to an actual runtime object. Next, the analysis changes the context from Oworld to Oroot,
and analyzes recursively all the expressions in the methods of Croot.
Instrumentation. Proving soundness means proving that there is a map between a
Runtime Object Graph (ROG) and an OGraph by instrumenting the dynamic semantics
(Fig. 3.10) using the maps H , K, LI , and LE . H maps a location ` to the corresponding
OObject, and K maps a runtime domain `.d to an ODomain. The multi-valued maps LI and
LE map a pair of locations (`src, `dst) to a set of OEdges {E}. We use two maps for edges
because a pair (H [`1], H [`2]) can be associated with an import edge from H [`1] to H [`2], or
with an export edge from H [`1] to H [`2].
Notation. For a map M , a key k, and a value v, we use M [k] to denote the lookup of k,
and M ′ = M [k 7→ v] for adding an entry for k to M . For a multi-valued map M , we use
the notation M ′ = M [k 7→∪ {v}] for adding an entry for k to M . If the map already has an
entry for k, the resulting value is the union of the existing value set and {v}.
3.1.3 Static Semantics
The formalization uses a constraint-based specification as a set of inference rules. In
FDJ, a program is a tuple (CT, e) that consists of a class table CT , which maps classes
to their definitions, and an expression e. The analysis starts with a root expression eroot,
that explicitly instantiates the root class Croot. The analysis result is the least solution
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 of the following constraint system:
∅, ∅, G ` (CT, eroot)
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The analysis starts by creating the OObject Oworld and its owning ODomain DSHARED, which
constitutes the root of the OGraph,
DSHARED = 〈D0, ::SHARED 〉 Oworld = 〈Cdummy< . >〉
then abstractly interprets eroot in the context of Oworld:
∅, ∅, G `Oworld eroot
The judgement form for expressions is as follows:
Γ,Υ, G `O,H e
The O subscript on the turnstile captures the context-sensitivity, and represents the context
object that the analysis uses to abstractly interpret e. Since an OObject O is uniquely
identified based on its domains, the context is a domain and the analysis is domain-sensitive.
The H subscript is a map used by the dynamic semantics and the store typing rule in the
static semantics (not shown). For readability, we omit H when not in use. CT (C) and
CT (Object) represent a lookup of a class C and the class Object in the class table2, and is
an implicit clause in all the static rules.
In Df-New, the analysis interprets an object allocation in the context of O and ensures
the analysis creates objects and domains. The analysis first ensures that DO contains an
OObject OC for the newly allocated object. Then, using dparams, Df-New ensures that each
of the actual domain parameters pi maps to an actual domain Di in the context of O, where
the corresponding formal domain parameter αi maps to the same Di but in the context of
OC . Df-New also ensures that the object hierarchy is created such that new ODomains are
created for each domain declarations in C according to the auxiliary judgment ddomains.
2These clauses are listed once at the top of Fig. 3.3 to avoid repetition.
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CT (C) = class C<α, β> extends C′<α> { T f ; dom; . . . ; md; }
CT (Object) = class Object<αo> { }
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 O = Cthis<DO> ∀i ∈ 1..|p| G `O Di ∈ findD(Cthis::pi)
OC = 〈 C<D> 〉 {OC} ⊆ DO
G `O dparams(C,OC) {(OC , qual(pi)) 7→ Di} ⊆ DD
Υ, G `O ddomains(C,OC)
∀m ∈ md mbody(m,C<p>) = (x : T , eR)
C<D> 6∈ Υ =⇒ {x : T , this : C<p>},Υ ∪ {C<D>}, G `OC eR
Γ,Υ, G `O e
Γ,Υ, G `O new C<p>(e)
[Df-New]
e0 : C<p> (Tk fk) ∈ fieldDecls(C)
G `O import(C<p>, Tk)
Γ,Υ, G `O e0
Γ,Υ, G `O e0.fk
[Df-Read]
e0 : C<p> (Tk fk) ∈ fields(C<p>)
e1 : C1<p′′> C1<p′′> <: Tk
G `O export(C<p>,C1<p′′>)
Γ,Υ, G `O e0 Γ,Υ, G `O e1
Γ,Υ, G `O e0.fk = e1
[Df-Write]
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉
G `O Oi ∈ lookup (Tsrc)
G `Oi Oj ∈ lookup (Tlabel)
{〈Oi, O,Oj , Imp〉} ⊆ DE
G `O import (Tsrc, Tlabel)
[Aux-Import]
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉
G `O Oi ∈ lookup (Tdst)
G `O Oj ∈ lookup (Tlabel)
{〈O,Oi, Oj ,Exp〉} ⊆ DE
G `O export (Tdst, Tlabel)
[Aux-Export]
e0 : C<p> mtype(m,C<p>) = T ′ → T
′
R mtypeDecl(m,C) = Tf → TR
G `O import(C<p>, TR)
∀k ∈ 1..|e| ek : Ta Ta <: T
′
k G `O export(C<p>, Ta)
Γ,Υ, G `O e0 Γ,Υ, G `O e
Γ,Υ, G `O e0.m(e)
[Df-Invk]
Figure 3.3: Static semantics.
Both dparams and ddomains are recursive auxiliary judgments that consider inheritance, i.e.,
the domain may be declared by a class C ′ that C extends. The base case for the recursion
is the java.lang.Object class (Fig. 3.3).
The analysis terminates in the presence of recursive types. Df-New uses the auxiliary
judgement Aux-Dom to ensure that DD has an ODomain corresponding to each domain
that C locally declares. If C is a recursive type, ddomains first checks if Υ already contains
the combination C<D>. If such a combination exists, the analysis reuses the ODomain
Drec that the key (〈C<D>〉, C::dj) maps to in DD and adds a cycle in the object-domain
hierarchy by mapping (OC, C::dj) to Drec. Otherwise, it creates a fresh ODomain Dj and
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G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 OC = C<D>





CT (Object) = class Object<αo> { }
G `O dparams(Object, OC)
[Aux-Alpha1]
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 O = C<DO>
n : Cn<p> G `O Oi ∈ lookup (Cn<p>)
Di = DD[(Oi, Cn::d)]
G `O Di ∈ findD (C::n.d)
[Aux-Find-Public]
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 O = C<DO> Di = DD[(O,C::di)]
G `O Di ∈ findD (C::this.di)
[Aux-FindThis]
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 O = C<DO> Di = DD[(O,C::αi)]
G `O Di ∈ findD (C::αi)
[Aux-FindD]
G `O DSHARED ∈ findD (::shared)
[Aux-FindShared]
CT (C) = class C<α, β> extends C′<α> {. . . dom; . . . ; } G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉
∀(domain dj) ∈ dom O
′
C = 〈C
′′<D′′>〉 OC = 〈C<D>〉
∃C′′<D′′> ∈ Υ ∪ {C<D>} s.t. C′′ = C ∧Drec = DD[(O
′
C , C::dj)] =⇒ {(OC , C::dj) 7→ Drec} ⊆ DD
∀C′′<D′′> ∈ Υ ∪ {C<D>} s.t. C′′ 6= C =⇒ (Dj = 〈Didj , C::dj〉 {(OC , C::dj) 7→ Dj} ⊆ DD)
Υ, G `O ddomains(C
′, OC)
Υ, G `O ddomains(C,OC)
[Aux-Dom]
Υ, G `O ddomains(Object, OC)
[Aux-Obj1]
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉
O = Cthis<D> Ok ∈ DO Ok = 〈C<D> 〉 C <: C
′







G `O Ok ∈ lookup (C
′<p′>)
[Aux-Lookup]
Figure 3.4: Auxiliary judgments for static semantics.
maps (OC , C::dj) to Dj. Aux-Dom recursively includes inherited domains from base classes
as well. Aux-Obj1, the base case of the recursion, deals with the class Object, for which
Aux-Obj1 does nothing, because Object has no fields, domains, or methods in FDJ.
The analysis assumes that all the methods of class C may be invoked. Df-New obtains
each return expression eR in each method body m of C, and recursively processes eR in the
context of the new OObject OC . To avoid infinite recursion, before Df-New analyzes eR, it
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checks if the combination of the class C and actual domains D have been previously analyzed
by looking for this combination in Υ. If this combination does not exist, Df-New pushes on
Υ the current combination. As a side note, Υ tracks previously created OObjects that lead
to the creation of OC as the call stack of the analysis. It does not do so globally across the
program because similar combinations of the same class and domain parameters can occur
in different contexts, and must be analyzed separately. Finally, Df-New analyzes each
argument of the constructor. Since the analysis distinguishes between a field initialization
in a constructor and a field write, Df-New does not require dataflow edges in DE.
The auxiliary judgement lookup returns the set of the OObjects Ok in DO such that
the class of Ok is C
′ or one of its subclasses. It also ensures that each domain Di of Ok
corresponds to D′i, a domain associated with O in DD. Due to subtyping, the number of
actual domain parameters p is smaller than or equal to the number of actual ODomains D.
This is how the analysis achieves precision, because lookup returns only a subset of all the
objects of class C ′ or its subclasses in DO. From this subset, the analysis picks the source
or destination OObjects, and finds the flow object of an OEdge.
The auxiliary judgement Aux-Export ensures that export edges exist between the con-
text OObject O and each of the OObjects Oi that lookup (Tsrc) returns. The auxiliary
judgment lookup invoked using the Tlabel argument returns the set of OObjects Oj that the
dataflow edges refer to. As a result, there could be multiple edges that refer to differ-
ent OObjects between the same source and destination. Aux-Import is similar to Aux-
Export, but the edge has an opposite direction from Oi to the context O. Another difference
is that Aux-Import invokes the second lookup in the context of Oi rather than O because
the imported object exists in the context of the receiver Oi.
Df-Read and Df-Write abstractly interpret field read and field write expressions, and
use Aux-Import and Aux-Export, respectively. Both auxiliary judgements take the type
e0 as the first argument, and pass it to lookup to set the source and destination OObjects.
For the OObject that the dataflow edge refers to, Df-Read uses the type of the field fk,
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Γ,Υ, G `O x
[Df-Var]
Γ,Υ, G `O `
[Df-Loc]
OC = H[`] Γ,Υ, G `OC e
Γ,Υ, G `O,H ` . e
[Df-Context]
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 ∀` ∈ dom(S),Σ[`] = C<p> H[`] = O = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO
∀m. mbody(m,C<p>) = (x : T , eR) {x : T , this : C<p>}, ∅, G `O eR
G `CT,H Σ
[Df-Sigma]
Figure 3.5: Static semantics (continued).
while Df-Write uses the type of the right-hand side expression e1.
Df-Invk abstractly interprets method invocation expressions. First, it ensures the ex-
istence of import edges from the receiver of the method to the context OObject O. These
import edges refer to the OObjects that the analysis finds by using lookup on the return type
of the method in the context of the receiver. Next, for each argument ek, Df-Invk ensures
the existence of the export edges from O to the receiver of the method that refer to the
OObject the analysis finds by using lookup on the type of each argument. The rule ensures
export edges only for a method invocation with at least one argument.
Df-Var, Df-Loc, and the rest of the rules complete our formalization and make the
induction go through (Fig. 3.5). Df-Context analyzes expressions of the form ` . e. The
context for analyzing e changes from O to OC , where OC is the result of looking up the
receiver ` in H . Finally, the induction requires an augmented store typing rule, Df-Sigma,
to ensures that the method bodies have been analyzed for all the locations ` in the store,
and that every ` has a corresponding OObject in DO. To denote all the objects in the store,
the rule uses the subscript CT instead of O.
Figure 3.6 shows the definitions the analysis uses to qualify a domain p by the class C
that declares it. In the context of Γ, Σ, and θ, Qual-Var qualifies n.d as C::d. This
judgement also applies to the case when n is this and p = this.d. Qual-Param qualifies
a formal domain parameter α as C::α, where C is the class of this. Since no class declares
the shared domain, Qual-Shared qualifies it as ::shared. We use these rules implicitly in
the static and dynamic semantics to ensure that (O,C::d) 7→ D is in DD.
67
Γ;Σ; θ ` n : C<p′> d ∈ domains(C<p′>)
Γ;Σ; θ ` qual(n.d) = C::d
[Qual-Var]
Γ; Σ; θ ` this : Cthis<p′> α ∈ params(Cthis)
Γ;Σ; θ ` qual(α) = Cthis::α
[Qual-Param]
Γ; Σ; θ ` qual(shared) = ::shared
[Qual-Shared]
Figure 3.6: Qualify domains rules.
3.1.4 Dynamic Semantics
To complete the formalization, we instrumented the dynamic semantics (Fig. 3.7). The
instrumentation extends the dynamic semantics of FDJ [10] (the common parts are high-
lighted), but is safe since discarding it produces exactly the FDJ dynamic semantics. The
instrumented evaluation rule is of the following form:
θ ` e;S;H ;K;LI ;LE  G e
′;S ′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E
where G= 〈DO,DD,DE〉 is the statically computed object graph, and  G means that the
expression e evaluates to e′ in the context of θ, the value of this. The rules in the dynamic
semantics keep G unchanged, but change the store S and the maps H , K, LI , and LE .
IR-New adds a new location ` to the store S, where ` maps to an object of type C with
the specified ownership domain parameters, and the fields set to the values v passed to the
constructor. The rule extends H by mapping ` and the OObject OC from DO. The rule
requires that each actual domains pi passed during instantiation has a corresponding actual
domain Di of OC . Next, the rule extends K such that for all the domains C::dj, the pair
(OC , C::dj) has a corresponding Dj in DD.
IR-Read and IR-Write ensure that an OEdge E exists between the context OObject O
and the receiver O`. They use θ and ` to lookup these OObjects in H . They also ensure that
the OObject Ov is of a subclass of the field class Ci as returned by the auxiliary judgment
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` 6∈ dom(S) S′ = S[` 7→ C<p>(v)]
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉
p = `′.d ∀i ∈ 1..|`′.d| Di = K[`
′
i.di]
`i ∈ dom(H) s.t. H [`i] = Oi Di = DD[Oi, qual(`
′
i.di)]
OC = 〈C<D>〉 OC ∈ DO H
′ = H [` 7→ OC ]
∀(domain dj) ∈ domains(C<p>) Dj = DD[(OC , C::dj)] K
′ = K[`.dj 7→ Dj ]
θ ` new C<p>(v);S ;H ;K;LI ;LE  G `;S
′ ;H ′;K ′;LI ;LE
[IR-New]
S[`] = C<p>(v) fields(C<p>) = T f
O = H [θ] O` = H [`] Ov = H [vi] Ti ∈ T
E = 〈O`, O,Ov , Imp〉 ∈ DE H ;K;LI ;LE ` Ov ∈ irLookup(Ti) L
′
I = LI [(`, θ) 7→∪ {E}]




S[`] = C<p>(v) fields(C<p>) = T f
S′ = S[` 7→ C<p>([v/vi]v)]
O = H [θ] O` = H [`] Ov = H [v] H ;K;LI ;LE ` Ov ∈ irLookup(Ti) Ti ∈ T
E = 〈O,O`, Ov, Exp〉 ∈ DE L
′
E = LE [(θ, `) 7→∪ {E}]





S[`] = C<p>(v) mbody(m,C<p>) = (x, eR)
O = H [θ] O` = H [`] mtype(m,C<p>) = T → TR
H ;K;LI ;LE ` Or ∈ irLookup(TR) E
′ = 〈O`, O,Or , Imp〉 ∈ DE L
′
I = LI [(`, θ) 7→∪ {E
′}]
∀k ∈ 1..|x| Ok = H [vk] H ;K;LI;LE ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk) Tk ∈ T
Ek = 〈O,O`, Ok, Exp〉 ∈ DE L
′
E = LE [(θ, `) 7→∪ {Ek}]






θ ` ` . v;S ;H ;K;LI ;LE  G v; S ;H ;K;LI ;LE
[IR-Context]
Ok ∈ rng(H) Ok = 〈C
′<D′>〉 C′ <: C





H ;K;LI ;LE ` Ok ∈ irLookup(C<`′.d>)
[IR-Lookup]
Figure 3.7: Instrumented dynamic semantics (core rules).
irLookup. Finally, the rules extend the maps LI and LE , respectively, by adding E to the
set of edges associated with (`, θ) in LI , and (θ, `) in LE .
IR-Invk ensures that an import OEdge E ′ exists from the receiver O` to the context O,
having as the edge’s label an OObject of a subclass of the return class CR. IR-Invk also
ensures that an export OEdge Ek exist from O to O` for every parameter and refers to an
OObject of a subclass of the method’s parameter class Ck. The rule uses θ and ` to lookup
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θ ` ei;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
i;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E








θ ` e0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
0;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E
θ ` e0.fi;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G
e′0.fi;S




θ ` e0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
0;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E
θ ` e0.fi = e1;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G
e′0.fi = e1;S




θ ` e1;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
1;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E








θ ` e0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
0;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E
θ ` e0.m(e);S;H ;K;LI;LE  G
e′0.m(e);S




θ ` ei;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
i;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E








` ` e;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′;S′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E
θ ` ` . e;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G ` . e




Figure 3.8: Instrumented dynamic semantics (congruence rules).
O and O` in H . It extends both LI and LE by adding E
′ to the set of import edges between
the locations ` and θ in LI , and by adding each Ek to the set of export edges between the
locations θ and ` in LE .
The IR-Lookup auxiliary judgment returns the set of OObject found by looking up
each actual domain `′i.di in K. When the method return expression reduces to a value v,
IR-Context propagates v outside of its method context. This rule does not affect the
execution of the program.
Finally, the dynamic semantics has the same congruence rules as FDJ [10] (Fig. 3.8).
In addition, there are two congruence rules for field-write: IRC-Write-Rcv and IRC-
Write-Arg. IRC-Write-Rcv states that the receiver expression e0 reduces to e
′
0, while





Section 2.6 (page 21) informally describes soundness of the extracted object graph. For-
mally, an OGraph is a sound approximation of any ROG, represented by a well-typed store
S, if the OGraph relates to the ROG as follows:
Object soundness. There is a map H that maps each object ` in S to exactly one repre-
sentative OObject in the OGraph. Similarly, there is a map K such that each runtime domain
`.d has exactly one representative ODomain in the OGraph.
Edge soundness. If there is a dataflow communication from an object `1 to `2 in a ROG,
with their representatives OObjects O1 and O2 in the OGraph, then there are two maps LI and
LE that map the pair (`1, `2) to a set of OEdges in the OGraph that represent the dataflow
communication between O1 and O2. Moreover, if the runtime dataflow edge from `1 to `2
refers to a runtime object `3 in a ROG, with its representative OObject O3 in the OGraph,
then there is an OEdge from O1 to O2 that refers refers to O3 (Fig. 2.6, page 21).
To relate the dynamic and the static semantics of the analysis, we define an approxima-
tion relation (Df-Approx) between a runtime state (S,H ,K,LI ,LE) and an analysis result
(DO,DD,DE). It ensures that the runtime objects, runtime domains and runtime edges
are consistent with their representatives in the statically extracted OGraph.
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Approximation Relation (Df-Approx).
∀ Σ `S, (S,H,K,LI , LE) ∼ (DO,DD,DE)
⇐⇒
∀` ∈dom(S),Σ[`] = C<`′.d>
=⇒
H [`] = OC = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO
and ∀`′j .dj ∈ `
′.d K[`′j.dj ] = Dj = 〈Didj , qual(`
′
j.dj)〉 ∈ rng(DD)
and ∀di ∈ domains(C<`′.d>)
K[`.di] = Di = 〈Didi , C::di〉 {(OC , C::di) 7→ Di} ∈ DD
and ∀`src ∈ dom(H), f ields(Σ[`src]) = Tsrc f
∀m. mtype(m,Σ[`src]) = T → TR
∀Tk ∈ {Tsrc} ∪ {TR}
H ;K;LI;LE ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk)
E′k ∈ LI [(`src, `)] E
′
k = 〈H [`src], H [`], Ok, Imp〉 ∈ DE
and ∀`dst ∈ dom(H), f ields(Σ[`dst]) = Tdst f
∀m. mtype(m,Σ[`dst]) = T → TR
∀Tk ∈ {Tdst} ∪ {T}
H ;K;LI;LE ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk)
Ek ∈ LE [(`, `dst)] Ek = 〈H [`], H [`dst], Ok, Exp〉 ∈ DE
Df-Approx states that given a well-typed store S of a program and an OGraph G =
〈DO,DD,DE〉 of the same program, there are maps H , K, LI , and LE , such that H maps
each runtime object ` in the store to a unique OObject OC from DO, K maps each runtime
domain `.di in the store to a unique ODomain Di, and LI and LE map each pair of runtime
objects (`src, `) and (`, `dst) to OEdges from DE. Df-Approx ensures the consistency of
these mappings with the ownership relation, and with the dataflow communication.
72
The last two conditions relate runtime dataflow communication back to field reads, field
writes, and method invocations that produce the corresponding import and export edges
in DE. LI maps a runtime dataflow communication from a runtime object `src to another
runtime object ` back to an import OEdge E ′k from DE. By our definition of import dataflow
communication, E ′k exists in DE due to a field read or a method invocation expression that
has `src as its receiver. The condition also ensures that if a dataflow edge refers to an OObject
of a subtype of Tk, then Tk is the type of a field of `src or the return type of a method of
`src.
Similarly, LE maps a runtime dataflow communication from a runtime object ` to an-
other runtime object `dst back to an export OEdge Ek from DE. By our definition of export
dataflow communication, Ek exists in DE due to a field write or a method invocation ex-
pression that has `dst as its receiver. The condition also ensures that if the dataflow edge
refers to an OObject of a subtype of Tk, then Tk is the type of a field of `dst or the type of a
parameter of a method of `dst.
Theorem: Dataflow Object Graph Soundness.
If G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉
G ` (CT, eroot)




then G `CT,H Σ
(S,H,K,LI , LE) ∼ (DO,DD,DE)
where ∗G relation is the reflexive and transitive closure of G relation, and θ0 is the location
of the first object instantiated by eroot. To prove the Object Graph Soundness theorem, we
prove the Dataflow Preservation and Dataflow Progress theorems, which extend the standard
FDJ Preservation and Progress. The common parts are highlighted .
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Theorem: Dataflow Preservation (Subject reduction).




∅, ∅, G `O e
(S,H,K,LI , LE) ∼ (DO,DD,DE)




then there exists Σ′ ⊇ Σ and T ′ <: T such that
∅,Σ′, θ ` e′ : T ′ and Σ′ ` S′
(S′, H ′,K ′, L′I , L
′
E) ∼ (DO,DD,DE)
∅, ∅, G `O e
′
and G `CT,H Σ
′
Proof. Proof is by induction on the instrumented evaluation relation (Appendix, page 179).
θ ` e;S;H ;K;LI ;LE  G e
′;S ′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E








∅, ∅, G `O e
(S,H,K,LI , LE) ∼ (DO,DD,DE)
then either e is a value
or else θ ` e;S ;H ;K;LI ;LE  G e
′;S′ ;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E
Proof. Proof is by induction over the derivation of
∅, ∅, G `O e
with a case analysis on the last typing rule used (Appendix, page 179). The most interesting
cases are Df-New, Df-Read (page 198), Df-Write (page 201), and Df-Invk (page 203).
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3.3 Extensions of Ownership Domains
This section describes more precisely how the analysis handles extension of Ownership
Domains [10], which Section 2.7 (page 40) describes informally. In extensions of Ownership
Domains, not all the objects are in named, conceptual group. Some objects are borrowed
from one domain to another and are aliased by variables declared lent in the code. The
type system can also guarantee that variables declared unique can alias an object that is
passed linearly without having a persistence reference to it. The analysis needs to keep
track of assignments between variables and uses a value flow graph. During extraction of
the OGraph, the analysis attempts to resolve lent and unique to a domain parameter (α), a
locally declared domain (n.d), or shared. If the attempt fails, the analysis creates a special
domain and a flow object in it.
I proved the soundness of the analysis that extracts an OGraph with dataflow edges
that refer to dataflow objects (Appendix 8.3, page 179). Flow objects maintain the unique
representative invariant since the analysis creates a fresh ODomain for each flow object.
Multiple dataflow edges can then refer to the same flow object. I conjecture but do not
prove that the extraction analysis with the value flow analysis extracts an OGraph that is
also sound. Based on the value flow analysis, ScoriaX adds more objects and more edges.
Even if it fails to resolve lent and unique, ScoriaX creates special domains and flow objects
to preserve soundness.
This section describes the revised syntax, data types and static semantics. In the rest of
the section, I highlight the changes in the formalization that are required to handle the
extensions of Ownership Domains.
3.3.1 Extended Syntax
To handle complex expressions in the code, I describe the analysis over the three-address
code [128] of an FDJ program (Fig. 3.9). Each three-address code expression has at most
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three operands and is typically a combination of an assignment and a binary operator or a
method invocation that has only variables as arguments.
The syntax includes lent and unique [12], and according to FDJ formalization [10], only
the first domain parameter (the owner domain) of a type can be lent or unique because the
class Object takes one domain parameter, and according to cdef, only the first domain is
mandatory for every type. An object creation expression can have the first domain parameter
unique (but not lent), thus the syntax uses the meta-variable A for a new expression. A
type T consists of a class C parameterized with a list of domains that are of the following
form: a domain parameter α, a declared domain n.d, or shared. The syntax also includes
the meta-variable TA for types in which the owner domain can also be unique, and TB for
types in which the owner domain can be also lent. For example, the type of fields in the
class definition cannot be lent because a borrowed object cannot be stored in a field; hence,
the field type is TA. On the other hand, the owner domain of the type of a method parameter
can be lent or unique, and the parameter type is TB.
3.3.2 Extended Object Graph
In addition to the OGraph described in Section 3.1.2, the analysis also builds a value flow
graph (FG) that tracks the assignment between two variables x and y, the substitution of
the actual argument to the formal method parameter, and object returned from a method.
A node in FG is a triplet (O, x,B) that denotes a variable x that is part of an expression
that the analysis interprets in the context of O, and x is of a type TB where the owner
domain B is a domain p, unique, or lent. For brevity, the notation (O, x,B) means a list of
n triplets (O, x1, B1), . . . , (O, xn, Bn). An edge in FG has a label to track if the value flow
is due to a method invocation (
(i
 ), a method return (
)i
 ). The label • denotes an empty
annotation on a value flow edge due an assignment ( ). The label ? denotes an information
flow due to a field write. The label on a value flow edge tracks call-site sensitivity [76, 75].
By considering O as a part of the node, the flow analysis is also domain-sensitive and can
77
CT ::= cdef table of class declarations
cdef ::= class C<α, β> extends C ′<α>
{ dom; TA f ; C(T ′A f
′, TA f)
{super(f ′); this.f = f ; } md } class decl.
dom ::= [public] domain d; domain decl.
md ::= TA ret m(TB x) Tthis {ret = eR; return ret; }
method decl.
e ::= | x = new C<A, p>(y)
| x = y.f | x.f = y | x = y | x = r.m(y)
| ` | ` . e expressions
n ::= x | v values or variable names
p ::= α | n.d | SHARED domain name
A ::= unique | p domain may be unique
B ::= lent | A domain may be lent or unique
T ::= C<p> precise type
TA ::= C<A, p> owner domain may be unique
TB ::= C<B, p> owner domain may be lent or unique
v, `, θ ∈ locations
x, y, r, a ∈ variables
S ::= ` → C<`′.d>(v) location store
Σ ::= ` → T store typing
Γ ::= x → TB type environment
Figure 3.9: Three-address code version of the FDJ syntax extended using lent and unique [12]. For
readability, repeated from Fig. 2.18
FG ::= ∅ | FG ∪ { (Osrc, x, Bsrc)
label
 (Odst, y, Bdst) } Value Flow Graph
label ::=(i | )i | • | ? value flow annotations
Figure 3.10: Value flow graph data type. For clarity, repeated from Fig. 2.19.
have different nodes for the same variable x if analyzed in different contexts. Section 3.3.4
describes in more detail the role of the label in computing the transitive flow through a
method invocation or a field assignment.
3.3.3 Extended Static Semantics
The analysis starts as previously described in Section 3.1.3, and also initializes FG with
an empty set. The form of the rules is adapted to incorporate FG to the left hand side of
the turnstile:
Γ,Υ, FG,G `O e
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CT (C) = class C<α, β> extends C′<α> { T f ; dom; . . . ; md; } G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉
O = Cthis<DO> ∀i ∈ 1..|p| FG,G `O Di ∈ findD(Cthis::pi)
OC = 〈 C<D> 〉 {OC} ⊆ DO
dparams(C,OC ) {(OC , qual(pi)) 7→ Di} ⊆ DD Υ, G `O ddomains(C,OC)
Γ[a] = Ta {(O, x, p1) (OC , this, α0), (O, a, owner(Ta)) (OC , this.f , owner(T ))} ⊆ FG
∀m ∈ md. mbody(m,C<p>) = (x : T , eR)
C<D> 6∈ Υ =⇒ {x : T , this : C<p>},Υ ∪ {C<D>}, FG,G `OC eR
Γ,Υ, FG,G `O x = new C<p>(a)
[Df-New]
CT (C) = class C<α, β> extends C′<α> { T f ; dom; . . . ; md; } G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉
O = Cthis<DO> FG,G `O D1 ∈ uniqueDomains(C)
∀i ∈ 2..|p| FG,G `O Di ∈ findD(Cthis::pi)
OC = 〈 C<D> 〉 {OC} ⊆ DO
dparams(C,OC) {(OC , qual(pi)) 7→ Di} ⊆ DD Υ, G `O ddomains(C,OC)
Γ[a] = Ta {(O, x, p1) (OC , this, α0), (O, a, owner(Ta)) (OC , this.f , owner(T ))} ⊆ FG
∀m ∈ md. mbody(m,C<p>) = (x : T , eR)
C<D> 6∈ Υ =⇒ {x : T , this : C<p>},Υ ∪ {C<D>}, FG,G `OC eR
Γ,Υ, FG,G `O x = new C<unique, p>(a)
[Df-New-Unique]
CT (Cr) = class Cr<α, β> extends C
′
r<α> { T f ; dom; . . . ; md; }
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 Γ[r] = Tr = Cr<p> (Tk fk) ∈ fields(Tr) FG,G `O import(Tr, Tk)
FG,G `O Or ∈ lookup(Tr) (T
′
k fk) ∈ Tf
{(O, r, owner(Tr)) (Or, this, α0), (Or , fk, owner(T
′
k)) (O, x, owner(Tk))} ⊆ FG
Γ,Υ, FG,G `O x = r.fk
[Df-Read]
CT (Cx) = class Cx<α, β> extends C
′
x<α> { T f ; dom; . . . ; md; }
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 Γ[x] = Tx = Cx<p> (Tk fk) ∈ fields(Tx)
Γ[r] = Tr Tr <: Tk FG,G `O export(Tx, Tr)
FG,G `O Ox ∈ lookup(Cx<p>) (T
′
k fk) ∈ Tf
{(O, r, owner(Tr))
?
 (Ox, fk, owner(T
′
k))} ⊆ FG
Γ,Υ, FG,G `O x.fk = r
[Df-Write]
CT (C) = class C<α, β> extends C′<α> { T f ; dom; . . . ; md; } G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉
Γ[r0] = C<p> mtype(m,C<p>) = T → TR FG,G `O import(C<p>, TR)
Γ[a] = Ta Ta <: T FG,G `O export(C<p>, Ta)
FG,G `O Or ∈ lookup(C<p>) T
′
R ret m(TB x) Tthis {ret = eR; return ret; } ∈ md
i = freshi(O, x0 = r0.m(a))
Γ[x] = Tx {(O, r0, p0)
(i
 (Or, this, α0), (O, a, owner(Ta))
(i
 (Or , x, owner(Tx))} ⊆ FG




 (O, x0, owner(TR))} ⊆ FG
Γ,Υ, FG,G `O x0 = r0.m(a)
[Df-Invk]
Γ[r] = Tr Γ[x] = Tx {(O, r, owner(Tr)) (O, x, owner(Tx))} ⊆ FG
Γ,Υ, FG,G `O x = r
[Df-Assign]
Figure 3.11: Static semantics of the extraction analysis. Highlighted are the parts that construct the value
flow graph.
79
The analysis uses expressions given in the form of three-address code, where x represents
the left-hand-side of the expression. In Df-New, the analysis interprets an object allocation
expression in the context of O. The analysis first ensures that DO contains an OObject OC
for the newly allocated object and DD has the mapping to construct the object-domain
hierarchy. The rule Df-New also ensures that FG includes an value flow edge from x to this
and value flow edges from each of the object allocation arguments a to the corresponding
fields this.f (Fig. 3.11). Next, Df-New-Unique handles the case when the owner domain
of the instantiated type is unique. The rule is similar to Df-New, except that it uses the
auxiliary judgment uniqueDomains to find the actual owner domain of OC (Fig. 3.12). If
uniqueDomain cannot find an actual ODomain, the analysis ensures that an OObject is
created in a fresh ODomain, as a child of O. All the child OObjects of such an ODomain are
flow objects.
Next, Df-Read, Df-Write, Df-Invk, and Df-Assign ensure value flow edges are created in
FG. For example, Df-Read, ensures that the flow graph contains one edge from the receiver
r in the context O to the context variable this in the context Or, and a second edge from
the field fk in the context of Or to x in the context of O. For a method invocation, the rule
Df-Invk adds labels to the value flow edges to uniquely identify a method invocation based
on the pair (O, x0 = r0.m(a)). For Df-Read, Df-Write, and Df-Invk, the context OObject
of the source is different from the context OObject of the destination of a flow edge. On
the other hand, for Df-Assign, the context OObject remains unchanged for the source and
destination.
The rules Df-Lookup-Lent and Df-Lookup-Unique handle the cases where the owner do-
main is lent or unique. These rules use solveLent and solveUnique to determine the actual
domain p′ and the context O′ where p′ is defined. The analysis includes the context O′ in the
result to be able to determine the actual domain D′1 corresponding to lent or unique be-
cause the context might be different from the current context O. For example, a class might
be instantiated in the context of O where the owner is unique. Next, the reference x in
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G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 O = Cthis<D> Ok ∈ DO Ok = 〈C<D> 〉 C <: C
′







FG,G `O Ok ∈ lookup (C
′<p′>)
[Df-Lookup]
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 O = Cthis<D> Ok ∈ DO Ok = 〈C<D1, D> 〉 C <: C
′







FG ` (O′, x, A) ∈ solveLent(O,C′) O′ = C′
this
<D′>
A = unique =⇒ FG ` (O′′, x, unique) ∈ findSrcUnique(O′, C′) ∧D′1 = DD[(O
′′, C′::unique)] ∧D′1 = D1





::p′) ∧D′1 = D1
FG,G `O Ok ∈ lookup (C
′<lent, p′>)
[Df-Lookup-lent]
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 O = Cthis<D> Ok ∈ DO Ok = 〈C<D1, D> 〉 C <: C
′







FG ` (O′, y, A) ∈ solveUnique(O,C′) O′ = 〈C′
this
<D′>〉
A = unique =⇒ FG ` (O′′, x, unique) ∈ findSrcUnique(O′, C′) ∧D′1 = DD[(O
′′, C′::unique)] ∧D′1 = D1





::p′) ∧D′1 = D1




(O, s, unique) (O′, y, unique) ∈ FGP s : C C <: C
′ 6 ∃(O′′, x, unique) (O, s, unique) ∈ FGP
FG ` (O, s, unique) ∈ findSrcUnique(O′, C′)
[Aux-Find-Unique]
FGP = propagateAll(FG) (O, x, unique) (O
′, y, A) ∈ FGP y : C C <: C
′
FG ` (O′, y, A) ∈ solveUnique(O,C′)
[Aux-Resolve-Unique]
FGP = propagateAll(FG) (O
′, x, A) (O, y, lent) ∈ FGP x : C C <: C
′
FG ` (O′, x, A) ∈ solveLent(O,C)
[Aux-Resolve-Lent]
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 FG ` (O′, y, A) ∈ solveUnique(O,C)
A = unique =⇒ (D = 〈Did, C::unique〉 ∧ {(O,C::unique) 7→ D} ⊆ DD)
A = p′ =⇒ (O′ = 〈C′
this




FG,G `O D ∈ uniqueDomains(C)
[Aux-UniqueDom]
Figure 3.12: Rules for resolving lent, and unique.
O = 〈C<DO>〉 n : Cn<p> FG,G `O Oi ∈ lookup (Cn<p>) Di = DD[(Oi, Cn::d)]
FG,G `O Di ∈ findD(C::n.d)
[Df-FindD-Public]
O = 〈C<DO>〉 Di = DD[(O,C::di)]
FG,G `O Di ∈ findD (C::this.di)
[Df-FindD-This]
O = 〈C<DO>〉 Di = DD[(O,C::αi)]
FG,G `O Di ∈ findD (C::αi)
[Df-FindD]
FG,G `O DSHARED ∈ findD (::shared)
[Df-FindD-Shared]
Figure 3.13: Auxiliary judgments for inference rules in Fig. 3.11.
the context O is assigned to y and in another context O′. The destination y is declared in
an actual domain p′. To determine the actual ODomain for the domain parameter p′, the
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extraction analysis uses the context of y, namely O′, not the context of x.
3.3.4 Flow Graph Analysis
Since a value might be passed linearly through several assignments, the rules solveLent
and solveUnique use another flow graph, FGP , where the transitive flow is propagated, as
direct flow edges may not exist in FG. FGP is computed in two steps. First, an algorithm
summarizes FG into a summary graph FG∗, then another algorithm propagates the transi-
tive flow for nodes in FG∗ and computes FGP . The algorithm summarize does not consider
the order of the assignments and the flow graph analysis is therefore flow-insensitive. By
using the labels of the flow edges, the summarize matches the parentheses with the same
value i and the flow graph analysis is call-site context-sensitive.
Understanding value flow analysis by working examples
In order to better understand the Flow Graph Analysis, I introduce three similar running
examples that each creates objects of the same type. The first two examples (Figure 3.15)
function summarize(FG)
FG∗ = FG
WL = {(O1, x1, B1)
a
 (O2, x2, B2) ∈ FG s.t. a is (i}
while WL 6= ∅ do
remove e1 : (O1, x1, B1)
a1
 (O2, x2, B2) from WL
if a1 is (i then
for e2 : (O2, x2, B2)
a2
 (O3, x3, B3) ∈ FG∗ do
if e3 = concat(e1, e2) 6∈ FG∗ then
add e3 to FG ∗ and WL
else
if a1 is • or ? then
for e′2 : (O0, x0, B0)
a′
2
 (O1, x1, B1) ∈ FG∗ do
if e′3 = concat(e
′
2, e1) 6∈ FG∗ then




 (O2, y, B2), (O2, y, B2) (O2, z, B3)) = (O1, x, B1)
(i
 (O2, z, B3)
concat((O1, x, B1)
(i
 (O2, y, B2), (O2, y, B2)
)i
 (O1, z, B3)) = (O1, x, B1) (O1, z, B3)
concat((O1, x, B1)
(i
 (O2, y, B2), (O2, y, B2)
?
 (O3, z, B3)) = (O1, x, B1)
?
 (O3, z, B3)
Figure 3.14: The algorithm summarize inspired from [75, Fig. 4.16]. Other cases of concat do not result in
additional edges.
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show how the Flow Graph Analysis distinguishes between these objects, and the extraction
analysis avoids creating false positive dataflow edges. The example in Figure 3.16 highlights
one limitation of the extraction analysis if developers overuse lent and unique. Each ex-
ample also shows the extracted OGraph that has OObjects such as 〈A<DATA,DOM1>〉 and
〈A<DATA,DOM2>〉. The flow graph FG (not shown) has nodes such as (〈A<DATA,DOM1>〉, f,
F) and (〈A<DATA,DOM2>〉, f, F) and the following flow edges:
(〈Main<SHARED>〉, a1, DATA)
(11
 (〈A<DATA,DOM1>〉, this, owner)
(〈Main<SHARED>〉, n1, DOM1)
(11
 (〈A<DATA,DOM1>〉, num, F)
(〈A<DATA,DOM1>〉, num, F)
?
 (〈A<DATA,DOM1>〉, f, F)
(〈Main<SHARED>〉, a2, DATA)
(14
 (〈A<DATA,DOM2>〉, this, owner)
(〈Main<SHARED>〉, n2, DOM2)
(14
 (〈A<DATA,DOM2>〉, num, F)
(〈A<DATA,DOM2>〉, num, F)
?
 (〈A<DATA,DOM2>〉, f, F)
(〈A<DATA,DOM2>〉, f, F) (〈A<DATA,DOM2>〉, ret, F)
(〈A<DATA,DOM2>〉, ret, F)
)15
 (〈Main<SHARED>〉, dest, lent)
Summarizing the value flow graph
The algorithm summarize (Fig. 3.14) computes FG∗ such that it concatenates two edges
where the first edge has the same destination as the source of the second edge. The algorithm
matches pair of edges (i and )i that have the same value for i. If the invocation (i is followed
by an assignment, the algorithm propagates the invocation. The ? label means that a method
stores a value in a field. Because other methods can use the value of the field, the ? label
cancels the effect of an (i label and the concatenated edge keeps the ? label. For the example
in Fig. 3.15, summarize adds the following edges:
(〈Main<SHARED>〉, n1, DOM1)
?
 (〈A<DATA,DOM1>〉, f, F)
(〈Main<SHARED>〉, n2, DOM2)
?
 (〈A<DATA,DOM2>〉, f, F)
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The flow graph FG∗ has a transitive flow:
(〈A<DATA,DOM2>〉, f, F) . . . (〈Main<SHARED>〉, dest, lent)
Therefore, by distinguishing between OObjects of the same type, but with different lists of
ODomains D, the Flow Graph Analysis avoids a false positive.
According to Aux-Resolve-Lent, the Flow Graph Analysis resolves lent to F in the
context of 〈A<DATA,DOM2>〉. Then, according to Aux-Lookup-Lent, lookup returns only
〈Integer<DOM2>〉 and not 〈Integer<DOM1>〉, which would introduce a false positive
dataflow edge in the OGraph.
Related work [75, Fig. 4.16] treats fields differently from local variables, and requires a
separate may-alias analysis for finding variables that may alias the same receiver object to
substitute a field this.f to a1.f or a2.f. In a flow node (O, this.f, B), the receiver
this refers to O, so no separate may-alias analysis is required.
Distinguishing between different method invocations
To compute the index i used on the value flow edges, a naive flow analysis could use the
line number of the method invocation expression in the code. If the analysis were to use
such a value for i in the rule Df-Invk, it would use the same value of i for different values
of O, which would create false positive flow edges. Instead, Df-Invk uses freshi to generate
distinct values for i based on the pair (O, x = r.m(y)) and allows the analysis to distinguish
between the same method invocation but in different contexts.
For example, consider Fig. 3.15 that shows code fragments where an object of type B
creates an object of type A and invokes the method set to assign the value for the field
f . The analysis creates two objects a:A in different domains for the same object allocation
expression new A(). The assignment of the field value also occurs at the same method
invocation a.set(n). Due to different values returned by freshi, the analysis considers the
method invocation a.set(n) twice, first in the context of b1:B and second in the context
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1 class A<owner,F> {
2 Integer<F> f;
3 void set(Integer<F> num) {
4 f = num;
5 }
6 Integer<F> get() { return f; }
7 }
8 class Main<owner>{
9 void main() {
10 domain DATA,DOM1,DOM2;
11 Integer<DOM1> n1= new Integer(-1);
12 A<DATA,DOM1> a1 = new A();
13 a1.set(n1);
14 Integer<DOM2> n2 = new Integer(2);
15 A<DATA,DOM2> a2 = new A();
16 a2.set(n2);
17 Integer<lent> dest = a2.get();
18 dest.compareTo(n1);
19 }
1 class A<owner,F> {
2 Integer<F> f;
3 void set(Integer<F> num) {
4 f = num;
5 }
6 Integer<F> get() { return f; }
7 }
8 class B<owner, F> {
9 domain OWNED;
10 A<OWNED,F> A a = new A();





16 void main() {
17 domain DATA,DOM1,DOM2;
18 Integer<DOM1> n1 = new Integer(-1);
19 B<DATA,DOM1> b1 = new B();
20 b1.assign(n1);
21 Integer<unique> n2 = new Integer(2);
22 B<DATA,DOM2> b2 = new B();
23 b2.assign(n2);


















































Figure 3.15: The analysis distinguishes between different objects of the same type A, and shows a dataflow
edge that refers to n2:Integer from a2:A to m:Main and not from a1:A to m:Main. It is not necessary that
the objects of type A are created for different object allocation expressions in the code (left vs. right).
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1 class A<owner,F> {
2 Integer<F> f;
3 void set(Integer<F> num) {
4 f = num;
5 }
6 Integer<F> get() { return f; }
7 }
8 class B<owner, F> {
9 domain OWNED;
10 A<OWNED,F> A a = new A();





16 void main() {
17 domain DATA,DOM1,DOM2;
18 Integer<unique> n1 = new Integer(-1);
19 B<DATA,DOM1> b1 = new B();
20 b1.assign(n1);
21 Integer<unique> n2 = new Integer(2);
22 B<DATA,DOM2> b2 = new B();
23 b2.assign(n2);



































Figure 3.16: If the architects overuse lent and unique, the analysis may extract false positive edges
of b2:B. If the analysis were to consider only the line number of the method invocation as
the value of i, FG∗ would have a false positive transitive flow from (〈A<DATA,DOM1>〉,f,F)
to (〈Main<SHARED>〉,dest,lent).
Computing transitive flow graph
To compute the transitive flow, the analysis uses the algorithm propagate (Fig. 3.17),
which takes as input the flow graph FG∗ returned by the summarize algorithm and a
source s. The output of propagate is a transitive flow graph FGP with the same nodes as
FG and FG∗, but more edges. To compute FGP , propagate uses a worklist algorithm and
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the method concat′, which concatenates two edges where the destination of the first edge is
the source of the first edge. For concatenation, propagate uses two value flow labels Call and
nCall. During the initialization, the label Call corresponds to flow edges with label (i, and
nCall correspond to the other label )i. If the second argument of concat
′ is an edge tagged
(i, the result is an edge tagged Call. Otherwise, either no edge is added, or the concatenation
propagates the nCall label.
Since the analysis uses the result of the algorithm to resolve lent and unique, the prop-
agation occurs only if any node of the two edges have a domain B that is lent, unique, or
a public domain n.d. The case n.d is needed because a transitive value flow may exist from
(O1, x,n.d) to (O1, y,lent), and further to (O2, z,lent), where the variables n and z are in
different contexts O1 and O2. Here, the analysis performs an extra step and finds the edge
from (O,ret,this.d) to (O1, x,n.d) such that this.d is a domain of O. For the example in




 (〈A<DATA,DOM2>〉, num, F)
(〈Main<SHARED>〉, n2, unique)
Call
 (〈A<DATA,DOM2>〉, f, F)
(〈Main<SHARED>〉, n2, unique)
Call
 (〈A<DATA,DOM2>〉, ret, F)
(〈Main<SHARED>〉, n2, unique)
Call
 (〈Main<SHARED>〉, dest, lent)
Then, Df-New-Unique invokes findD(Main::unique) that in turn invokes
solveUnique(〈Main<SHARED>〉,Integer). Here, unique is resolved to the domain parameter
F that is bound to DOM2 in the context of 〈B<DATA,DOM2>〉. Therefore, Df-New-Unique
creates the OObject 〈Integer<DOM2>〉.
3.4 Implementation
The extraction analysis follows the algorithm runAnalysis (Fig. 3.18) and starts from the
root expression that is provided as input along with all the class declarations in the program.





for e : (O1, s, B1)
a
 (O2, x2, B2) ∈ FG∗ do
if {B1, B2} ∩ {lent, unique, n.d} 6= ∅ then
if a1 is (i then
add (O1, s, B1)
Call
 (O2, x2, B2) to FGP and WL
else
add (O1, s, B1)
nCall
 (O2, x2, B2) to FGP and WL
while WL 6= ∅ do
remove e1 : (O1, x1, B1)
nCall|Call
 (O2, x2, B2) from WL
for e2 : (O2, x2, B2)
a
 (O3, x3, B3) ∈ FG∗ do
if e3 = concat
′(e1, e2) 6∈ FGP then




for (O, x,B) ∈ FG∗ do
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Figure 3.17: The algorithm propagate adds more edges between nodes for variables declared as lent or
unique.
DSHARED = 〈D0, ::SHARED 〉, Oworld = 〈Cdummy< . >〉
FG0 = ∅, DO0 = {Oworld}
DD0 = {(Oworld, ::shared) 7→ Dshared}, DE0 = ∅
The algorithm has two iterations. First, the analysis creates the object hierarchy with
OObjects and ODomains only, and collects the nodes and edges of the value flow graph FG.
The iteration terminates when it reaches a fixed point, i.e., no flow nodes and flow edges are
added to FG, and no new objects and domains are added to the OGraph. In this iteration,
the extraction analysis does not compute dataflow edges and flow objects, because computing
dataflow edges requires FG, which further depends on DO. Otherwise, the analysis may
88
extract a spurious number of dataflow edges that refer to these flow objects when it is not
able to resolve lent and unique based on the intermediate FG. In the second iteration,
the analysis invokes the algorithm propagateAll, creates the flow objects, and computes
the dataflow edges. The second iteration terminates when the algorithm propagateAll no
longer adds edges to FGP and no objects, domains, or dataflow edges are added to the
OGraph.
Section 3.3 describes the analysis using a constraint-based specification which are declar-
ative, while the implementation uses transfer functions which are imperative. Each function
accept is a transfer function that is equivalent to the corresponding inference rule. It takes
as arguments all the elements on the left-hand-side of the turnstile in the constraint-based
specification and the context OObject O. For each declarative clause, subset ⊆ set in the
constraint-based specification, the transfer function has an statement set′ = subset ∪ set.
In particular, for each object allocation expression, the function accept creates a new OOb-
ject OC . Hence, the clause that ensures {OC} ⊆ DO in Df-New becomes the statement
DO′ = {OC} ∪DO in the transfer function. Next, accept abstractly interprets each method
declaration of the instantiated class, and of the class it extends, recursively. The algorithmic
description omits the remaining details of Df-New (Fig. 3.11). The transfer functions for the
other expressions are similar.
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function runAnalysis(eroot, CT )
DO = DO0, DD = DD0, DE = DE0 FG = FG0, Γ = ∅, Υ = ∅
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 G′ = 〈DO′, DD′, DE′〉
G′ ⊆ G⇔ DO′ ⊆ DO ∧DD′ ⊆ DD ∧DE′ ⊆ DE
// Iteration 1
〈FG′, G′〉 = accept(〈Γ,Υ, FG,G,Oworld〉, eroot)
while FG′ ⊆ FG ∧G′ ⊆ G do
〈FG,G〉 = 〈FG′, G′〉




〈FG′, G′〉 = accept(〈Γ,Υ, FGP , G,Oworld〉, eroot)
FGP = propagateAll(FG
′)
while FG′ ⊆ FGP ∧G′ ⊆ G do
G = G′




function accept(〈Γ,Υ, FG,G,O〉, x = new C<p>())
〈DO,DD,DE〉 = G
OC = 〈C<D>〉, DO′ = DO ∪ {OC} . . . //as in Df-New
for m ∈ md. mbody(m,C<p>) = (x : T , eR) do
if C<D> 6∈ Υ then
Γ′ = {x : T , this : C<p>}
Υ′ = Υ ∪ {C<D>}
G′ = 〈DO′, DD′, DE′〉
〈FG′, G′〉 = accept(Γ′,Υ′, FG′, G′, OC , eR)
return 〈FG′, G′〉
function accept(〈Γ,Υ, FG,G,O〉, x = . . . )
Figure 3.18: The algorithm runAnalysis describes the steps the analysis follows while iterating multiple
times over the code. An informal version is in Fig. 2.20 (Section 2.7.4, page 45)
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3.4.1 Implementation Supports Full Java Language
ScoriaX is implemented as a plug-in for Eclipse developed using the Crystal static anal-
ysis framework [104], which allows the development of a static analysis to follow closely
the formal description using transfer functions. There are several differences between the
formalization of the analysis and the concrete implementation of the analysis. The imple-
mentation supports the following features of the Java language not included in FDJ: generic
types, interfaces, arrays, nested classes, and cast expressions. The implementation does not
support other features of Java such as static code, anonymous class3, Java reflection and
native code.
For example, to support interfaces, since a class can implement multiple interfaces, Sco-
riaX unifies domain declarations in multiple interfaces based on their names. That is, for a
class C that implements interfaces I1, I2, I3 that declares a domain D, I1::D = I2::D = I3::D.
The analysis treats generics and ownership domains as orthogonal [27] at the cost of more
verbose annotations. Figure 2.16 (page 38) gives an example of using Ownership Domains
and generics in the class HashMap.
3.4.2 Extraction of Other Types of Edges
ScoriaX can be extended to extract other types of edges such as points-to edges, previously
formalized in [4, 5], creation edges, and control flow edges. The extraction of object-domain
hierarchy remains unchanged, while the data types (Fig. 3.19), and the rules Df-New and
Df-Invk are extended.
ScoriaX handles differently the invocation of methods from the invocation of constructors.
When a source object creates a destination object and passes references to the destination
as constructor arguments, the analysis extracts a creation edge for each argument. Similarly
to a dataflow edge, a creation edge refers to an object. Extracting creation edges require
3For anonymous classes, a workaround is to refactor the code using refactoring tool support provided by
Eclipse.
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E ∈ OEdge ::= 〈 From = Osrc, To = Odst,Label = Olabel,Flag = Imp |Exp 〉 Dataflow Edge
CrE ∈ OCREdge ::= 〈 From = Osrc, To = Odst,Label = Olabel 〉 Creation Edge
PtE ∈ OPTEdge ::= 〈 From = Osrc, To = Odst,Field = f 〉 Points-to Edge
CfE ∈ OCFEdge ::= 〈 From = Osrc, To = Odst,Method = m 〉 Control Flow Edge
DE ::= ∅ | DE ∪ { E, CrE, P tE,CfE } All Edges
Figure 3.19: Data types to include additional types of edges: points-to, creation, and control flow edges
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉
O = Cthis<DO> ∀i ∈ 1..|p| FG,G `O Di ∈ findD(Cthis::pi)
OC = 〈 C<D> 〉 {OC} ⊆ DO
∀Ta ∈ Γ[a] FG,G `O Oa ∈ lookup(Ta) {〈O,OC , Oa〉} ⊆ DE
. . .
Γ,Υ, FG,G `O x = new C<p>(a)
[Df-New]
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉
O = Cthis<DO> FG,G `O D1 ∈ uniqueDomains(C)
∀i ∈ 2..|p| FG,G `O Di ∈ findD(Cthis::pi)
OC = 〈 C<D> 〉 {OC} ⊆ DO
∀Ta ∈ Γ[a] FG,G `O Oa ∈ lookup(Ta) {〈O,OC , Oa〉} ⊆ DE
. . .
Γ,Υ, FG,G `O x = new C<unique, p>(a)
[Df-New-Unique]
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉
Γ[r0] = C<p> mtype(m,C<p>) = T → TR FG,G `O import(C<p>, TR)
Γ[a] = Ta Ta <: T FG,G `O export(C<p>, Ta)
FG,G `O Or ∈ lookup(C<p>) {〈O,Or,m〉} ⊆ DE
. . .
Γ,Υ, FG,G `O x0 = r0.m(a)
[Df-Invk]
Figure 3.20: Static semantics for extraction of creation and control flow edges. For brevity, the rules omit
some of the details in Fig. 3.11.
straightforward changes in Df-New, where lookup is invoked for the type of each argument
(Fig. 3.20).
An object may control the state of another object without sending any data to it. For
example, an object can start a thread by invoking the method Thread.start(). If a
method invocation or a constructor has no arguments, the analysis does not create export
dataflow edges. Instead, the analysis can create a control flow edge that refers to the invoked
method.
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3.5 Previous Versions of ScoriaX
An early version of ScoriaX extracted dataflow edges that refer to types and was de-
scribed using transfer functions. The data type of the OEdge had C instead of the OObject
Olabel.
E ∈ OEdge ::= 〈 From = Osrc, To = Odst,Label = C,Flag = Imp |Exp 〉
The OGraph did not support different edges that refer to different objects of the same type. In
addition to the straightforward changes in the data types, Df-Read, Df-Write and Df-Invk,
having dataflow edges that refer to objects involved changing the definition of soundness
to account for dataflow objects, changing the approximation relation by introducing the
auxiliary judgment irLookup, which further propagate the change to the rule Ir-New. Con-
sequently, the Progress and Preservation proofs for the cases Df-New, Df-Read, Df-Write,
and Df-Invk have been updated.
Another major difference with the earlier system is adding support for the extensions of
Ownership Domains. The annotations lent and unique are used in practice to annotate
legacy code. Ignoring these annotation results into an unsound OGraph that may be missing
objects or edges.
Other changes involve fixing how the analysis handles recursive types (Section 2.8.1).
Previous version supports only recursive types that declare one domain, otherwise the anal-
ysis does not terminate. To ensure termination the rule Aux-DOM checks all objects in
the analysis stack Υ that have the same type with the current object being created. The
change propagated in the proof of the Progress theorem to the case Df-New and further to
the lemma Df-Domains (page 209).
Differences with previous work. ScoriaX is similar to the one that extracts an OGraph
with points-to edges [5]. The two analyses create the same ownership hierarchy, but different
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types of edges. A points-to edge [5] has a label that is just the field name. The key differences
deal with generating dataflow edges that refer to objects and the soundness proof [4, Sec. 3.2,
and 3.3].
Differences with earlier versions of this work. This thesis revises the rules in the static
and dynamic semantics of Rawshdehs thesis [106, 107], and fully defines the approximation
relation and proves progress, preservation, and soundness.
3.6 Summary
This chapter formalizes an analysis that extracts dataflow edges that refer to objects in a
sound, hierarchical object graph, and proves object soundness and edge soundness such that
ScoriaX meets the extraction requirement H1c. The analysis is domain-sensitive and meets
the aliasing requirement (H1d). The analysis supports legacy code (H1b) annotated using
the extensions of Ownership Domains. The analysis extracts an object-domain hierarchy
(H1a) and by design ensures a finite depth in the presence of recursive types (H1f). To
achieve precision (H1e), the analysis relies on Ownership Domains such that it distinguishes
between objects of the same type in different domains, and between dataflow edges that refer
to objects of the same type. The next chapter evaluates the scalability of the analysis on
real-world applications and discusses the precision of the extracted graph.
Acknowledgements
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Chapter 4 Evaluation of Extraction
Previous chapters introduced ScoriaX, a static analysis that extracts dataflow communi-
cation edges in a sound, hierarchical object graph. This chapter discusses the evaluation of
ScoriaX based on three systems (Table 4.2), provides support for the hypothesis H1 and dis-
cusses how ScoriaX meets the extraction requirements (Section 1.5.1, page 10), in particular
how ScoriaX meets the precision (H1e) and scalability (H1h) in practice.
H1. For an object-oriented program, the architect adds annotations and uses a
static analysis to extract dataflow communication edges that refer to objects in
a sound, hierarchical object graph that approximates the runtime architecture of
the program, and meets the extraction requirements.
In the rest of the chapter, Section 4.1 describes the tool support used during the evalu-
ation. Section 4.2 describes the methodology. Section 4.3 introduces the subject systems.
Section 4.4 describes the results, and Section 4.5 concludes.
4.1 Tool Support
ScoriaX supports legacy code (H1b) and as discussed in Section 3.4 (page 86) ScoriaX is
plug-in for Eclipse. As input, the extractor provides the code with annotations, and the root
class. ScoriaX can persist an extracted OGraph into an XML file that can be visualized using
a standalone viewer [4, Section 4.3.2], which allows expending and collapsing graphs. ScoriaX
also supports the dot format of the GraphViz tool [50], which supports cluster graphs used
to represent the graph using nested boxes but with limited support for user interaction. Most
figures of OGraphs in this thesis are generated from exported dot files.
ScoriaX warns the user if the result of the extraction is unsound (H1c) due to the code
using some features in Java that the analysis does not currently handle such as static initial-
ization blocks. The extractor can click on an extraction warning and go to the line of code
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for which the extraction analysis fails. Extraction warnings are also reported if annotations
are missing or are inconsistent.
A typechecker ensures that annotations and code are consistent. To help the
extractor while adding annotations, ScoriaX uses an existing typechecker [4, Appendix A]
and tool support for adding boilerplate annotations [6]. The annotations use language sup-
port for annotations available since Java 1.5 and implement the Ownership Domains type
system [10]. The typechecker ensures that annotations are consistent with each other and
with the code, and reports any inconsistencies as typechecker warnings that the annotator
needs to address before running ScoriaX. The typechecker is also integrated in Eclipse and
reports the warnings in the default Problems Window. Additional details on the annotation
language and the typechecker are in [4, Appendix A].
Extraction in the presence of external libraries. ScoriaX is a whole program analysis
but the code of libraries and frameworks that the program use may not always be available
to be annotated. Even when available, a library or a framework is often larger than the
application itself, which may use only a small part of it. The typechecker allows associating
Ownership Domain annotations with Java bytecode using external files, which can be reused
across systems. The annotator can provide annotations for each class and method declaration
in the library that are referred from the annotated code. Only the class declaration, field
declarations, method parameters and return values require annotations, while the bodies of
the methods are discarded.
4.2 Extraction Methodology
Extracting an object graph is not a push-button operation, and the extractor follows the
process in Table 4.1. First, the extractor gathers the documentation about the system to
be analyzed, prepares the code and the root class, which instantiates the classes with the




3 public static void main(@Domain("lent[shared]") String[] args) {
4 @Domain("shared") Main m = new Main();
5 }
6 void run() {
7 @Domain("UI<UI,LOGIC,DATA>")
8 MainActivity act = new MainActivity();






15 class MainActivity extend Activity{ . . . }
Figure 4.1: An example of a root class for an Android application.
the existing classes, or prepared it manually based on existing documentation [6]. In future
work, it is possible to generate the root class from configuration files as is done by other
tools [48]. That is, the root class instantiates every class that is being loaded by reflection
from a configuration file.
Figure 4.1 shows an example of a root class for an Android application that usually
resides on one machine. To express that an Android app follows the State-Logic-Display
architecture, which is a three-tier architecture [122], the names the top-level domains are
UI (for Display), LOGIC (for Logic), and DATA (for State), with the corresponding domain
parameters U, L, and D. From the existing documentation or configuration file, the annotator
can find the first object that the Android framework instantiates (e.g., MainActivity).
Since there are multiple ways to annotate a system, the process of adding annotations
and extracting the graph is iterative. The annotator can fine-tune the annotations to gain
more precision, push objects underneath other objects in the object-domain hierarchy, or
pull objects at higher level of the hierarchy. The goal of the extractor is to minimize both
typechecker and extraction warnings. It is often useful to prioritize typechecker warnings
where missing annotations has a higher priority than adding annotations for library classes [4,
Section 4.4.1].
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Table 4.1: The process of extracting object graphs and existing tool support
Step Stage Task Tool support
1 Prepare code Use generics, extract local
variables for object allocation
expressions that are part of
complex expressions, convert
anonymous classes into nested
classes
Eclipse refactoring tools
2 Create a root class that instan-
tiates the entry points of the
program
N/A
3 Add annotations For every class declaration and
every variable declaration in
the code, add Ownership Do-
mains annotations
tool support for adding default
annotations [6]
4 Minimize annotation warnings Typechecker [4]
5 Extract object graph Prepare ScoriaX configuration
file, specify root class, en-
try point, and optionally what
types of edges to extract and
output format
ScoriaX
6 Minimize extraction warnings ScoriaX
7 Refine annotations as needed Typechecker
8 Add summary for library
classes
Tool support for associating
ownership domain annotations
with Java bytecode
9 Repeat from step 6
4.3 Subject systems
In this thesis, I evaluated ScoriaX on the three systems in Table 4.2, which lists their
size. For each system, the implementation of the analysis extracts dataflow edges and flow
objects, creation edges, and points-to edges.
Apache FTP Server (AFS) [1] is an open-source implementation of a complete and
portable server engine based on the standard File Transfer Protocol (FTP). The annotators
were guided by the reference architecture available [129].
CryptoDB (CDB) [69] is a secure database system designed by a security expert that pro-
vides cryptographic protections against unauthorized access, and includes a sample imple-
mentation in Java. CryptoDB has both a Java implementation and an informal architectural
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Table 4.2: Subject systems: Apache FtpServer (AFS), CryptoDB (CDB), and Universal Password Manager
for Android (UPMA)
System Kind Version KLOC Classes Interfaces DIT
max mean
AFS Java app 1.0.5 14.4 159 39 5 1.68
CDB Java app 2.3 21 1 3 1.57
UPMA Android app v1.14 4.2 88 4 7 2.13
Total 20.9
description that guided the process of adding annotations and extracting object graphs [4,
Sec. 7.8]. The object graph was then compared against a detailed runtime architecture drawn
by a security expert [7, 131].
Universal Password Manager for Android (UPMA)1 is an Android application that
stores the passwords of the users using an encrypted database. The database is stored in a
file that can be shared between multiple devices using a standalone server or online storage
services such as DropBox. The annotations follow the State-Logic-Display architecture.
4.4 Results
Table 4.3 shows the number of abstract objects, flow objects, and different types of edges
that ScoriaX extracts. In each system, about half of the dataflow edges are self-edges. I focus
on non-self dataflow edges that are more interesting for reasoning about security. For each
system, the OGraphs are sparse, but the dataflow edges show communication that is relevant
for security. Multiple abstract objects flow from the same source to the same destination,
which enables reasoning about communication size, which measures the number of distinct
dataflow edges from a source to a destination. For example, the CDB OGraph shows 4
dataflow edges from the mgr:ConsumerManager to the object provider:Provider, which
handles encryption keys. The edges refer to objects representing customer information and
credit card information that is confidential. These edges are true positives and the architects
need to ensure that the provider:Provider does not disclose credit card information in clear
1I analyzed UPMA to check if it satisfies the Android security policies. This chapter provides a quan-
titative analysis of the extraction, while a more detail evaluation that finds security vulnerabilities is in
Section 6.2.
99
Table 4.3: Size of the extracted OGraph with dataflow edges, points-to edges, and creation edges. Shows
also self-edges, multiple dataflow edges between same objects (comm. size), and dataflow edges that refer to
the same object (same flow).
System objects Dataflow Creation Points-to Communication size Same flow
edges flow edges self edges self edges self min max mean min max mean
AFS 129 18 642 314 92 3 400 8 0 42 0.0223 0 116 2.984
CDB 49 10 180 86 47 3 104 0 0 4 0.0400 0 49 1.918
UPMA 86 7 232 127 70 0 258 0 0 3 0.0144 0 31 1.221
text further into an untrusted sink.
In addition, multiple dataflow edges refer to the same abstract object (same flow), which
enable the architect to track flow of data in the abstract object graph. The CDB OGraph
has 5 dataflow edges that refer to encrypted data and 3 dataflow edges that refer to the same
object that represents the credit card information. The credit card information flows from
an object of type CustomerManager to an object of type CustomerInfo and back, and then
from mgr:CustomermManager to provider:Provider. The architect needs to ensure that
provider:Provider does not disclose credit card information to other objects and then
investigate all the edges from cci:CreditCardInfo to provider:Provider. Indeed, one
such edge exists, where the provider receives an object of type HashMap<String,String>
that contains the credit card number and expiration date and are sent to the encryption
engine. It is possible then to write a constraint to ensure that no other dataflow edge refer
to this object as I will discuss in Chapter 6 (page 117).
4.4.1 ScoriaX Meets the Extraction Requirements
To provide evidences that support the hypothesis, the qualitative analysis focuses on
showing how ScoriaX meets the extraction requirements.
H1a: Express design intent
The architect can refine the annotations to express design intent, as needed. In AFS,
the architects can check that an anonymous user cannot execute administrator commands,
where each command has a corresponding class that implements the interface Command. This
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may lead a vulnerability because executing a command, such as RMDIR, would enable an
attacker to remove folders on the server. After adding the initial annotations and examining
the extracted OGraph, the architect decides to refine the annotations by making all the
administrator commands from the domain LOGIC into a separate domain COMMANDS. The
AFS OGraph has 4 different dataflow edges that refer to an object representing an anonymous
user. The architect can then impose the constraint that no dataflow edges that refer to the
anonymous user has as a destination an object in the domain COMMANDS.
H1c: Sound object graph
The architect assumes that the object graph shows all possible objects and edges that
may occur in any possible program run. Fewer than 20% of the objects are flow objects,
but resolving lent and unique is crucial for meeting the soundness requirement (H1c).
Otherwise, in the presence of flow objects, some runtime objects and edges would have no
representative in the extracted object graph. To resolve lent and unique, the analysis also
meets the aliasing requirement (H1d) using a separate, flow-insensitive but domain-sensitive
analysis. The value flow analysis is crucial for extracting dataflow edges because about
20–40% of variables are declared lent and unique [134].
H1e: Precise object graph
ScoriaX meets the precision requirement: the extracted graph does not suffer from ex-
cessive merging and is not a fully connected graph. In fact, the extracted object graphs are
sparse and have a comparable number of objects and non-self dataflow edges. For AFS, the
number of non-self dataflow edges is 328, which is one order of magnitude lower than the
number of edges in a fully connected graph. Still imprecision occurs if the architects overuse
the annotations shared, lent, and unique (Section 3.3.4, page 81).
The AFS OGraph has a maximum of 42 dataflow edges from the protocol interpreter to the
client session. These dataflow edges refer to objects that represent user information, files, and
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an object of type ServerSocket. Since some of these objects represent confidential data, the
architect need to ensure that the object of type ServerSocket provides encryption to avoid
eavesdropping. Tracing to code from the dataflow edge that refers to a ss:ServerSocket
leads to the method invocation ioSession.getAttribute(name), but a closer inspection
reveals that the edge is a false positive. Since the return type of the method getAttribute
of the class FtpIoSession is Object and is annotated shared, the analysis finds all the
objects in shared including the object of type ServerSocket. To avoid the false positives
that may further lead to false positives when executing constraints, the architects can fine-
tune the annotations to improve precision. That is, one can change the annotation such that
the object of type ServerSocket is in OWNED instead of shared. In general, using shared is
discouraged since little reasoning can be done about such objects.
H1f: Summarization
By referring to a pair (type, domain) corresponding to an abstract object, the architects
can reason about objects that have the same conceptual purpose or the same security prop-
erty, even if they are created in different locations in the code. In each system, the maximum
of dataflow edges that refer to the same object occurs for dataflow edges that refer to the
object of type String in the domain shared, but there are examples that are more interest-
ing. Architects can fine tune annotations and use hierarchy to distinguish between objects
of type String that have different conceptual purposes. The UPMA OGraph has different
objects of type String to distinguish between the password and the account name where
only the password represents confidential information. There are 4 dataflow edges that refer
to the password, and 10 that refer to the account name. The architects can reason about the
destination of the dataflow edges that refer to a password, check if it is an untrusted sink,
or if another edge with an untrusted sink as a destination refers to the destination.
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H1g: High-level view
ScoriaX meets the high-level view requirement (H1g) where the object-domain hierarchy
helps improving precision of the analysis. The depth of the object-domain hierarchy seems
constant compared to the size of the graph. Empirical data [134] shows that object-domain
hierarchy achieves 1x-10x reduction in the number of objects in the domains declared by
the root class. These objects are architecturally relevant and the object graph fits on one
page by showing only these objects with their substructure collapsed and dataflow edges
lifted to their first visible ancestor of the source and destination. The architects can still
recover the details by expanding the substructure. Reasoning about security requires more
than tracking objects visually, and architects need support to query the object graph, which
Scoria also provides (Section 5.3, page 110).
H1h: Scalability
The extraction analysis needs to scale to real-world applications of at least a few thousands
lines of code. Tradeoffs needs to be considered: the more precise the extraction analysis is,
the less scalable it is. ScoriaX achieves scalability (H1h) for systems the size of a typical
Android app (2–30KLOC) [88], but their size is too small to claim that ScoriaX meets the
scalability requirement. Computing transitive value flow is probably a culprit in limiting
the scalability of the extraction analysis. Another bottleneck that limits the scalability of
the analysis is the effort of adding annotations. For UPMA, I estimate the effort of adding
annotations and extracting the object graph to be 2 hours/KLOC, where part of the effort
was required to summarize the Android framework (Table 4.4). Conceivably, less effort
would be needed to annotate another Android application since some of the summaries can
be reused.
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Table 4.4: UPMA: Estimated effort to annotate and reason about security.
Phase Effort Percent
Adding annotations 8.5 hours 68%
Extracting object graph 2 minutes <1%
Writing constraints 1 hour 8%
Refining annotations 3 hours 24%
Total 12.5 hours 100%
4.5 Summary
This chapter shows an evaluation by running ScoriaX on three applications with more
than 20KLOC of Java code. The chapter discusses examples of false positive edges due to
excessive use of annotations shared, but also shows how the architects can increase precision
by placing objects of the same type in different domains. Architects can find cases where
more precision is needed, and fine-tune the annotations to help the analysis achieve more
precision as needed. This chapter shows that ScoriaX can be used for positive assurance and
does not report any vulnerability. A more systematic evaluation, where ScoriaX is incorpo-
rated in Architectural Risk Analysis, and architects write machine-checkable constraints is
in Chapter 6 (page 117).
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Chapter 5 The Scoria Approach
This chapter1 introduces a semi-automated approach named Scoria that finds security
vulnerability using constraints on the abstract object graph. The chapter discusses how
Scoria meets the security analysis requirements (Section 1.4, page 9) and presents the security
model that allows architects to query the object graph and write constraints. By separating
constraints from extraction, the model is extensible (SC3) such that architect can write
application-specific constraints. Since the model extends an object graph that is hierarchical
and has dataflow edges that refer to objects, Scoria allows architects to write constraint in
terms of object provenance (H2a) and indirect communication (H2f).
In the following, Section 5.1 gives an overview of Scoria. Section 5.2 defines the con-
cepts used by the approach. Section 5.3 describes a security model, and Section 5.4 con-
cludes.
5.1 Scoria Overview
Scoria is a semi-automated approach that statically approximates the runtime architecture
of an object-oriented system as a sound abstract object graph to support architects on finding
security-relevant architectural flaws. Having a sound abstract graph enables reasoning about
abstract object identity, which means that every abstract object of the abstract graph is
uniquely identified. Object identity enables the comparison of references. In particular,
distinct edges can refer to the same abstract object.
Because the abstract graph tracks when different edges refer to the same abstract object,
it enables reasoning about object provenance when the same abstract object that flows from
a first source to a first destination also flows from a second source to a second destination
(Fig. 5.1(a)). Object transitivity tracks when the same abstract object flows from an initial
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nected to b:B through descendants and
reachable objects.
Figure 5.1: Information content available from communication
source to a final destination through several intermediate abstract objects (Fig. 5.1(b)). This
is a special case of object provenance above when the destination of the first edge is the same
as the source of the second edge.
Some objects that carry protected data may not be reachable directly, but may be reach-
able by traversing directed edges of various types from one object to another until the ab-
stract object containing the protected data is reached. This abstract graph can thus identify
indirect communication through object reachability (Fig. 5.1(d)).
For security, it is important to identify the object that a dataflow edge refers to. Some
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objects that carry protected data may be part of some other object that seems to carry only
unprotected data. These cases can be identified by traversing the abstract object hierarchy.
The abstract graph thus allows identifying indirect communication through descendants and
ancestors. A descendant of an abstract object is the abstract object itself or a child abstract
object of another descendant. Similarly, an ancestor of an abstract object is the abstract
object itself or a parent of another ancestor. The abstract graph thus supports reasoning
about indirect communication through the abstract object hierarchy. In particular, there
are two cases: (1) an indirect communication through ancestors exists if there is an edge
from or to an ancestor of the source or the destination; or (2) an indirect communication
through descendants exists if there is an edge from or to a descendant of the source or the
destination (Fig. 5.1(c)).
Security information that is not directly extracted from the code may be added to the
abstract graph after the fact as security properties to abstract objects and edges. The set of
security properties include some common properties such as trust level and confidentiality
that are typically used in architectural level reasoning. Properties can be further extended
for a particular system or to enable additional reasoning.
The abstract graph allows automating some of the reasoning about security-relevant ar-
chitectural flaws through machine-checkable constraints on the abstract runtime structure of
the system. The constraints use queries that are executed against the abstract graph. The
queries can have two forms: (1) Selection queries return a set of abstract objects or a set
of edges; and (2) Property queries support assigning security properties to a set of abstract
objects or a set of edges. The returned sets include abstract objects or edges that satisfy a
predicate. The types of predicates can be extended, e.g., is an abstract object an instance
of, is an abstract object a descendant of, etc.
A constraint is a predicate on the sets returned by the queries. For example, a constraint
can check if a query returns an empty set, or if the intersection of two returned sets is empty.
The constraints separate the security policy from the annotations and the extraction that
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shows the as-built system. While the extraction is just descriptive, the constraints can be
more prescriptive and enforce security policies. The set of constraints can be extended for a
particular system or reused across systems (e.g., all mobile applications have to obey a given
security policy).
The rest of the section defines the Scoria process and these concepts more precisely.
5.1.1 The Scoria Process
The architects supported by Scoria find architectural flaws using the following process
based on a security model named SecGraph (Section 5.3). The SecGraph augment the
information on the OGraph with additional design intent. The SecGraph is just a wrapper
of the underlying OGraph with placeholders to assign security properties to OObjects, and
OEdges, and with methods for querying the graph.
1: The architects add annotations to code and typecheck them, fixing any of the typechecker
warnings in the process.
2: Second, the architects use ScoriaX that automatically extracts an OGraph from the code
with annotations and creates the SecGraph.
3: As an optional step, the architects assign security properties to objects and edges as
needed using property queries on the SecGraph.
4: The architects write and execute constraints on the sets returned by selection queries on
the SecGraph.
5: The architect can write additional constraints, assign more security properties or refine
the annotations to fine-tune the precision of the extraction and repeat the process.
6: Finally, the architects trace to code from suspicious edges that the constraints highlight
and inspect potential architectural flaws.
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5.1.2 Incrementality of Scoria
The Scoria process is incremental such that the architects can begin by assigning property
values to only a few of the objects. Scoria assigns the default property value Unknown to all
the objects in the SecGraph. Scoria can be customized for libraries and frameworks where
specific methods return confidential values, or are known to disclose information passed as
arguments. The same queries can then be reused to find vulnerabilities across systems that
use the same library or framework.
If Scoria finds no vulnerabilities, the architect can write application-specific queries to
learn more about the system and to write additional constraints. Also, if Scoria returns too
many false positives, the architect can write more specific queries to reduce their number.
For example, given a set of dataflow edges, the architect can select only those edges that
trace to code to an application-specific method.
5.2 Definitions
Object identity means that every abstract object in an object graph is uniquely identified.
As a result, object identity enables the architects to assign a value to a security property of
an object o:O and enables comparison of references. Therefore, the property value can be
accessed from all the dataflow edges that refer to o:O. Since o:O is uniquely identified, the
property value is the same for all these dataflow edges. Also, two distinct abstract objects
o1:C and o2:C can have different property values even if o1 and o2 are of the same class
C.
Object Provenance is a query that return the set of dataflow edges e1 from a:A to b:B
such that another dataflow edge e2 exists from c:C to d:D and both e1 and e2 refer to the
same object o:O (Fig. 5.1(a)). For security, the architects can decide if the communication
of the object o:O is suspicious by writing a constraint that checks if the set returned by an
object provenance query is empty.
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Object Transitivity is defined as the communication of an object o:O from a:A to c:C
where a path of dataflow edges exists from a:A to c:C through some intermediate object
b:B, where all the dataflow edges in the path refer to the same object o:O (Fig. 5.1(b)).
Object transitivity is important for security to reason about the initial source of a dataflow
object.
In an object graph, a dataflow edge refers to an object that can have a substructure or
can reach other objects.
Object Hierarchy is defined as descendants and ancestors of an object o:O that are sets
of objects such that a transitive parent-child relation exists between an object in the sets and
o:O. Object hierarchy is important for security because confidential information may be a
descendant of a dataflow object, or a dataflow object can be part of the substructure of an
object that represents confidential information (Fig. 5.1(c)).
Object reachability is defined as a path of edges of various types from a source object c:C
to a given object o:O (Fig. 5.1(d)). The object o:O is reachable from c:C if a path exists from
c:C to o:O. Object reachability is important for security because the object that represents
confidential information can be reachable from a dataflow object. Then, the architects can
consider such an edge to be suspicious. There are different types of relations between objects.
In addition to dataflow, we also consider points-to and creation communication.
A points-to communication exists from the source object a:A to the destination object
b:B if one of a’s field f is a reference to b:B. The label of the points-to edge is the field
f. A points-to edge represents a persistent relation between objects and is relevant for
security because a dataflow object can be used to reach an object that represents confidential
information, although the dataflow object itself is not confidential.
A creation communication exists from the source object a:A to the destination object
b:B if a creates b from an object o:O. Similar to a dataflow edge, a creation edge refers
to an object, and is relevant for security it may lead to vulnerabilities such as information
disclosure or tampering.
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Architects can obtain additional information about objects that are indirectly connected
by a dataflow communication through descendants or reachable objects.
Indirect communication exists from a source object a:A to a destination object b:B if
a dataflow or a creation edge exists from a descendant of a or an object reachable from a
to a descendant of b or an object reachable from b. Indirect communication is relevant for
security because a confidential object may be passed to a descendant of an untrusted object
and the communication may not be explicit in the abstract graph.
5.3 Security Graph and Queries
To find security vulnerabilities, one strategy is to conduct ARA from the attackers point
of view considering the following threats: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information
disclosure, Denial of service and Elevation of privilege (STRIDE) [60]. The constraints in
Scoria focus on vulnerabilities related to dataflow communication such as Spoofing, Tamper-
ing and Information Disclosure. Finding flaws, such as Denial of Service, requires tracking
changes in the state of objects, which the extracted object graph, focused on structural
information, does not support.
In previous work [7, 8], some of the STRIDE checks were automated by defining
component-level properties such as TrustLevel represented using an Architecture Descrip-
tion Language. This work largely reuses the same model but represents it on a lightweight
adapter of the OGraph, the SecGraph. This section describes the data types of the SecGraph
and introduces formally examples of selection queries and property queries.
In the implementation of Scoria, the SecGraph is a library that provides several interfaces
and default implementations of selection queries and property queries. Thus, Scoria provides
extensibility and allows architects to write constraints in a Java-like language, and uses
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- isConfidential: True False Unknown
- isEncrypted: True False Unknown
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- isSanitized: True False Unknown




Figure 5.2: Partial representation of the SecGraph. Continued in Fig. 5.3,5.4
5.3.1 Data Types
A SecGraph is as an OGraph enriched with queries and security properties. The Sec-
Graph has SecObjects and SecDomains as nodes, and DataFlowEdges, PointsToEdges and
CreationEdges as edges (Fig. 5.2). The SecGraph provides queries such as descendants() for
finding the set of descendants of a given SecObject, and reachables() for getting the set of
reachable SecObject from a given SecObject using various types of edges. In the SecGraph,
I omit the details of the static analysis that extracts the OGraph (Chapter 3, page 57), and
focus on the queries and constraints. The queries return an ObjSet and EdgeSet that have
a name and property values for their elements. An ObjSet is cross-cutting to a SecDomain
where an ObjSet contains any SecObject that satisfy a predicate (a Condition). An ObjSet
is different from a SecDomain such that the same SecObject can be part of two ObjSets,
but the same SecObject cannot be part of two SecDomains.
All these data types extend the base type SecElement, which has traceability information
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Query based on object provenance
objectProvenance(fSrc : SecObject, fDst : SecObject,
sSrc : SecObject, sDst : SecObject) : EdgeSet
objectProvenance :=
⋃
{edge} s.t. edge : DataFlowEdge ∈ edges() ∧
∃o ∈ objects() s.t. o ∈ flow(connectedByDF(fSrc, fDst)) ∧
edge ∈ connectedByDF(sSrc, sDst) ∧ edge.f low = o
flow(dfEdges : Set〈DataF lowEdge〉) : ObjSet
flow :=
⋃
{obj} s.t. obj : SecObject ∈ objects() ∧
∃edge ∈ dfEdges s.t. edge.f low = obj
connectedByDF(src : SecObject, dst : SecObject) : EdgeSet
connectedByDF :=
⋃
{edge} s.t. edge : DataFlowEdge ∈ edges() ∧
(edge.src = src ∧ edge.dst = dst)
objProvenanceIndirect(fSrc : SecObject, fDst : SecObject,
sSrc : SecObject, sDst : SecObject) : EdgeSet
objProvenanceIndirect :=
⋃
{edge} s.t. edge:DataFlowEdge ∈ edges() ∧
∃o ∈ objects() s.t. o ∈ flow(connectedIndirect(fSrc, fDst)) ∧
edge ∈ connectedByDescendants(sSrc, sDst) ∨
edge ∈ connectedByReachablility(sSrc, sDst) ∧ edge.f low = o
Figure 5.3: Object provenance queries on a SecGraph
consisting of a set of traceability entries that correspond to expressions in the code. A
traceability entry is a reference to a node in the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) such as a
ClassInstanceCreation. One advantage of using AST2 in the representation of Traceability
instead of just a file name and a line number is that the constraints can include information
about code structure such as a name of a method. Another advantage of using an AST is
that Architects can refine annotations, which may be added on new lines without breaking
the traceability links.
5.3.2 Selection Queries
The simplest selection queries use methods specified on an instance of the SecGraph,
G. For example, G.edges() returns all the edges in the graph. An instance edge of type
DataFlowEdge, edge.flow returns the dataflow object that edge refers to. A query can also
invoke methods in complex expressions such as edge.flow.descendants(), which returns the
2The tool converts from the intermediate AST representation to the AST used by the IDE.
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Assign property values and select objects
setObjectsProperty(props : Set〈Property〉, cond : Condition)
∀obj ∈ objects(), s.t. cond.satisfiedBy(obj) =⇒
∃p : IsConfidential ∈ props ∧ obj.isConfidential := p ∨
∃p : TrustLevel ∈ props ∧ obj.T rustLevel := p ∨ . . .
getObjectsByCond(cond : Condition ) : ObjSet
getObjectsByCond :=
⋃
{obj} s.t. obj : SecObject ∈ objects() ∧
cond.satisfiedBy(obj)
Select edges based on security properties
getFlowToSink(fProps : Set〈Property〉, sProps : Set〈Property〉) : EdgeSet
flows := getObjectsByCond(fProps) sinks := getObjectsByCond(sProps)
getFlowToSink := getFlowToSink(flows,sinks)
getFlowToSink(flows : ObjSet, sinks : ObjSet) : EdgeSet
getFlowToSink :=
⋃
{e} s.t. e ∈ edges() ∧
e : DataFlowEdge ∨ e : CreationEdge ∧
∃sink : SecObject ∈ sinks ∧ ∃o : SecObject ∈ objects() s.t.
e ∈ connectedByDescendants(o, sink) ∨
e ∈ connectedByReachability(o, sink, {PointsTo}) ∧
flw ∈ flows ∩ (e.flow.descendants() ∪ reachables(e.flow, {PointsTo}))
Conditions based on type+object hierarchy
InstanceOf(objT : Type)
satisfiedBy(obj : SecObject) := obj.C.isSubTypeOf(objT)
IsInDomain(prntT : Type, prntD : String, objT : Type)
satisfiedBy(obj : SecObject) := obj.C.isSubTypeOf(objT) ∧
obj.parentDom.d = prntD ∧ obj.parentObj.C.isSubTypeOf(prntT )
IsChildOf(prntO : SecObject, prntD : String, objT : Type)
satisfiedBy(obj : SecObject) := obj.C.isSubTypeOf(objT ) ∧
obj.parentDom.d = prntD ∧ obj.parentObj = prntO
Condition based on type+object reachability
IsInstOfRchblFromInstOf(st : Type, dt : Type, eType : Set〈EdgeType〉)
isSrc := InstanceOf(st) isDst := InstanceOf(dt)
satisfiedBy(obj : SecObject) := ∃ obj ∈ getObjectsByCond(isSrc) ∧
∃ dobj ∈ getObjectsByCond(isDst) ∧ obj ∈ reachables(dobj, eT ype)
Condition based on type+object traceability
IsCreateadInMD(methDecls : Set〈MethodDeclaration〉)
satisfiedBy(obj : SecObject) :=
∃cic : ClassInstanceCreation ∈ obj.traceability() s.t.
md : MethodDeclaration ∈ cic.declarations() ∧ md ∈ methDecls
Figure 5.4: Selection and property queries on a SecGraph
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set of all descendants of the dataflow object.
The query objectProvenance returns a set of dataflow edges such that the same object that
flows from a first source to a first destination also flows from a second source to a second des-
tination (Fig. 5.3). The query uses connectedByDF() that returns the set of dataflow edges
between two objects, and flow() that returns the set of dataflow objects that the dataflow
edges in a given set refer to. Reasoning about object provenance may also involve indirect
communication through descendants and reachable objects. The query objProvenanceIndi-
rect uses connectedByDescendants() that returns the set of dataflow edges from a descendant
of the source to a descendant of the destination, and connectedByReachability() that return
the set of dataflow edges from an object reachable from the source to an object reachable
from the destination.
The SecGraph also provides the selection query getFlowToSink that takes as arguments
two sets of property values fProps and sProps and returns those dataflow edges or creation
edges that refer to a SecObject with the property values fProps and has as destination a
SecObject with the property values sProps. The query getFlowToSink has flags to control
whether to chase descendant and reachable SecObjects, as well as indirect communication,
such that queries are general expressed only in terms of security property.
A selection query such as getObjectsByCond() returns theObjSet or EdgeSet that satisfy a
Condition. The SecGraph has several Conditions that can be further extended. A constraint
is a predicate on the returned ObjSet or EdgeSet such as an ObjSet is empty, the intersection
or union of two ObjSet is empty.
5.3.3 Conditions
A Condition is a predicate that takes as arguments elements of the object structure, code
structure, or property values. The predicate is implemented by the satisfiedBy method that
is invoked for every element as the query traverses the SecGraph. For example, a selection
query using IsCreatedInMD returns the set of SecObjects instantiated in the body of one
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of the methods provided as argument. A query based on type only is less precise than a
query that combines information from the code structure and the SecGraph. For example,
a query using the condition InstanceOf returns the set of all SecObjects of a type specified
as argument. Sometimes, not all objects of a type should be treated the same. Using the
condition IsInDomain, a selection query returns a subset of these SecObjects by specifying
the type of the parent object, and name of a parent domain. In addition, a Condition
can use reachability information. For example a selection query based on the condition
IsInstOfRchblFromInstOf returns the set of SecObjects of a type dt that are reachable from
SecObjects of type st through various type of edges.
5.3.4 Property Queries
A property query such as setObjectsProperty() assigns security properties to a set of ob-
jects or a set of edges (Fig. 5.4). To allow architects to specify design information unavailable
in the code, a SecElement has an extensible set of security properties. Each Property in-
cludes predefined values and the value Unknown used for default initialization. For example,
the architects can specify objects that are trusted, or confidential. The property values are
stored at the level of the SecGraph. In the rest of the thesis, when we say we assign to an
object TrustLevel.True, it means the we assign to the object the security property TrustLevel
with the value True.
5.3.5 Extensibility
For extensibility, Condition and Property are defined as interfaces, and several concrete
implementations of these interfaces are described in this chapter. By design, the queries have
parameters declared in terms of these interfaces. The architects can define additional condi-
tions by defining classes that implement the Condition interface, which may use application-
specific information such as name of domains, types and methods that the architects learn
about by inspecting the SecGraph or the code.
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5.4 Summary
This chapter describes Scoria and shows that it meets the extensibility requirement (SC3)
using an incremental process to find security vulnerabilities. Scoria is based on the security
model SecGraph that supports queries in terms of object provenance (H2a) and indirect
communication (H2f). Chapter 6 describes an evaluation Scoria providing quantitative and
qualitative support for discussing the recall and the precision of Scoria.
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Chapter 6 Finding Architectural Flaws
This chapter1 presents the evaluation of Scoria on finding security vulnerabilities and
provides support for the hypothesis H2 (Section 1.5.1, page 9).
Based on a sound, hierarchical, abstract object graph with dataflow edges that
refer to objects, the architect writes machine-checkable constraints in terms of
one or more of the Scoria features to effectively (high recall and precision) to
detect security vulnerabilities.
This chapter is organized as follows. First, to show that Scoria meets the requirement
(SC2) and supports automation, Section 6.1 presents machine-checkable constraints ex-
ecuted on small examples with injected vulnerabilities. The examples are based on the
non-compliant code from the CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java [81] for which
automated detection was previously unavailable. Section 6.2 shows that constraints are
extensible (SC3) and can find information disclosure in an open-source Android applica-
tion. To estimate the recall and precision, Scoria is evaluated on a benchmark of test cases
designed by other researchers [48] that focuses on information disclosure in Android apps
(Section 6.3). Section 6.5 summarizes the chapter and concludes.
6.1 Evaluation on CERT Rules
This section provides evidence that Scoria supports automation of informal security con-
straints using five extended examples based on the CERT rules. The CERT coding standards
are the result of security communities effort to support developers that use programming
languages such as Java, C/C++, and Perl on writing code without security vulnerabilities
by following best-practices rules. I focus on the rules for Java [81], where each CERT rule
has an informal description, examples of compliant and non-compliant code, and available
1The evaluation on CERT and UPMA appeared in [133]. A tool demonstration of Scoria appeared in [132]
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solutions for automated detection. The CERT rules are informally described and for most
rules automated detection is unavailable.
6.1.1 Constraints that Implement CERT Rules
Selection of CERT rules. To select the five CERT rules, I used the following criteria.
First, the selected rules are related to information disclosure or tampering. Second, the
rules involves communication of objects, and third, the automated detection of the rule was
previously unavailable. Other CERT rules, not selected, require reasoning about control flow
or object state or involve the denial of service or elevation of privileges vulnerabilities.
I created complete examples from the non-compliant code fragments, then guided by the
informal description, I wrote constraints to trigger the automated detection of the archi-
tectural flaws. Since the CERT rules are general, the machine-checkable constraints could
conceivably be reused across Java applications with minor changes.
MSC00-J. Use SSLSocket rather than Socket for secure data exchange.
A client-server application that highlights a potential information disclosure if the com-
munication between the server and the client is not encrypted. The example consists
of two objects, client:EchoClient and server:EchoServer that communicate via a
message ss:String received from user input. The communication is established via a
sckt:Socket object, which contains two streams of data, namely, in:InputStream and
out:OutputStream. The object sckt:Socket does not provide encryption and should be
used only if the data transmitted is not confidential or if the network is trusted. Otherwise,
the implementation should use encryption protocols such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) to
ensure that the channel is not vulnerable. The server supports both types of communication
and has an object sslSckt:SSLSocket that encrypts data.
To find a possible information disclosure, the constraint insecureDataflows (line 6.1)
uses object provenance and checks if the same object that flows from an object of type
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insecureDataflows(g : SecGraph, isSrc : Condition, isDst : Condition, isUntrusted : Condition) (6.1)
insecureDataflows :=
⋃
{e} s.t. e : DataFlowEdge ∈ g.edges() ∧ (6.2)
e ∈ g.objProvenanceIndirect(inObj, tObj, tObj, uObj) where (6.3)
inObj ∈ g.getObjectsByCondition(isSrc) (6.4)
tObj ∈ g.getObjectsByCondition(isDst) (6.5)
uObj ∈ g.getObjectsByCondition(isUntrusted) (6.6)
isSrc := IsInDomain(Main, DATA, InputStream) (6.7)
isDst := InstanceOf(EchoClient) ∪ InstanceOf(EchoServer) (6.8)
isUntrusted := InstanceOf(Socket) (6.9)
{e1, e2} ⊆ insecureDataflows(G, isSrc, isDst, isUntrusted) (6.10)
e1 := 〈client:EchoClient, out:PrintWriter, ss:String〉 (6.11)
e2 := 〈server:EchoServer, wrtr:OutputStream, ss:String〉 (6.12)
1class EchoClient {
2 void run(){
3 Socket sckt = new Socket("localhost", 9999);
4 OutputStream out = sckt.getOutputStream();
5 PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(out, true);
6 while ((userInput = System.in.read()) != null) {
7 out.write(userInput); //inf. disclosure




Constraint, code fragments and SecGraph for the CERT rule MSC00-J] Constraint, code
fragments and SecGraph for the CERT rule MSC00-J. Confidential information flows to a
descendant of sckt:Socket.
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InputStream in the domain DATA of the class Main (line 6.7) to an object of type
EchoClient also flows to an object sckt:Socket. The constraint also uses object prove-
nance (line 6.3) and checks that the object flows to the descendants or reachable objects of
sckt:Socket. Indeed, the same object ss:String flows from client:EchoClient to the ob-
ject out:PrintWriter from which a descendant of sckt:Socket is reachable (line 6.11). The
object ss also flows from server:EchoServer to a descendant of sckt:Socket (line 6.12).
The constraint highlights these two dataflow edges as suspicious. From a suspicious dataflow
edge, the architects can trace to the method invocation out.write(stdInput) (line 7 in the
code fragments). There are no coding defects, however an information disclosure does ex-
ist.
If the constraint were to use the type information only and consider all objects of type
OutputStream as untrusted, it would report four suspicious dataflow edges including two
false positives: the dataflow edge from client to the standard output stream, and the
dataflow edge from server to a child of sslSckt:SSLSocket.
FIO05-J. Do not expose buffers created using the wrap() or duplicate() meth-
ods to untrusted code.
The class CharBuffer has methods that wrap an array of primitive types into an object
of type CharBuffer. According to the Java documentation, modifications of such an object
cause the array to be modified and vice-versa [81, 98]. Therefore, passing cb:CharBuffer
to an untrusted object exposes the array that is reachable from cb. Instead, an object with
a reference to a copy of the array should be passed.
The constraint bufferExposures (line 6.13) selects the objects of type CharBuffer created
in the body of the method wrap or duplicate (line 6.17). Next, the constraint selects the
children of these objects that are of type char[] (line 6.19) and assigns to them IsConfiden-
tial.True (line 6.20). The constraint also assigns TrustLevel.Untrusted to c:Client, which
represents untrusted code (line 6.21). The query getFlowToSink returns a suspicious edge
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bufferExposures(g : SecGraph) (6.13)
bufferExposures := g.getFlowToSink({IsConfidential.True}, {TrustLevel.Untrusted}) (6.14)
mdWrap = G.getMethodDecl(CharBuffer.wrap) (6.15)
mdDuplicate = G.getMethodDecl(CharBuffer.duplicate) (6.16)
isInMD := IsCreatedInMD({mdWrap,mdDuplicate}) (6.17)
∀o ∈ getObjectsByCond(isInMD), (6.18)
isChild := IsChildOf(o, OWNED, char[]) (6.19)
G.setObjectsProperty(IsConfidential.True, isChild) (6.20)
G.setObjectsProperty(TrustLevel.Untrusted, InstanceOf(Client)) (6.21)
{e} ⊆ bufferExposures(G) (6.22)
e := 〈m:Main, c:Client, cb:CharBuffer〉 (6.23)
Figure 6.2: Constraint, and SecGraph for the CERT rule FIO05-J. Confidential information flows to a
malicious client.
(line 6.23) because the dataflow object cb:CharBuffer has a points-to edge to the confiden-
tial object of type char[] and the destination object is c. This constraint may also consider
objects of types that are similar to CharBuffer such as IntBuffer.
SER03-J. Do not serialize unencrypted, sensitive data.
Serialization saves an object persistently. All the fields reachable from the object are also
saved unless the developers mark them as transient. An information disclosure exists if a
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confidential, unencrypted object is serialized and if the serialized data is not itself stored
securely.
The CERT example [81, SER03-J] uses the Serializable interface. Since other libraries
can also be used for serialization, the SecGraph has the property IsTransient to keep the con-
straint independent from a specific library. The constraint insecureSerializations (line 6.24)
assigns TrustLevel.Untrusted to objects of type ObjectOutputStream (line 6.29), then as-
signs IsConfidential.True and IsEncrypted.False to objects of type Double in the domain
OWNED of objects of type Point (line 6.31). Next, it assigns IsTransient.False to points-to
edges from objects of type Point to objects of type Double (line 6.33). Finally, insecure-
Serializations checks if the EdgeSet returned by getFlowToSink is not empty such that the
outgoing points-to edge from the dataflow object has IsTransient.False.
The constraint finds an information disclosure as a dataflow from coord to oout
(line 6.35), where the dataflow object is p:Point that has references to value:Double.
The object value:Double has the property IsConfidential.True and should not be serialized.
However, the points-to edge from p to value has IsTransient.False, and serialization occurs.
Next, the architects can trace to code and find the method invocation oout.writeObject(p)
in the body of Coordinates.run.
By using the condition IsInDomain, the constraint assigns property values only to a
subset of all the objects of type Double, i.e., it does not include children of objects of type
Coordinate. If the constraint were to use the InstanceOf condition instead of IsInDomain,
all the objects of type Double would be considered confidential, and insecureSerializations
would return one false positive.
FIO13-J. Do not log sensitive information outside a trust boundary.
Logging enables a program to collect essential information for debugging. However, log-
ging confidential information such as IP addresses may be prohibited by law in many coun-
tries [81, FIO13-J]. The class Logger in Java provides basic functionality for logging.
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insecureSerializations(g : SecGraph) (6.24)
insecureSerializations :=
⋃
{e} e : DataflowEdge ∧ (6.25)
e ∈ g.getFlowToSink({IsConfidential.True, IsEncrypted.False}, {TrustLevel.Untrusted}) s.t. (6.26)
∃pte ∈ g.getOutEdges(e.flow(), PointsTo) ∧ pte.isTransient = False (6.27)
isostream := InstanceOf(ObjectOutputStream) (6.28)
G.setObjectsProperty(TrustLevel.Untrusted, isostream) (6.29)
points := IsInDomain(Coordinate, OWNED, Point) (6.30)
isXY := IsInDomain(Point, OWNED, Double) (6.31)
G.setObjectsProperty({IsConfidential.True, IsEncrypted.False}, isXY) (6.32)
G.setEdgesProperty(IsTransient.False, IsP tEdge(points, isXY)) (6.33)
{e} ⊆ insecureSerializations(G) (6.34)
e = 〈coord:Coordinates, oout:ObjectOutputStream, p:Point〉 (6.35)
Figure 6.3: The object p:Point is serialized although it refers a confidential object.
The constraint insecureLogging (line 6.36) checks if dataflow edges exist such that a
dataflow object has IsConfidential.True and the destination has TrustLevel.Untrusted. The
constraint uses reachability information to assign IsConfidential.True only to the objects
of type String reachable from an object of type InetAddress (line 6.39). The constraint
highlights a dataflow edge from srvr to log that refers to the object ip:String. The
architects can trace to the line of code logger.severe(machine.getHostAddress()), which
indeed logs the IP address (line 6.43 Fig. 6.4).
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insecureLogging(g : SecGraph) (6.36)
insecureLogging := g.getFlowToSink(IsConfidential.True,TrustLevel.Untrusted) (6.37)
rch := IsInstOfRchblFromInstOf(InetAddress, String, {PointsTo}) (6.38)
G.setObjectsProperty(IsConfidential.True, rch) (6.39)
isLog := InstanceOf(Logger) (6.40)
G.setObjectsProperty(TrustLevel.Untrusted, isLog) (6.41)
{e} ⊆ insecureLogging(G) (6.42)
e := 〈srvr:LogServer, log:Logger, ip:String〉 (6.43)
Figure 6.4: Logging confidential the IP address to an untrusted object.
To assign the IsConfidential property, the architects use a condition that considers type
and reachability information. If the architects were to use a condition that considers
only the type information, insecureLogging would return a false positive for the expres-
sion logger.getLogger(name), where the name argument does not refer to a confidential
object.
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IDS07-J. Do not pass untrusted, unsanitized data to the Runtime.exec()
method.
A Java program can invoke external commands provided by the operating system such as a
command that lists a folder’s content. An architectural flaw exists if an attacker can tamper
with the input and launch arbitrary injected commands with the privileges of the target
user. As a solution, the program must sanitize untrusted objects flowing along untrusted
communication [81, IDS07-J].
An attacker can invoke arbitrary commands on Windows by tampering with the argu-
ments of the method Runtime.exec. The constraint commandInjections (line 6.44) finds
tampering by using object provenance, and traceability information. It uses object prove-
nance to check if the same object that is passed as an argument to m:Main is also passed to
an object of type Runtime (line 6.46). It also uses traceability (line 6.50) and highlights only
dataflow edges due to the method invocation Runtime.exec (line 6.56) (Fig. 6.5). The ar-
chitects trace to code and find the rt.exec("cmd.exe /C dir " + dir). If the constraint
were to use only information about the type of the arguments, it would also return a false
positive for rt.load(filename).
6.1.2 Results
The results show that constraints using all Scoria features can detect security vulnerabil-
ities that are architectural flaws. Two of the constraints use object provenance and do not
require security properties. For the others, the architects need to assign security properties
to only a few of the SecElements and use the defaults elsewhere (Table 6.1). The constraints
use the information provided by points-to and dataflow edges in the SecGraph. While all
the constraints highlight dataflow edges, three of them use reachability information through
points-to edges.
The evaluation highlights why Architectural Risk Analysis (ARA) requires a runtime
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comInjections(g : SecGraph, isUntrusted : Condition, isTrusted : Condition,md : MethodDeclaration) (6.44)
commandInjections :=
⋃
{e} s.t. e : DataFlowEdge ∧ (6.45)
∃e ∈ g.objectProvenance(main, o, o, rt) where (6.46)
(∃ main : SecObject ∈ g.getObjectsByCond(isUntrusted) ∧ (6.47)
∃ rt : SecObject ∈ g.getObjectsByCond(isTrusted)∧ (6.48)
∃ o : SecObject ∈ g.objects()) ∧ (6.49)
mInvk : MethodInvocation ∈ edge.traceability() ∧ (6.50)
mInvk.methodDecl = md ∧ edge.isExport()) (6.51)
mdExec := G.getMethodDecl(Runtime.exec) (6.52)
isUntrusted := InstanceOf(Main) (6.53)
isTrusted := InstanceOf(Runtime) (6.54)
{e} ⊆ comInjections(G, isUntrusted, isTrusted,mdExec) (6.55)
e := 〈dirList:DirList, rt:Runtime, command:String〉 (6.56)
Figure 6.5: Example of tampering. Attacker can execute arbitrary commands
architecture—not a code architecture. For example, bufferExposures distinguishes between
different objects of the same type with different property values such as the two SecObjects of
type char[] and the two SecObjects of type CharBuffer. By using the runtime architecture,
the constraints return fewer false positives. Some constraints also use information from the
code architecture such as subtyping information or method names.
In related work [7], object graphs with points-to edges were abstracted into a runtime
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MSC00-J information disclosure X X X X X 2 2 0 0
FIO05-J information disclosure X X X 1 1 2 0
SER03-J information disclosure X 1 1 2 2
FIO13-J information disclosure X 1 1 2 0
IDS07-J tampering X X X 1 1 0 0
architecture represented in an architectural description language. Constraints that check in-
formation disclosure were expressed as predicates that check only the presence or the absence
of communication, which is not enough. In Scoria, not only can architects check the pres-
ence or absence of communication, they can also express constraints about the information
content of the communication between objects because a dataflow edge refers to an abstract
object. For example, in the constraint insecureLogging, the SecGraph has two dataflow edges
from srvr:LogServer to log:Logger. If the constraint were to check only for the absence
of communication, it would be too restrictive. The communication from srvr to log is
required, otherwise the system becomes vulnerable to other security vulnerabilities such as
repudiation [60]. Only one dataflow edge leads to information disclosure, and the constraint
can tell the two edges apart by tracking the object flowing along the edge and using object
provenance.
6.2 Evaluation on Open-Source Application
Previous examples presented constraints that found injected architectural flaws. Sco-
ria can also find architectural flaws that the architects are not aware of in open-source
applications. For example, an Android application is written in Java and consists of sev-
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eral Activity components that interact with the user using a View. Two objects of type
Activity communicate with each other using an Intent that represents a message used for
inter- and intra-application communication.
The subject system is Universal Password Manager Android application (UPMA) version
1.13, a 4KLOC open-source Android app that encrypts and stores usernames, passwords and
confidential notes in a database protected by a master password. A security vulnerability
in UPMA would impact a large number of users interested in protecting their confidential
information.
6.2.1 Collecting Security Constraints from Documentation
This subsection provides examples of informal constraints considered during the UPMA
case study. During ARA, architects gather information about the application and informal
security constraints from the existing documentation that can be application-specific or
documentation of frameworks and libraries used by the application. Detailed security policies
are often available in the description of standard security protocols that the application or
the library uses. The architects may read and understand these security policies which
are a collection of constraints and identify risks. However, since these constraints are only
informally described, checking them on the implementation is challenging.
Informal constraints reusable across frameworks and libraries
Some constraints are general across applications that use the same framework or library.
For example, the following security policy is documented both by researchers [28] and in the
Android documentation [19]:
“Do not put sensitive data into Intents used to start Activities
[. . . ] applications with the GET TASKS permission are able to see
ActivityManager.RecentTaskInformation which includes the base Intent
used to start Activities”.
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Other security constraints are available as best-practices specific to mobile applications [2].
The following informal constraint2 states that the clipboard can be accessed by any applica-
tion installed on the device, and the copy/paste feature should be disabled in the presence
of confidential information.
Android also supports copy/paste by default and the clipboard can be accessed
by any application. Where appropriate, disable copy/paste for areas handling
sensitive data. Eliminating the option to copy can help avoid data exposure.
Informal constraints are also available in the documentation of services. Supporting third-
party services require the application to ensure that the authentication credentials of these
services are securely stored and communicated. For example, UPMA has support for the
Dropbox service to allow users to store and share the database on several devices. The fol-
lowing are snippets of informal security constraints from the Dropbox documentation3.
• [...] all requests are done over SSL.
• OAuth 1.0 continues to be supported for all API requests, but OAuth 2.0 is
now preferred
• Step 1 of authentication. Obtain an OAuth request token to be used for the
rest of the authentication process. [...] Since this method is on behalf of
an unauthenticated user, no access token or secret should be involved when
signing or sending the request.
These informal constraints require that no secret should be sent to the service when the
authentication is initiated. Then all communication needs to use encryption provided by the
SSL protocol. Although both versions of the standard authentication protocol are supported,
the DropBox documentation recommends developers to use the latest version.
2Informal constraint taken ad litteram from https://viaforensics.com/resources/reports/best-practices-
ios-android-secure-mobile-development/copy-paste/
3Text snippets from the Dropbox documentation https://www.dropbox.com/developers/core/docs
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Informal constraints in standard security protocols
Dropbox documentation refers further to the standard description of the authentication
protocol. The architects may use such documentation to gather additional constraints from
the security guidelines informally described. For example, to prevent client impersonation,
the security guidelines of the OAuth 2.0 protocol requires the client credentials, which include
the password and the authentication token, to be kept secret4.
A malicious client can impersonate another client and obtain access to protected
resources if the impersonated client fails to, or is unable to, keep its client cre-
dentials confidential.
Informal constraints in version control repositories
Informal security constraints are also available in bug reports. The security-related bugs
are only reported to a private email to protect the users until developers fix the bug. Details
on security constraint may still be available as comments in the version control where the
security bug is fixed. UPMA is actively maintained and has an available repository that
contains the following comment5:
Hide accnt details in screenshots and task manager. Security precaution to ensure
a third party can’t view account details left open when UPM was last used.
The UPMA developer changed the code to ensure that another application cannot steal the
password by taking a picture of the screen when the password is displayed in clear text.
The developer changed the class ViewAccountDetails and set a security flag in the method
onCreate (Fig. 6.6).
4Security guideline taken ad litteram from the authorization protocol
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-10
5A commit message in UPMA https://github.com/adrian/upm-android/commit/bd53100
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GIT commit @bd53100
src/com/u17od/upm/ViewAccountDetails.java public void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);




Figure 6.6: Changes in UPMA 1.14 to prevent screenshots being taken by malicious apps when the password
in clear text is displayed.
insecureIntents(g : SecGraph) (6.57)
insecureIntents := g.getFlowToSink({IsConfidential.True, (6.58)
IsEncrypted.False}, {TrustLevel.Untrusted}) (6.59)
isIntent := InstanceOf(Intent) (6.60)
setObjectsProperty(TrustLevel.Untrusted, isIntent) (6.61)
isPwd := IsInDomain(AccountInformation, PWD, String) (6.62)
setObjectsProperty({IsConfidential.True, IsEncrypted.False}, isPwd) (6.63)
{e1, e2, e3, e4} ⊆ insecureIntents(G) (6.64)
e1 := 〈vad:VADetails, intnt:Intent, vad:VADetails〉 (6.65)
e2 := 〈vad:VADetails, s:String, pwd:String〉 (6.66)
e3 := 〈al:AccountsList, s:String, pwd:String〉 (6.67)
e4 := 〈aea:AddEditAccount, s:String, pwd:String〉 (6.68)
Figure 6.7: A constraint that checks if the password is sent to an object of type Intent.
6.2.2 Information Disclosure in UPMA
This case study evaluates if Scoria can find an architectural flaw that violates the informal
security constraints previously described. Confidential information, such as the password in
clear text, should not be disclosed to objects of type Intent or ClipboardManager. In Scoria,
the machine-checkable constraint insecureIntents is executed on the SecGraph extracted from
annotated code of UPMA.
In this example, finding the untrusted sink is straightforward based on the type of the
object. Finding what objects are confidential requires a brief inspection of the code to
locate where the password concept is implemented. The inspection revealed that the class
AccountInformation has the fields username and password to store confidential information
in plain text.
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insecureClipboard(g : SecGraph, isPwd : Condition, isClipboard : Condition) (6.69)
insecureClipboard :=
⋃
{e} s.t. e : DataFlowEdge ∈ g.edges() ∧ (6.70)
o ∈ g.getObjectsByCond(isPwd) ∧ crEdge : CreationEdge ∈ g.getEdgesByFlow(o, Creation) where (6.71)
e ∈ g.getEdgesByFlow(crEdge.dst, DataFlow) ∧ e.dst ∈ g.getObjectsByCond(isClipboard) (6.72)
isClipboard := InstanceOf(ClipboardManager) (6.73)
isPwd := IsInDomain(AccountInformation, PWD, String) (6.74)
{e1, e2} ⊆ insecureClipboard(G, isPwd, isClipboard) (6.75)
e1 := 〈sr:SearchResults, cm:ClipboardManager, s:String〉 (6.76)
e2 := 〈accts:FullAccountList, cm:ClipboardManager, s:String〉 (6.77)
Figure 6.8: The password is sent indirectly through creation edges to an object of type ClipboardManager
The constraint insecureIntents (line 6.57) uses object hierarchy to distinguish between
different objects of type String, where only the password and account represent confiden-
tial information (line 6.62). A potential information disclosure exists for those objects of
type Intent that receive such information. The constraint uses the getFlowToSink query
(lines 6.58), which in turn uses indirect communication through object hierarchy and object
reachability to check that a dataflow object contains or can reach into confidential informa-
tion.
To check if the password is exposed to the clipboard, the machine checkable constraint
insecureClipboard uses object reachability through creation edges (Fig. 6.8). The constraint
checks if a dataflow edge with an untrusted sink refers to the destination of a creation
edge, which in turn refers to a confidential object. Scoria finds a vulnerability in the class
AccountsList that FullAccountsList and SearchResults extend where the unencrypted
password is disclosed (Fig. 6.9). Since the clipboard is accessible to any other app, passwords
stored by UPMA are vulnerable to eavesdropping when the user copies them.
6.2.3 Lessons Learned
Fig. 6.10 shows a fragment of the UPMA OGraph, elides the substructure of some objects,
and included only the edges that provide support for the following observations.
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1 class FullAcountList extends AccountsList{ ... }
2 class SearchResults extends AccountsList{ ... }
3 class AccountsList {
4 boolean onContextItemSelected(MenuItem item) {
5 View targetView = ...;
6 ...
7 // a copy of the password in cleartext is sent to clipboard
8 setClipboardText(getPassword(getAccount(targetView)));
9 }
10 void setClipboardText(String text) {
11 ClipboardManager clipboardManager = ...;
12 clipboardManager.setText(text);
13 }
14 String getPassword(AccountInformation account) {











26 class ViewAccountDetails {
27 void populateView(){
28 ...
29 TextView accountPasswordTextVeiw = ...




Figure 6.9: Code where the password in clear text is disclosed to clipboard
Constraints may return false positives
An object graph merges multiple objects of the same type in one domain, which may lead
to false positive edges due to a method invocation in a super class [87]. None of the dataflow
edges highlighted by the constraints in the CERT examples is a false positive. However, one
of four dataflow edges highlighted by insecureIntents in UPMA is a false positive due to
excessive merging of objects of type String in the domain SHARED. A points-to edge exists
from intnt:Intent to s:String in SHARED. A creation edge from aea:AddEditAccount to









































































Figure 6.10: A fragment of the extracted UPMA SecGraph shows dataflow objects of type File, and a flow
object of type byte[] from ai:AccountInformation to os:ByteArrayOutputStream
excessively merges objects of type String including the object of type String created when
the UPMA user displays an account. Sending the password in plain text to be displayed
is part of the intended UPMA functionality and is not a vulnerability because the UPMA
developer prevented other applications to take a snapshot (Fig 6.6).
The analysis extracts dataflow edges that refer to objects and distinguishes be-
tween objects of the same type
The extracted SecGraph shows distinct objects of type File, where dest:File represents
the file that stores the encrypted database, while cert:File represents a file that stores
the encryption keys. The analysis shows a dataflow edge from act:UPMApplication to
accts:FullAccountList that refer to dest:File. This edge is due to a feature in UPMA
that allows the user to copy the database file to the external memory of the phone. If the
dataflow edge were to show only the type of the object, it would be misleading because such
a dataflow edge would indicate that the file containing the encryption keys is also copied
and the encryption keys are exposed, which is not the case.
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ScoriaX extracts several flow objects
While both objects of type File are nodes in the SecGraph, the analysis also extracts
several flow objects. For example, a flow object b:byte[] is referred from the dataflow edge
from ai:AccountInformation to os:ByteArrayOutputStream. This flow object is created
during encryption when the object pd:PasswordDatabase translates password:String of
ai:AccountInformation from plain text to a binary representation which is also confiden-
tial. The architects need to ensure that the binary representation only flows to the encryption
service.
More precise ownership types produce more precise results
Developers can control the precision of the extracted graphs by placing objects in differ-
ent domains. For example, the class SaveDatabaseAsynkTask has a field of type Activity.
The field is the receiver of a method invocation activity.getString() which returns the
flow object. The field is declared in owner domain. If all the instances of subclasses
that extend Activity were in LOGIC, the analysis would show dataflow edges to the ob-
jects act:UPMApplication and accts:FullAccountList, which are of types that extend
Activity. However, such edges would be false positives. One manual workaround is to
have the developer define a separate domain, LOGIC2, and place these object in that domain,
so the analysis does distinguish between these objects and cnb:CreateNewDatabase, thus
avoiding these false positives (Fig. 6.10).
6.3 Evaluation on Benchmark
The section describes the evaluation based on an existing benchmark designed by re-
lated work [48]. Scoria is thus compared in terms of true positives, false positives, and false
negatives with another research tool, FlowDroid [48] described in detail in Section 7.2.3
(page 159), and two commercial tools commonly used in industry Fortify [62] and App-
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Scan [66] described in detail in Section 7.2.5 (page 161). This comparison is instructive
because these tools use hard-coded constraints that check if confidential data flows from a
source to an untrusted sink, where the list of sources and sinks can be automatically gener-
ated [20]. In contrast, Scoria combines annotations, a static analysis to extract a high-level
representation, and constraints that are separated from extraction.
For evaluation, I include hand-selected test cases from DroidBench [48] because is one of a
few studies that have the tools and the dataset publicly available to allow direct comparison.
I excluded test cases from the same equivalence class that target the same behavior of a static
analysis and tests that focus on code constructs specific to Java such as anonymous classes or
static initialization blocks (Table 6.2). The benchmark is divided into equivalence classes that
target the specifics of static analyses such as callbacks, collections, object-sensitivity, inter-
application communication, and lifecycle of objects created by the Android framework. Other
approaches either are evaluated on commercial systems such as popular Android apps, or
are evaluated only on a few test cases, which do not allow a systematic comparison. Popular
apps restrict our evaluation to static analyses that use bytecode because their source code
is often unavailable. Scoria requires the source code to be available and can be used to find
vulnerabilities proactively before the release.
The evaluation uncovered some classes of vulnerabilities that DroidBench lacked, so the
original benchmark was extended with new test cases, which are related to authentication,
encryption, and injection attacks. Some of the new test cases were inspired the examples in
the CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java [81]. Then, I proposed test cases related
to bypassing authentication, exploitable service and violation of least privilege principle.
Since the test cases I contributed to the benchmark may be useful for other researchers, I
am making them publicly available [3].
The Scoria evaluators who were previously unfamiliar with Scoria or FlowDroid received
instructional training on adding annotations, running the static analysis, and writing con-
straints. The test cases IntentSink1 and ObjectSensitivity1 from DroidBench were used in
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Table 6.2: Selected test cases from DroidBench
Selected DroidBench
Equivalence class tests vulns. tests vulns.
Arrays and Lists 1 0 3 0
Callbacks 5 9 6 10
Field and Object Sensitivity 6 2 7 2
Inter-App Communication 3 3 3 3
Lifecycle 5 5 6 6
General Java 3 2 5 4
Android-Specific 5 3 5 3
Implicit Flows 4 8 4 8
TOTAL 32 32 39 36
Table 6.3: Recall and precision based on DroidBench
AppScan Fortify FlowDroid Scoria
TP, higher is better 13 14 31 35
FP, lower is better 4 3 6 6
FN, lower is better 19 18 12 8
Precision 76% 82% 84% 85%
Recall 41% 44% 72% 81%
F-measure 0.53 0.57 0.77 0.83
the training. The evaluators then completed the other test cases mostly on their own, but
got frequent feedback from the Scoria designers. The evaluator did not rerun FlowDroid
on the test cases that were reused from the original DroidBench benchmark, but did run
FlowDroid on the additional test cases.
6.3.1 Quantitative Results
Table 6.4 presents the results of the evaluation and its rows show the selected test cases
grouped in equivalence classes, where the last rows has test cases in the extended benchmark.
The first column with the name of the test cases is followed by several columns that emphasize
which features of Scoria the evaluators used. The last four groups of columns present the
results for each tool showing the number of true positives (TP), false positives (FP), and
false negatives (FN).
This section reuses the existing results from the related study [48] without rerunning
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Table 6.4: Results of comparing approaches that find security vulnerabilities. Results on AppScan, Fortify









































































































AppScan Fortify FlowDroid Scoria
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (g) TP FP FN TP FP FN TP FP FN TP FP FN
Arrays and Lists
ListAccess1 X 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Callbacks
Button1 2 0 1 6 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Button2 2 0 1 8 1 0 2 1 0 2 3 1 0 3 0 0
LocationLeak1 2 0 6 4 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 0 0
LocationLeak2 2 0 6 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 0 0
MethodOverride1 X 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Field and Object Sensitivity
FieldSensitivity1 X 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FieldSensitivity3 X 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
FieldSensitivity4 X 0 0 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
InheritedObjects1 2 0 1 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
ObjectSensitivity1 X 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ObjectSensitivity2 X 2 0 2 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
Inter-App Communication
IntentSink1 X X 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
IntentSink2 2 0 0 6 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
ActivityComm1 X 0 0 1 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Lifecycle
BReceiverLifecycle1 2 0 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
ActivityLifecycle1 X X 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
ActivityLifecycle2 2 0 1 4 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
ActivityLifecycle3 2 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
ServiceLifecycle1 2 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
General Java
Loop1 2 0 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
SourceCodeSpecific1 X 0 0 2 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
UnreachableCode 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Miscellaneous Android-Specific
PrivateDataLeak1 X 0 0 3 7 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
PrivateDataLeak2 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
DirectLeak1 2 0 0 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
InactiveActivity 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
LogNoLeak 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Implicit Flows
ImplicitFlow1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 2
ImplicitFlow2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 2
ImplicitFlow3 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 2
ImplicitFlow4 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 2
Extended Benchmark
ACipher X 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
ACipher2 X 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
AToken1 X X X 2 0 0 6 3 0 0 3 0 0
AToken2 X X X 2 1 0 6 1 2 0 1 0 0
ASocket X X 2 0 2 5 1 1 0 1 0 0
AActivity X 2 0 0 3 0 0 1 1 0 0
ARuntime X 1 0 0 6 1 0 0 1 0 0
DataContainer X 2 0 2 4 2 0 0 2 0 0
AChat X 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 0 0
SecretViewer X 1 0 3 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
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FlowDroid, AppScan and Fortify on the original benchmark. Since FlowDroid outperforms
the commercial tools in terms of both precision and recall based on the original benchmark,
the corresponding cells in the extended benchmark are empty.
Compared to FlowDroid, Scoria has higher recall, precision and a similar F-measure6 (Ta-
ble 6.3). Based on the original test cases from DroidBench, Scoria finds one vulnerability
and avoids one false positive of FlowDroid, but reports five additional false positives. The
extended benchmark highlights cases where Scoria can do better than FlowDroid, which
misses three vulnerabilities that Scoria finds and also reports five false positives.
6.3.2 Qualitative Analysis
The results of the evaluation show that by using object provenance and indirect commu-
nication constraints, Scoria can find security vulnerabilities such as information disclosure
and tampering. Comparing to other research approaches, Scoria performs better in terms of
recall and precision due to the flexibility Scoria provides for fine-tuning the annotations that
provide precision about aliasing, for writing constraints, and for assigning security properties.
Scoria also performs better in terms of precision and recall than two commercial security
tools when targeting the same types of security vulnerabilities. The evaluation also high-
lights several limitations of Scoria in terms of precision due to ScoriaX being flow-insensitive,
and in terms of scalability due to the manual process of adding annotations.
Scoria meets most of the requirements from Section 1.4 (page 9). The rest of the section
revisits the requirements and presents in more detail several lessons learned based on Scoria
evaluation.
Unsound call-graph reduces recall
The results for the commercial approaches indicate a lower recall for the Callbacks and
Lifecycle equivalence classes of DroidBench because of a precomputed call graph. Extract-
6The weighted harmonic mean of precision and recall
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ing a call graph is challenging in the presence of callbacks that are methods invoked by a
framework in an order predefined by the object lifecycle. Security vulnerabilities exist for
example when one callback stores confidential data into a field, and another callback reads
the value of the field and discloses the confidential data into an untrusted sink. Callbacks
often implements the Observer design pattern, which uses subjects and observers and notifies
the registered observers when the state of a subject changes.
FlowDroid is optimized to find vulnerabilities in applications built on the Android frame-
work. It models the lifecycle of an object of type Activity by adding the callbacks as entry
points in the call graph and assumes that all the callbacks are invoked. Therefore, FlowDroid
has a better recall compared to AppScan and Fortify for the LifeCycle test cases, Location-
Leak1 and LocationLeak2. FlowDroid reports, however, a false negative for SecretViewer,
where information disclosure occurs when a confidential document is changed and a notifica-
tion is sent to all the objects of a type that implement the Listener interface. FlowDroid uses
an unsound call graph and cannot resolve the type behind the Listener interface; therefore,
it misses the vulnerability.
To achieve high recall, ScoriaX safely assumes that every method declared on an instan-
tiated class may be invoked, and avoids the use of an unsound call graph. This assumption
reduces the computational complexity and increases recall for the aforementioned test cases.
Admittedly, the assumption is a source of imprecision of Scoria as the UnreachableCode test
case highlights.
By filtering, approaches gain precision, but reduce recall
Because one vulnerability can compromise the whole system, Scoria avoids sacrificing
recall for precision. This is in contrast to FlowDroid, which uses the value of attributes in
configuration files to filter the call graph and ICFG to gain more precision. In Android,
for each object of type Activity, a configuration file (manifest.xml) contains values for
attributes that define the behavior of the object at runtime. For example, if a class that
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extends Activity has the attribute android:enabled assigned false, the framework cannot
instantiate any object of such a class. FlowDroid filters the fragment of the ICFG that is
related to such a class. By filtering, FlowDroid avoids a false positive in InactiveActivity,
but fails to find the vulnerability in AActivity, where the attribute is changed at runtime
bypassing the configuration file. Scoria is more conservative and assumes that all classes
may be instantiated at runtime. Scoria finds the vulnerability in AActivity and returns one
false positive for InactiveActivity.
Some classes of security vulnerabilities are hard to find
Security vulnerabilities that are hard to find seem to involve implicit flows and immutabil-
ity; I discuss each one in turn.
An implicit flow is a dependency between the predicate of a conditional statement and the
expression executed based on the value of the predicate. For example, if an application allows
unlimited login attempts and returns a binary response, a malicious user can use brute-force
attack based on a dictionary to guess the passwords although there is no explicit flow of the
confidential password to an untrusted sink. None of evaluated approaches supports implicit
flows7 (Table 6.4).
Another class of vulnerabilities that are hard to find involves immutability. Consider for
example an object of type HashMap that has values representing credit card information and
keys representing the address of the credit card owner. If the state of the object used as
a key is changed at runtime (i.e., the object is mutable) the credit card information can
no longer be looked by its previous key, which may result in a denial-of-service attack. To
overcome this difficulty, researchers proposed approaches for enforcing immutability [105]
and determining pure methods that are guaranteed to not change the state of the receiver
object [109]. Scoria does not consider immutability.
7Milanova et al. proposed a static analysis that extracts implicit flows edges in the ICFG [77] and
FlowDroid reports support of implicit flows as work in progress [26].
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Summarization increases recall
Summarizing multiple runtime objects that have the same conceptual purpose with one
representative (H1f) increases recall when the objects are created by different object al-
location expressions in the code. Finding such vulnerabilities would otherwise require an
analysis that keeps track values that flow through library code (which may not be available),
or through files (which may be hard to track). The test case Loop1 obfuscates an object of
type String that represent the device identification number by adding an intermediate char-
acter between any two characters in the initial object. The obfuscated object still represents
confidential data; hence, the architect decides to use one representative for both objects by
placing them in the same domain. A runtime dataflow with an object of type SmsManager
as a destination would only refer to the obfuscated object. In Scoria, the architect assigns
IsConfidential.True to the representative of both objects, and the constraint reports a true
positive. FlowDroid and AppScan keep track of the transformations by propagating the
security property from the argument of the method concat of the class String to the return
value and report the vulnerability, while Fortify fails to report it.
Soundness does not generate an excessive number of false positives
Although for some test cases FlowDroid is more precise being flow-sensitive, Scoria com-
pensates for flow-insensitivity in other test cases using domain-sensitivity. ScoriaX is a sound
(H1c) flow-insensitive, but domain-sensitive analysis (H1b). The precision at the level of ob-
jects and edges is reflected in finding vulnerabilities. On average, 80% of vulnerabilities
reported by Scoria are true positives, thus Scoria achieves a high precision.
Scoria reports more false positives than FlowDroid for the test cases FieldSensitivity4
and ObjectSensitivity2, where a confidential and a non-confidential value are assigned to
the same variable. Since ScoriaX is flow-insensitive and the domain of an abstract object
does not change at runtime, Scoria assumes the worst case, i.e., that the variable may alias
a confidential object. For other test cases, Scoria compensates by distinguishing between
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objects of the same type in different domains. Then, Scoria is more precise and avoids the
false positive reported by FlowDroid. For Button2, a variable imei is assigned null before
is concatenated to a constant. In Scoria, the architect inspects the code and fine-tunes the
annotations such that the result of concatenation is in SHARED while the object imei:String
is in the domain DATA.
Separating constraints from extraction increases recall
Scoria is semi-automated (SC2) by allowing the architects to write machine-checkable
constraints. It separates constraints from extraction (SC3) and is able to find a vulnera-
bility that FlowDroid misses. FlowDroid uses a constraint that is only based on transitive
communication of objects. Keeping track of all assignments is challenging because some occur
in the code frameworks and libraries and this code may not always be available. For the test
IntentSink1, the confidential information is first passed to an object of type Intent, which
is then passed as an argument to an untrusted sink through some variables in the frame-
work. FlowDroid fails to find these vulnerabilities since it does not analyze the framework.
By using constraints based on object traceability and object reachability, Scoria reports the
vulnerability. The constraint checks if the same information that leaves the source is passed
to the sink through some other objects. Thank to the domain annotations, it is easier for
Scoria to keep track of information flow because it merges objects of the same type in the
same domain.
Object provenance increases recall
Scoria supports a constraint in terms of object provenance, which is used to find the
vulnerability in AChat, where the same object that flows from the application to the service
should not flow from an external client to the service. The service of AChat allows a registered
user to search for existing phone numbers in a database. A malicious client can use the
service to register a fake user that searches for all possible phone numbers in a region that
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are valid and registered by the service. Such an attack circumvents the use of encryption and
exposes confidential information (valid phone numbers in a region) although the service is not
explicitly disclosing phone numbers8. To find such a vulnerability, architects need flexibility
to adapt and write application-specific constraints, which the designer of a security approach
may not consider.
Object provenance and indirect communication increase precision
Scoria allows architects to write constraints in terms of object provenance (H2a) and
indirect communication (H2f), which increase the precision. Scoria can implement the con-
straints of FlowDroid using object transitivity and object reachability through only points-
to edges. Unsurprisingly, for most of the test cases in DroidBench, using such a constraint
provides sufficient precision (Table 6.4, column 3). Scoria has other features that allow
architects to increase precision. For example, Scoria considers reachability through other
types of edges such as creation edges in addition to the points-to edges. For the test cases
in the extended benchmark, avoiding false positives requires using object provenance, edge
traceability, and object hierarchy in addition to object reachability. For ASocket, the archi-
tects writes a constraint that uses indirect communication and checks that no confidential
object flows to a descendant of an object of type Socket, which does not provide encryption.
Using object hierarchy, the constraint distinguishes between two objects of the same type,
SocketOutputStream. The first object is a descendant of an object of type Socket and the
second is a descendant of an object of type SSLSocket. Thus, Scoria avoids a false positive
that FlowDroid reports if it considers the method SocketOutputStream.write an untrusted
sink.
8This test case is inspired from the SnapChat attack [51]
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Application-specific security properties increase precision
Scoria separates security properties from extraction (SC3), and allows the architects to
assign security properties to objects and edges on the extracted object graph. The same
security properties can be reused across applications for classes in the Java library and
frameworks. In several test cases however, assigning security properties requires application-
specific knowledge. In FlowDroid, this requires using sources and sinks that are application-
specific methods, while in Scoria it requires knowledge about locally declared domains or
types that architects can gain by querying the OGraph. Assigning application-specific prop-
erties increases the precision for several cases, including the precision of FlowDroid in the test
case ACipher where the architect adds to the list of sources the method declaration decrypt
of the class Service. Otherwise, if the architect were to use as a source the method doFinal
of the class Cipher that can encrypt or decrypt data, FlowDroid would return a false posi-
tive. This also occurs in test case ACipher2, where two objects of type Service exist, and
the class Service has only one method run that decrypts or encrypts data. For ACipher2,
FlowDroid reports a false positive, which is avoided by Scoria using object provenance.
Assigning security properties on edges can also increase precision. For AToken2, a client
object has a field marked as transient, and this field is not serialized. The field represents
confidential information, but information disclosure does not exist even if the client object
is serialized into an untrusted file. To avoid the false positive, Scoria uses the IsTransient
property for the points-to edge. This property is independent of the serialization library
being used. By assigning security properties only to objects, FlowDroid reports two false
positives.
Assigning properties to objects instead of declarations increases precision
Scoria uses a runtime architecture (SC1) and distinguishes between objects of the same
type that have different security properties. Section 6.1 discusses why the use of a class
declaration to assign security properties can lead to false positives. By using method decla-
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rations to assign security properties, FlowDroid is less precise than Scoria for test cases where
the same method is used in different contexts. Consider for example the method doFinal
of Cipher, which returns encrypted or decrypted data depending on the context, and the
method write of the class SocketOutputStream, which does not disclose confidential data
if the parent of the object of type SocketOutputStream is of type SSLSocket.
6.4 Threats to Validity
The test cases in the extended benchmark are small, consisting of fewer than 100 lines of
non-comment, non-blank lines of code, with at most 5 classes. Despite being small, the micro-
benchmark allows us to understand the differences between Scoria and other approaches
in terms of precision and recall. The test cases are realistic and cover a wide range of
vulnerabilities that may occurred in practice.
In the evaluation using the benchmark (Section 6.3), the expertise and experience of the
evaluators using the approaches may influence the results. This issue is more pronounced
with Scoria since it is not a push-button approach and involves human judgment in adding
annotations, writing constraints and interpreting the results. In this case, the evaluators
had little prior experience. In the presence of false positives, the architects can refine the
constraints to use object hierarchy, object reachability, and the traceability to code that the
security model provides. Some of these features of Scoria are used more than others, which
might happened because some of the advanced features of Scoria are more difficult to use
in practice. It would be interesting to investigate how much effort it takes to refine the
constraints, and which features require more effort.
Another threat to validity is that the evaluators have access to documentation in each
test case that describe what constitute confidential data or untrusted sink, along with the
number of existing vulnerabilities. In practice, and for the UPMA case study (Section 6.2),
such information is not available and the process stops based on the available resources.
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The Scoria evaluators first minimized the number of extraction and annotation warnings.
In the second phase, they focused on writing constraints to minimize the number of false
positives and false negatives, and rarely changed the annotations. By running again the
typechecker, the evaluators ensured that the annotations and the code are consistent. It
would be interesting to evaluate different exit criteria such as measuring the quality of the
annotations [134].
Another threat to validity is related to the visualization of the extracted graph. For the
DroidBench test cases, the abstract object graphs are small and the evaluators relied on
exported object graph as pictures while writing constraints. For larger systems, they would
need an interactive visualization tool to collapse and expand the visualization of objects and
lift edges to keep the graphs manageable and reduce effort. In this thesis, I assume that
a hierarchical OGraph, can be visualized using nested boxes (see details in [4, Sec. 2.4.3]).
The visualization can use different abstraction mechanisms such as abstraction by types
within a domain [4, Sec. 3.4.2], and achieves 1x–10x reduction in the number of abstract
objects displayed [134]. This kind of visualization enable high-level understanding, while
the details are still available as needed by expanding the substructure of a displayed object.
The examples used in DroidBench are small enough that it is possible, as well as useful and
instructive to look at the OGraph. For example, evaluators can see where the analysis loses
precision for the value-flow analysis, or where additional precision is needed.
Scoria is focused on finding architectural flaws related to connectors in a runtime archi-
tecture and focuses only on the runtime structure. Architectural flaws may also be related
to the state of the object, and the abstract object graph does not capture such information.




This chapter provides quantitative and qualitative support to show that Scoria meets the
security analysis requirements. Scoria is a semi-automated approach (SC2) that supports
ARA by using the SecGraph as an approximation of the runtime architecture (SC1). The
architects can write informal security policies as machine-checkable constraints that are
executed against the SecGraph. The constraints are extensible (SC3) and can express CERT
rules and security policies from existing documentation. By using constraints in terms of
object provenance and indirect communication, Scoria achieves more than 80% recall and
80% precision on finding information disclosure and tampering. The results are better than
the ones of commercial approaches, and for some test cases, Scoria can find vulnerabilities
that information-flow based approaches such as FlowDroid [48] miss. The next chapter
(Chapter 7) discusses related work in detail.
Credits
I would like to thank Ebrahim Khalaj, Sumukhi Chandrashekar, and Dajun Lu who an-
notated most of the DroidBench test cases and wrote constraints. Ebrahim also contributed
to the test cases in the extended benchmark and ran FlowDroid to provide the numbers in
Table 6.4.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the EC-SPRIDE group for making FlowDroid and DroidBench
available. We are also making available our extended benchmark [3].
149
Chapter 7 Related Work
This chapter highlights conceptual differences between approaches that use a program
analysis to find security vulnerabilities in object-oriented programs. The approaches focus
on web applications and mobile applications where one security vulnerability can affect many
users. Scoria consists of a static analysis that extracts a sound, hierarchical object graph
where the architects can fine-tune the precision of the extraction analysis using ownership
types annotations. To find information disclosure and tampering, Scoria allows architects
to write constraints and assign security properties to abstract objects and edges, where the
constraints and security properties are separated from the extraction analysis.
Other than Scoria, several approaches target the same problem of finding information
disclosure and tampering using a static analysis. I focus on general approaches without
targeting applications implemented in a specific object-oriented framework (Table 7.1). The
static taint analyses [21, 43, 49], information flow control and the tainting type system [37, 92]
combine constraints and extraction. Although the constraints consider transitive dataflow
communication and reachability, these approaches may miss some of the vulnerabilities that
can be found by the separate constraints in architectural-level approaches [115, 16] and
Program Query Language (PQL) [84]. Most approaches are flexible in allowing architects
to assign security properties but at different levels of granularity such as objects, variables,
expressions, method and class declarations.
The chapter has the following structure. Section 7.1 describes the static and dynamic
analyses that extract object graphs focusing on how these object graphs can be used for
reasoning about security. Section 7.2 describes existing approaches for finding security vul-
nerabilities and compares them with Scoria. Section 7.3 discusses how related approaches
are evaluated.
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7.1 Extracting Object Graphs
Section 2.1 (page 14) discusses how an object graph approximates a runtime architecture
and what requirements an analysis must meet in order to extract an object graph that is
suitable for ARA. This section describes static and dynamic analyses that extracts object




A static analysis works at compile time and uses as input the source code or compiled
bytecode. To handle the complex expressions in the code, the static analyses often transform
complex expressions into an intermediate representation as a three-address code [128]. Each
three-address code expression has at most three operands and is typically a combination
of an assignment and a binary operator or a method invocation that has only variables as
arguments. This transformation reduces the complexity of a static analysis. To represent
the dynamic structure of the program, static analyses extract object graphs where a node is
an abstract object and edges represent relations between abstract objects.
Flat object graphs
Existing static analyses extract object graphs with points-to edges [87, 76, 114] or dataflow
edges [116, 67]. Most of these graphs are non-hierarchical and mix objects representing im-
plementation details with architecturally relevant objects. Moreover, the label of a dataflow
edge is either missing or refers to a type rather than an abstract object. This detail be-
comes crucial for writing constraints in terms of object provenance. Some of the extracted
object graphs [116, 67] are unsound and show multiple representatives for the same runtime
object. Then, an architect can potentially assign different security property values for the
same runtime object. Other static analyses extract sound object graphs, but with points-to
edges only [96, Section 11.1.2].
For a given method invocation, analyses extract different sources and destinations for a
dataflow edge. For a method invocation b.m(c) in the context of an object a:A, Spiegel’s
analysis [116] extracts an export dataflow edge from the context object a:A to the receiver
b:B, and an import dataflow edge from b:B to a:A. On the other hand, Milanova’s analy-
sis [75, Figure 4.1] extracts an edge from the receiver object b:B to the argument object c:C
any without labels. Similar to Spiegel’s analysis, ScoriaX extracts dataflow edge refers to an
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object. That is, the analysis creates an export dataflow edge from the context object a:A to
the receiver object b:B and the edge refers to the argument c:C.
Jackson and Waingold [67] propose the Womble analysis that extracts a flat object graph
with points-to edges. On the points-to relation, the edge label is the name of the field in
the corresponding field declaration. Womble however does not address the aliasing challenge
and extracts unsound object graphs.
Hierarchical object graphs
Other static analyses also use annotations to extract hierarchical object graphs. For ex-
ample, Lam and Rinard [73] propose a static analysis to extract an object model by merging
objects based on developer-specified annotations (tokens). The tokens provide precision such
that the analysis handles aliasing and extracts models for “subsystem access”, “call/return
interaction”, and “heap interaction”, which are similar to the dataflow edges ScoriaX ex-
tracts. The label on the edges representing call/return interaction is a token that represents
objects passed as arguments. If it were to follow the same idea, ScoriaX would show domains
as labels. Domains are different from tokens because the set of tokens is fixed and statically
declared such that the extracted object model has a predefined hierarchy depth.
7.1.2 Framework-Based Static Analyses
Existing program analyses have already been evaluated as clients of compilers [114]. Once
the analyses became available as open-source framework, researchers other than the original
authors of the analyses use them to find security vulnerabilities. For example, the static
analysis frameworks such as SOOT [72] and WALA [65] have initially been used to compare
different variants of point-to analyses. Recently, they are part of approaches that find security
vulnerabilities in Android applications [21, 43, 49]. Framework-based static analyses extract
graphs with nodes that represent variables, method declarations, and expressions. This
section describes some of the graphs in detail.
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System Dependency Graph (SDG)
SDG has nodes representing statements such as object allocation expressions, which rep-
resent abstract objects and method call-sites. An edge in SDG represents data and control
flow between these expressions. A SDG approximates the information flow that occurs at
runtime and can be extracted by static analyses frameworks such as WALA [65]. An SDG is
used in Information Flow Control approaches discussed later in this chapter (Section 7.2.6).
A SDG includes explicit data flows that are due to assignments and implicit flows. An im-
plicit flow [77] exists when the execution of an expression is controlled by another expression,
as it is the case for conditional statements.
Abstract System Dependency Graph (ASDG)
An Abstract System Dependency Graph (ASDG) [30] is derived from a SDG and it has
nodes representing expressions has edges representing method invocations (control flow), and
assignments (data flow). Since an SDG shows a node for every expression in the bytecode,
the level of detail can be overwhelming for an architect to write constraints (Fig. 7.2). An
ASDG is a closer representation of a code structure with nodes representing classes and
methods, and is often used in program comprehension [103].
Interprocedural Control Flow Graph (ICFG)
Another static analysis framework, SOOT [72], extracts an ICFG, which is an equivalent
of a SDG where the body of each method is represented once as a Control Flow Graph
(CFG). Both SDG and ICFG are used in static taint analyses to find security vulnerabilities
in Android applications [21, 43, 49] (Section 7.2.3).
Precision of a framework-based static analysis
The architects have a low tolerance for false positives. A precise static analysis can be for
example flow-sensitive or context-sensitive. However, a precise static analysis that is flow-,
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context-, and object-sensitive does not scale for a large number of variables [114]. Another
static analysis framework (DOOP [113]) increases scalability by implementing the analysis
in the declarative language Datalog [63]. Still, the parameterized object-sensitive analysis
is implemented only for k = 1 and k = 2 with limited scalability [114]. ScoriaX uses a
domain as a context, and is domain-sensitive and object- and flow-insensitive (Section 2.4,
page 25). Instead of switching sensitivity flags for the whole program, architects can increase
the precision as needed. They have the recourse of fine-tuning the annotations by preventing
two objects from being merged by placing them in different domains.
Another limitation of these frameworks is that the may-alias analysis uses a precomputed
call graph, which in turn uses the result of may-alias analysis. In the presence of callbacks
and polymorphism, computing a sound call graph is challenging [14]. Callbacks often occur
in the presence of the observer design patterns, when an event triggered by the subject
invokes a method of the observer.
Consider for example the code fragment in Figure 7.1, where the method update of
the class Listener is invoked in the method notifyObservers of the class BaseChart.
Since Listener is an interface, and several classes that implement this interface exist, the
static analysis needs to determine the actual method invoked at runtime. An unsound call
graph shows only the method update of the interface Listener. An over-conservative sound
approach assumes that the methods update of all the classes that implement Listener might
be invoked. At runtime, only the method update of the classes Model is invoked because
only the object model:Model is registered as an observer. However, the sound call graph
shows that the method update of BarChart and PieChart are also invoked (Fig. 7.2(a)).
By using annotations, ScoriaX is more precise and the OGraph shows no edges between




BarChart<VIEW, DOC> barChart = new BarChart();
PieChart<VIEW, DOC> pieChart = new PieChart();








class Model<OWNER, V> extends Listener<OWNER> {}
class BarChart<OWNER,M> extends BaseChart<OWNER,M>{}
class PieChart<OWNER,M> extends BaseChart<OWNER,M>{}
interface Listener<OWNER> {
public domain DATA; //public domain
void update(Msg<lent> msg);
}
class List<OWNER, T<ELTS>> {//generic type T




domain OWNED; //domain declaration
List<OWNED, Listener<M>> listeners;
Msg<DATA> vTOm = new MsgVtoM();








Listener<M> l = listeners.value;
//M maps to DOC
//for l analysis lookup objects
// of a subtype of Listener in DOC
// and creates edges only to model






































pieChart:PieChart barChart:BarChartDATA pieChart:PieChart barChart:BarChart
mTOv:
MsgMtoV
Figure 7.1: Listeners code fragments. The complete code is in [130].
7.1.3 Dynamic Analyses
A dynamic analysis can be more precise than a static analysis, and can extract a hierar-
chical object graph [74, 89, 83]. If the input of a dynamic analysis is a heap snapshot, the
analysis can extract only points-to relations between objects, which are persistent relations
at runtime. On the other hand, if the input is an execution trace, which has information
about method invocations and their arguments in addition to the instantiated objects, a
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(a) Sound call graph shows a false positive edge from Model.notifyObservers() to Model.update(Msg)
and from BaseChart.notifyObservers() to BarChart.update(Msg)
(b) A fragment of the SDG obtained by expanding the invocation notifyObservers of the class Model.
Figure 7.2: A sound call graph and SDG for the Listeners example in Fig. 7.1 extracted using the static
analysis JOANA [53]. Fragments of the SDG are available by expanding the nodes in the call graph. Nodes
represent bytecode expressions, and edges represent value flow and control flow edges between variables and
expressions. The labels on the edges show the identifiers of the source and destination. Zoom in to 400%
for details.
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dynamic analysis can extract dataflow edges. A dynamic object graph may have thousands
of nodes and a dynamic analysis requires extensive graph summarization to obtain an ab-
stracted graph [89, 56]. Storing and recording execution traces can be problematic due to
their size. Dynamic analyses often use filters to keep the size of execution traces manageable.
However, excessive filtering may lead to missed dataflow edges.
Extracting dataflow edges that refer to objects
Lienhard et al. propose an analysis that uses execution traces to extract an Object Flow
Graph (OFG) in which edges refer to objects, and nodes represent classes and groups of
classes [74]. The OFG analysis addresses the aliasing challenge, and extracts dataflow edges
for field read, field write, and method invocation expressions in the code, the same expres-
sions used by ScoriaX. Since nodes represent classes, an OFG is unable to show dataflow
communication between different instances of the same class.
Dynamic hierarchical object graphs
A dynamic analysis does not require annotations to extract a hierarchy of objects [83].
However, dynamic analysis can infer an object hierarchy only based on strict encapsulation
where a child object at the lower levels is accessible only through its parent. In Scoria,
however, a parent object can have a child object that is conceptually part of it without
being dominated by the parent. Although a dynamic analysis has fewer false positives than
a static analysis, it finds vulnerabilities only if the architects are able to write unit tests that
expose the vulnerability. The goal of security analyses is to find vulnerabilities that may
not be already known. To my best knowledge, dynamic hierarchical object graphs have only
been used in program comprehension and for finding performance issues [83].
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7.2 Finding Security Vulnerabilities
This section describes approaches that find security vulnerabilities. ARA is one of the
three pillars in finding security vulnerabilities along penetration testing and code inspec-
tion [86]. A security vulnerability can be caused by a software defect, which is local, and an
approach can find such a vulnerability by analyzing one class at a time. Finding a security
vulnerability that exist due to an architectural flaw requires understanding the program at
a higher-level and often uses information that is not available in the code such as security
properties and constraints. This chapter distinguishes between approaches that separate
constraints from extraction.
7.2.1 AST-Based Static Analyses
Analyses that are fully automatic usually avoid a manual setup such as annotations [25].
They traverse the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) of the program looking for vulnerabilities
localized in a class or a method. While an AST-based analysis supports legacy code, vul-
nerabilities are described as patterns or AST visitors [127]. Although these pattern-based
approaches provide automated detection, the output of a static analysis tool still requires
human evaluation [32].
For example, consider the commercial tool SecureAssist [33] that is a security “spell
checker” for Java. One SecureAssist pattern is the invocation of the method createTempFile
of the method File. SecureAssist reports for example that UPMA creates a temporary file
in the class HTTPTransport. The existence of a temporary file does not necessarily imply
the existence of security vulnerability. In UPMA, the architects need to inspect how the
temporary file is used in another class, SyncDatabaseActivity. The inspection reveals that
the temporary file represents the encrypted database downloaded from a remote server. If
the file is more recent than the current database file, the application overrides its content
and deletes it. Since the temporary file is encrypted, no information disclosure exists.
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7.2.2 Android-Specific Analyses
For Android applications, static analyses identify applications that access resources for
which the user does not explicitly provide permissions, or abuse the user trust and disclose
confidential information. Blue Seal [59], for example, uses an information flow analysis to
generate flow permissions. The user can give an application permission to access the GPS
location or the network to display advertisements, and the user trusts that the application
does not disclose the current location to third party servers. If such an information flow
exists, Blue Seal notifies the user before installation.
Grace et al. [52] propose a static analysis to determine resources that applications can
access without having proper permissions. Rather than using an existing static analysis
framework, this approach implements its own parser that keeps track of the subtyping rela-
tions and conservatively assumes that a reference passed as an argument could be of a subtype
of the method formal parameter type. Since the approach is too conservative, it prunes in-
feasible path for scalability and models the Android permissions in method summaries. If
a method checks for permission before it accesses confidential resources, the method is not
analyzed. The analysis also determines public methods in applications provided by third
party vendors that can bypass permissions checks and access confidential resources. For ex-
ample, it finds an application on HTC phones that can send SMS messages without having
the SMS SEND permission enabled by the user.
7.2.3 Static Taint Analyses
Similar to Scoria, a static taint analysis [49, 126, 48] finds information disclosure and
tampering by tracking how the values flow1 from a source (a method that returns confidential
information) to a sink (a method that discloses information received as arguments) without
passing through a sanitizer (a method that checks if the input has a predefined format).
A static taint analysis uses a SDG or an ICFG and a separate may-alias analysis provided
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by a static analysis framework. Turning on sensitivity flags to increase precision may also
increase the analysis time and reduce scalability [85]. To improve scalability, one solution is
to use an on-demand may-alias analysis [125] that considers only the variables with assigned
security properties.
FlowDroid
FlowDroid [48] is a static taint analysis that reasons about information flow at the level of
variables and expressions in the code. FlowDroid considers aliasing and relies on SOOT [72]
to extract an ICFG of the program. It uses an on-demand may-alias [125] such that it is
object-, field-, and context-sensitive and allow the architects to increase the precision by
turning on sensitivity flags. If the approach reports a false positive, the architects need to
understand the inner workings of the static analysis, which is non-trivial.
Finding a vulnerability means checking the constraint that no path from sources to
sinks exists in ICFG. The constraint uses transitive information flow and object reacha-
bility through points-to edges. If the architects notice a false negative, they may change the
list of sources and sinks, but cannot change a constraint without changing the static analy-
sis. The initial list of sources and sinks is automatically generated [20], and architects can
alter the list as needed. Therefore, the architects have some flexibility in assigning security
properties but cannot distinguish between two invocations of the same method in different
contexts. FlowDroid works on Java and web-application, but it focuses on Android applica-
tions and models the state of objects of type Activity, Application, and Service in the
Android framework by parsing configuration files.
7.2.4 Dynamic Taint Analyses
TaintDroid [42] is a dynamic taint analysis focused on Android applications that assigns
security properties to values at each bytecode instruction executed. TaintDroid monitors the
1We use value flow instead of data flow terminology to distinguish a data flow between variables from
dataflow communication between objects.
161
execution and stops the monitored application if a tainted value does not satisfy a given secu-
rity constraint, and can find information disclosure when the device identification number or
the current location are sent to a server by assigning security properties at the level of vari-
ables, methods and files. The constraints are however hard-coded such that any object that
contains a tainted value is considered tainted, and are limited to simple checks to avoid the
performance overhead for the approach to be practical. Another disadvantage of TaintDroid
is the amount of engineering needed, which is specific not only to the version of Android
framework used, but also to multiple heterogeneous devices of a variety of manufacturers on
which TaintDroid is installed.
7.2.5 Commercial Security Tools
The section describes several commercial static analyses that find security vulnerabilities
and coding defects. Most commercial tools include AST-based analyses that find local soft-
ware defects such as buffer overflows. They provide robust static analyses that scale to large
code bases as required by industry. Since the architects have a low tolerance to false positives,
commercial tools often sacrifice soundness for precision, and focus on scalability.
HP Fortify SCA
Fortify Static Code Analyzer [62, 31] is a commercial tool that provides several types of
analyses including AST-based analysis to find local defects and a static taint analysis to find
information disclosure and tampering. The information flow analysis in Fortify is based on
finding a path in the ICFG from a source to a sink based on a set of secure coding rules.
Another analysis Fortify provides is a control flow analysis in which constraints restrict the
invocations of methods in a certain order. The control flow analysis can find, for example,
if an XML reader is properly configured before it is used.
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IBM AppScan
Similarly to Fortify, AppScan Source [66] supports both an information flow analysis
and a control flow analysis based on the call graph. AppScan uses a SDG and supports
customizing the rules to enable the architects to extend the possible sources or sinks, or to
specify methods that sanitize data or that can propagate confidential data. Although more
flexible comparing to FlowDroid, the constraints have a fixed form. A constraint has a source,
a sanitizer, and a sink and checks that no information flows from a source to a sink without
passing through the sanitizer [126]. In addition, AppScan provides a dynamic taint analysis
and allows architects to combine results of the static and dynamic taint analysis.
Coverity Security Advisor
Another commercial tool that provides an AST-based analysis and a static taint analysis
is Coverity [35], which provides several rules to find security defects. The rule of Coverity
that is similar to a static taint analysis is “insecure data handling” that ensures no tainted
input can be used directly or indirectly to modify files or to connect to databases using SQL
queries. Thus, Coverity can prevent tampering such as SQL injection.
The main advantage of Coverity is that it focuses not only on finding security vulnerabil-
ities but also on supporting developers to fix the vulnerability once found. Coverity provides
traceability to code from the identified defects to the lines of code that contain the vulner-
ability. The vulnerability can be scattered over several lines of code from which developers
need to understand how the vulnerability may occur.
Coverity and the other commercial tools focus also on other coding defects that may
indirectly lead to security vulnerabilities such as dereferencing null pointers or the use of
public static non-final variables. If an attacker can trigger a null pointer exception, the
exception can stop the application and lead to a denial-of-service attack.
The authors of CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java [81] have evaluated several
of the commercial and open-source tools previously mentioned. Table 7.2 is compiled based
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Table 7.2: Tools that provide automated detection of the CERT rules (Source: [81]).
CERT rule Coverity Fortify FindBugs
EXP01-J. Never dereference null pointers X X X
OBJ10-J. Do not use public static nonfinal variables X X X
MSC03-J. Never hard code sensitive information X X
IDS00-J. Sanitize untrusted data passed across a trust boundary X X X
IDS01-J. Normalize strings before validating them X
IDS02-J. Canonicalize path names before validating them X
IDS03-J. Do not log unsanitized user input X
on CERT data and highlights those CERT rules for which the approaches provide automated
detection. Most of these rules refer to coding defects as opposed to architectural flaws for
which Scoria provides support (Section 6.1, page 117).
7.2.6 Type-Based Approaches
Information Flow Control
Hammer et al. [54] propose an approach, static information flow control (IFC), that is
based on an object-sensitive and flow-sensitive SDG. The IFC approach finds information
disclosure (assures confidentiality) and tampering (assures integrity) and provides flexibil-
ity in assigning security properties to the types of expressions, where the security prop-
erties are organized in a lattice following Bell-LaPadula model [23, 22]. The constraints
are however combined in the IFC, and require non-trivial changes to support for example
encryption [71].
Implementations of the approach such as JOANA [53] use the SDG generated by
WALA [65] and support both explicit and implicit flows. Compared to the aforementioned
taint analyses, IFC is sound and supports assigning security properties to expressions rather
than method declarations. It finds for example, the vulnerability in SecretViewer which
FlowDroid misses due to the unsound call graph, but reports a false positive for ACipher,
which FlowDroid and Scoria avoids (Section 6.3, page 135). Since JOANA does not support
Android applications, a detailed comparison with Scoria based on DroidBench remains as
future work.
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Security information is unavailable in the code. Some approaches [46, 37, 92] require ar-
chitects to provide security types as annotations in the code. These annotations are different
from the annotations Scoria uses, which focus only on describing aliasing, without providing
security information.
Role-based access control
To enhance the code with an authorization mechanism such as role-based access control
many approaches use Java annotations. In most cases, these annotations are only checked
at runtime. In contrast, a typechecker ensures that annotations and code are consistent at
compile-time. For example, Object Role Based Access Control (ORBAC) [46] uses a type-
checker to enforce the security policy that a user cannot read confidential data of other users
unless their roles allow him to do so. However, ORBAC does not handle object hierarchy
and the role-based protection is not propagated to children objects, although the children
may represent confidential data.
Type-systems for security
A type system [37, 92] allows architects to add security properties as annotations that
augment the type of a variable that includes confidential value (@Tainted) or that can be
exposed (@Untainted). Then, architects aided by the typechecker propagate the annotations
in the code. To find information disclosure a typechecker analyzes one class at a time and
ensures that no @Tainted is assigned to an @Untainted value. In Tainting Checker [37,
102], the constraint is a simple hard-coded check that the architects cannot change without
redesigning the typechecker. The main advantage of a typechecker is that it only needs an
AST and an intra-procedural CFG as a program representation, which makes the tainting
type system modular and scalable. A tainting type system provides soundness, supports
aliasing while the precision is provided by annotations.




3 View<UI,LOGIC,DATA> view = new View();
4 }
5 class View<owner,L,D> {
6 domain OWNED;
7 Host<L,D> h = new Host();
8 Client<L,D> c = new Client(h);
9 void onCreate(String<D> pwd){
10 c.authenticate(pwd);
11 File<D> tFile = new File("client.tmp");
12 FileOutputStream<OWNED> fos = new FileOutputStream(tfile);








21 void authenticate(String<D> pwd) {
22 aToken = h.getAccessToken(pwd);
23 }




Figure 7.3: Object reachability: The client object and the access token are persistently stored. A malicious
client can impersonate the original client and post messages. Security constraint: A dataflow edge with an
untrusted destination does not refer to an object from which confidential data is reachable.
while the parameter of the method write is annotated @Untainted. To find the vulnerability,
the type system still needs reachability information because only a variable of the enclosing
type of aToken is passed as an argument to the method write. The type system would need
to consider all types that have at least one field annotated @Tainted as confidential, which
may be overly conservative. If the developer were to use a serialization library and marks
the field aToken as transient then the confidential data is not saved and the type system
reports a false positive. Different serialization libraries require different implementations of
the type systems. In Scoria, the architects can add the IsTransient security property and
refine the constraint to avoid the false positive.
JFlow [92] is a Java-like programming language for writing secure programs, and Jif [93]
is a type system that assures confidentiality and integrity for programs written in JFlow.
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However, JFlow is not backward compatible with Java, and the type annotations are more
complex than the ones Scoria uses, which only declare domains or put objects in domains.
JFlow supports multiple types of annotations including among others annotations for assign-
ing security properties and for defining constraints on explicit and implicit information flow.
Since Jif checks the JFlow constraint annotations one class at a time, the constraints seem
to enforce information flow control only locally. It would be interesting to compare JFlow
constraints with the Scoria constraints that can use global information about objects that
are created in different parts of the program and have the same conceptual purpose.
7.2.7 Querying Object Graphs
Researchers proposed approaches that support querying object graphs to find software
defects and architectural flaws. For example, Object Query Language (OQL) [136] queries
a snapshot of a heap and allows architects to reason about reachability. Since the heap
snapshot has only points-to edges, the architects cannot reason about dataflow communi-
cation. Program Query Language (PQL) [84] allows architects to reason about an object
graph. Queries are written in a Java-like language and can be executed against object
graphs extracted by both dynamic and static analysis. However, since the object graphs are
non-hierarchical, PQL does not support queries in terms of object hierarchy.
PQL can enforce constraints such as “a password from the user should not be written
in a file without encryption”. Writing constraints and assigning security property is sepa-
rate from extraction and the architects can write queries that are code patterns. A static
checker finds all the potential matches similarly to an AST-based analysis. A dynamic anal-
ysis looks for the patterns in the execution trace as well. The static analysis part is sound
and considers aliasing. It uses a flow-insensitive, but context-sensitive analysis that stores
the may-alias relation in a deductive database where data is represented using binary deci-
sion diagrams (BDD). Querying may-alias relations is efficiently done using the declarative
language Datalog [63].
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7.2.8 Operating System-level Approaches
Although an operation system has no security vulnerabilities, developers may still in-
troduce vulnerabilities at the application-level. For example, Mai et al. [82] propose a
lightweight operating system (ExpressOS) and prove that it is free of vulnerabilities. In the
evaluation, the authors consider about 300 vulnerabilities listed by the Common Weakness
Enumeration Initiative (CWE) [90]. Although ExpressOS prevented all OS-level vulnerabil-
ities, it cannot prevent some application-level architectural flaws.
7.2.9 Architectural-Level Approaches
An architectural-level approach first extracts a high-level, architectural representation
from the code. For object-oriented code, the representations can be of multiple types such
as a code architecture that shows how code is organized in classes and packages [91], a
runtime architecture that shows objects and group of objects [5], or a deployment view that
shows how components are deployed on hardware components [16].
Code architecture
To support ARA, Sohr et al. propose an architectural centric approach to find archi-
tectural flaws [115]. Scoria shares the same motivation, but the proposed solutions differ.
Sohr et al. approach uses Bauhaus [108] that extracts a code architecture. In Berger et
al. [24], Bauhaus approximates the runtime architecture for two web applications, which are
then used to find architectural flaws. However, their approximated architecture does not
distinguish between components of the same type used in different contexts.
Writing constraints In Berger et al. [24], the architects can write constraints in the
Object Constraint Language (OCL) [97], which is a declarative language that is part of
UML. However, the edges on the runtime architecture have no labels. This makes it difficult
for the architects to write constraints about the information content of a dataflow. Indeed,
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the evaluation is conducted in a style similar to Reflexion models [91], focusing only on the
presence or absence of communication.
Runtime architecture
Almorsy et al. [15, 16] use various UML models such as sequence diagrams extracted with
commercial reverse engineering tools [17]. One advantage of the sequence diagram over the
object graph is the flow-sensitivity; i.e., the sequence diagram has the time dimension that
shows the order in which methods are invoked. However, the sequence diagram is only a
partial representation of the runtime architecture. Moreover, the static analysis that extracts
the sequence diagram is an AST visitor that does not consider aliasing. Therefore, in the
extracted sequence diagram, the object type is the same as the declared type of the reference
to the object, which can be an interface.
An interface can have multiple implementation classes, and each instance of these classes
can have distinct security property values. Finding precisely the type behind an interface
is non-trivial. For the Listeners example (Fig. 7.1), the sequence diagram for the invoca-
tion notifyListeners shows one abstract object l:Listener for the method invocation
l.update(msg) (line 19). At runtime, the variable l may alias the objects b:BarChart and
p:PieChart but not m:Model. This information is available on the object graph, but not on
the sequence diagram (Fig 7.4).
He et al. [55] formalize the software architectural model (SAM) using Petri nets. Similar
to SAM, the object graph used by Scoria is hierarchical, but is less restrictive than a Petri
net that requires two disjoint sets of nodes: transitions and places. Dataflow objects are
similar to transitions, but with fewer restrictions, i.e., dataflow objects can also be nodes in
the object graph.
Writing constraints To write constraints, architects can also use an architectural de-
scription language (ADL) such as ACME [9], which allows the architects to extend the
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Figure 7.4: A fragment of the sequence diagram automatically extracted by the commercial tool Altova [17]
for the Listeners example (Fig. 7.1).
set of properties and constraints. ACME also supports hierarchical decomposition, but an
ACME connector cannot refer to a component, and hence would not allow architects to
model dataflow edges that refer to objects. Rather than require architects to learn a sepa-
rate language for writing constraints, a Scoria constraint is written in a Java-like language
and uses assertions similar to the ones for unit testing. Although less extensible than an
ADL or OCL and not declarative, Scoria still provides extensibility of properties and con-
straints using Java interfaces. Architects can add additional properties and constraints by
implementing these interfaces.
To write OCL constraints in an IDE such as Eclipse architects and developers need to use
additional plugins such as Eclipse Modeling Framework (EMF) [119]. OCL is extensible, but
exporting the representation of Scoria to EMF requires a further extension because modeling
a hierarchical object graphs and dataflow edges that refer to objects are not part of UML or
EMF.
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7.3 Evaluation of Security Approaches
This section discusses related security benchmarks and the alternatives that researchers
use to evaluate approaches for finding security vulnerabilities.
7.3.1 Security Benchmarks
A test case in the benchmark has a few classes and is designed to check if an approach
finds a few vulnerabilities while it avoids false positives. As an advantage over using large
applications, benchmarks allow systematic evaluation and comparison of security approaches.
There are other benchmarks in addition to the ones described in Chapter 6 (page 117).
Livshits et al. proposed the benchmark SecuriBench Micro [78] for evaluating approaches
that find vulnerabilities in web-applications. The test cases focus on vulnerabilities such
as injection attacks, and check if the static approaches handle aliasing, collections, and
dataflow communication. FlowDroid performs well on SecuriBench Micro but does not find
two vulnerabilities related to dataflow communication. It would be interesting to extend
the evaluation of Scoria to SecuriBench Micro in addition to the evaluation on DroidBench
(Section 6.3, page 135).
MalGenome [138] is a collection of 1200 malware Android applications. This thesis fo-
cuses on approaches that find vulnerabilities in legitimate well-intended applications. The
approaches may not be able to detect malware, which often avoid detection by taking ad-
vantage of known limitations of static analyses.
7.3.2 Applications with Injected Vulnerabilities
Several web applications with injected vulnerabilities are available and allow evaluation
of security approaches [100]. SecuriBench [79] is a collection of several web applications
that span from hundreds to tens of thousands of lines of code. Each application has several
injected vulnerabilities such as SQL injection that are common in web applications. The
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benchmark is used by its designers to evaluate approaches such as PQL [84]. Other re-
searchers [77] use SecuriBench to evaluate their approach. Tainting type system [37] is also
evaluated using a test case from SecuriBench.
An Android application with injected vulnerabilities is InsecureBank [101]. It has several
injected vulnerabilities including information disclosure to a file stored on the external mem-
ory card of the device. FlowDroid is able to find the vulnerabilities on the client side, which
is an Android application, but not on the server side, which is implemented in Python.
7.3.3 Case Studies on Real-World Applications
Enck et al. [43] evaluate Fortify on popular Android applications available on the market.
Fortify can find several classes of vulnerabilities including the misuse of the device identifi-
cation number or the GPS location. Other approaches [42, 45] use dynamic analysis to find
vulnerabilities by monitoring applications. Their goal is to identify and prevent vulnerabili-
ties at runtime. These approaches were evaluated on hundreds of applications selected based
on their popularity.
Using popular apps in the evaluation may not be enough. An approach may report the
same vulnerability in applications that have a similar functionality, but miss other classes
of vulnerabilities. For example, Fahl et al. [44] analyze more than 20 Android applications
similar to UPMA that store encrypted password databases. These applications share the
same vulnerability, where the password in clear text is disclosed to the clipboard.
Scandariato et al. [110] evaluate Fortify against a penetration testing approach on two
open-source web-applications targeting the OWASP Top 10 list [99]. Although performed
on a limited scale (nine participants), the controlled experiment indicates that Fortify finds
more vulnerabilities than penetration testing with no significant difference in precision.
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7.4 Summary
Most security approaches support legacy code and use a program representation that is
a graph with various nodes and edges. The scalability is in general limited by soundness,
aliasing, and precision of the extraction analysis. The research gap that Scoria fills in is sound
approaches that provide extensibility in writing constraints, querying the graph to assign
security properties, and fine-tuning the precision of the static analysis without sacrificing
soundness. Chapter 8 discusses the limitations of Scoria and concludes.
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Chapter 8 Conclusions and Future Work
Finding security vulnerabilities that an attacker can exploit to acquire confidential data
or tamper with resources requires reasoning about the content of communication, not just
about the presence or absence of communication. Thus, reasoning about the security of
an object-oriented application requires a static analysis that is sound, and extracts dataflow
edges that refer to objects. The complexity of the extracted graph can be overwhelming, and
the solution this thesis uses is to organize the abstract objects hierarchically based on design
intent provided by annotations. Chapter 3 proves the abstract object graph is sound, and
Chapter 4 shows that architects can use a static analysis that extracts a sound, hierarchical
object graph to reason about security by querying the abstract object graph and writing
constraints.
One contribution of this thesis is extracting dataflow edges that refer to abstract objects
using a sound analysis. Chapter 6 provides support for the hypothesis that the architects
can find security vulnerabilities by executing constraints in terms of object provenance and
indirect communication on an abstract object graph. These extensible constraints can find
vulnerabilities that are otherwise missed by an analysis that hard-codes constraints only
based on information flow that track only object transitivity and object reachability. Some
of the vulnerabilities were missed due to unsoundness, while others because finding them
requires reasoning about object provenance.
In the following, Section 8.1 discusses several limitations of the approach, and Section 8.2
suggests future research directions.
8.1 Limitations
The section discusses limitations of the extraction analysis, and of writing con-
straints.
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8.1.1 Limitations of the Extraction
Potential unsoundness. Scoria does not handle reflection or dynamic code loading di-
rectly, which is a common limitation of static approaches and may lead to missing dataflow
edges. In Scoria, the architects can summarize the effects of reflection using annotations
by defining virtual object allocations or virtual dataflows that lead to additional objects or
dataflow edges between abstract objects [47]. Another solution is to use a separate constant
propagation analysis to reason about arguments of methods and classes that allow the use of
Java reflection [113]. The constant propagation works well when the argument is the actual
name of a class, but is more difficult when the argument is created on the fly and may be
known only at runtime based on constants in configuration files or constants initialized by
the users.
In this thesis, soundness is proven on a declarative specification of the analysis using
inference rules, while the implementation follows closely an imperative description based on
transfer functions. To avoid any discrepancies from the specification, the analysis could be
implemented using declarative languages such as Datalog [63] similarly to the static analyses
in DOOP [113, 114].
Precision. The extracted abstract object graph is an over-approximation of any possible
execution, and, as discussed in Section 2.9.3, some of the objects or dataflow edges are false
positives. The extraction analysis relies on the precision that the annotations provide. The
evaluation (Section 4.4) provides examples where more precision is needed. Supported by
a typechecker, the architects can refine the annotations such that the extraction analysis
places objects of the same type in different groups. Therefore, the architects can improve
the precision of the extraction analysis as needed in a local manner, rather than turning on
sensitivity flags for the whole program.
Scalability. The thesis evaluates ScoriaX on three applications with more than 20KLOC
of Java code. Therefore, Scoria scales to real-world applications of a size of an Android
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application, without being Android specific. It would be interesting to evaluate Scoria on
more and larger systems such as the web-applications in the benchmark SecuriBench [79].
The main bottleneck is the effort required to add annotations; a related study measured the
effort of adding annotations to be 1hour/KLOC [6]. Because the annotations implement a
type system, they are amenable to type inference that is a separate research problem and
an active area of research [64]. Although adding annotations requires significant effort or an
expensive inference analysis, this effort is required once. The constraints that find security
vulnerabilities are executed separately on the extracted graph.
8.1.2 Effort of Writing Constraints
Scoria is not a push-button approach, and requires manual effort from architects that
includes adding annotations, assigning security properties and writing constraints. As dis-
cussed in Section 6.3.2, separating constraints and security properties from extraction is also
one of the strengths of Scoria that architects can use to increase precision and recall. One
dimension that is lacking in the evaluation is measuring the effort involved in applying each
of the approaches. This information is not provided in the original benchmark for Flow-
Droid [48]. In addition, since the Scoria evaluators on DroidBench were still learning to use
the approach and the tool, we did not measure the effort. In the case of Scoria, the effort of
adding annotations and writing constraints can be significant, so is worth measuring. Since
Scoria outperforms other approaches in some cases only, it would be interesting to study
whether the improvement in terms of fewer false negatives or higher precision is worth the
extra effort.
Currently, the constraints are written in an imperative language by using unit test asser-
tions. It would be interesting to investigate other alternatives such as writing constraints in
a declarative language [63].
The thesis provides several examples of constraints that can be reused with minimal
changes, mainly for assigning security properties using application-specific information.
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Some of the information about security properties can be reused across systems that use the
same library of framework. The constraints based on object transitivity and indirect com-
munication are reused with minimal changes in several of the test cases in DroidBench [48].
It would be useful to allow the architects to start with a set of reusable constraints based on
the automatically generated sinks and sources used by FlowDroid [20]. Then, the architects
can use Scoria to focus on more expressive, application-specific constraints.
8.2 Future Work
Future research direction could improve the extraction analysis by addressing current
limitations and extract additional types of edges. Another direction may involve a field
study to investigate how architects use Scoria in practice. Software maintenance [30, 103]
could also benefit from an abstract object graph that is sound and hierarchical.
8.2.1 Improve Extraction
The extraction uses only the information available in the source code. To support dynamic
code loading, and reflection, it would be interesting to combine ScoriaX with a dynamic
analysis [83]. Ideally, a hybrid approach would use both static and dynamic analysis such
that it meets both the soundness and the precision requirements. Another future direction
may involve incorporating a partial order in which objects and edges are created using the
static execute after/before relation [68].
8.2.2 Extract Other Types of Edges
Dataflow edges reflect communication that is explicit in the code. Future work may
include extraction of other information such as implicit flows due to a condition in the code
that can also lead to security vulnerabilities. Implicit flows would be an addition to the
existing types of edges the implementation of the analysis extracts, such that the integration
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in Scoria would be straightforward.
8.2.3 Field Study on Security Architects
It would be interesting to investigate how security architects use Scoria in practice and
measure their effort to extract object graphs and to write constraints. Such a study would
estimate how reusable the constraints are and highlight additional types of constraints that
the designers of Scoria may not have considered.
8.2.4 Abstract Object Graphs in Software Maintenance
Another research direction may investigate the effectiveness of the abstract object graphs
in software maintenance where developers often use only a code structure diagram such as
a class diagram. However, in a code structure diagram, some dependencies are not obvi-
ous [135] and soundness may be required for maintenance tasks such as impact analysis
and change propagation during which developers investigate all possible dependencies of
a changed component. This research direction was initiated by giving developers an ab-
stract object graphs with points-to edges only and found to reduce the overall effort of
software changes compared to developers who have access only to a diagram of the code
structure [18].
8.3 Conclusion
Reports of security vulnerabilities in software still occur at an alarming rate [51] as attack-
ers find new ways to circumvent the security of applications. Approaches that find security
vulnerabilities need more flexibility to adapt to new types of attacks by combining the power
of tool support with the insights that only architects and security experts can provide. This
idea is incorporated in Architectural Risk Analysis that is adopted in industry, but the
process is still mostly manual [36].
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This thesis aimed to design a principled, rigorous approach to support Architectural Risk
Analysis, and the project succeeded in many ways. We were able to formalize a model of
dataflow communication, prove its soundness, build tools, run them on real, high-value code
including server code and mobile applications, and find several serious security vulnerabilities
or places where an implicit security policy is not being respected. While additional work
remains, I hope to see more rigorous and better tool-supported Architectural Risk Analysis




We now prove Progress, Preservation and Soundness theorems.
9.1 Theorem: Dataflow Preservation (Subject Reduc-
tion)
If
∅,Σ, θ ` e : T
Σ ` S
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 G `CT,H Σ
∅, ∅, G `O e
(S,H,K,LI , LE) ∼ (DO,DD,DE)
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there exists Σ′ ⊇ Σ and T ′ <: T such that ∅,Σ′, θ ` e′ : T ′ and Σ′ ` S′
(S′, H ′,K ′, L′I , L
′
E) ∼ (DO,DD,DE)
∅, ∅, G `O e
′
and G `CT,H Σ
′
The Dataflow Preservation theorem extends the FDJ Type Preservation theorem (the common parts are
highlighted). Those parts are proved by induction over the derivation of the FDJ evaluation relation :
e;S  e′;S′.
Proof. We prove preservation by induction on the instrumented evaluation relation
θ ` e;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′;S′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E
The most interesting cases are Ir-New, Ir-Read (page 182), Ir-Write (page 184), and Ir-Invk
(page 186).
Case Ir-New: e = new C<`′.d>(v), and e′ = `. We have:
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 O = Cthis<DO> ∀i ∈ 1..|`′.d| G `O Di ∈ findD(Cthis::`
′.di)
OC = 〈 C<D> 〉 {OC} ⊆ DO
G `O dparams(C,OC ) {(OC , qual(`
′.di)) 7→ Di} ⊆ DD
Υ, G `O ddomains(C,OC)
∀m ∈ md mbody(m,C<`′.d>) = (x : T , eR)
C<D> 6∈ Υ =⇒ {x : T , this : C<`′.d>},Υ ∪ {C<D>}, G `OC eR
Γ,Υ, G `O e
Γ,Υ, G `O new C<`′.d>(v)
[Df-New]
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` 6∈ dom(S) S′ = S[` 7→ C<p>(v)]
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉
p = `′.d ∀i ∈ 1..|`′.d| Di = K[`
′
i.di]
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′
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′ = K[`.dj 7→ Dj ]
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[IR-New]
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′
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(2) ∅, ∅, G `O e′
(3) G `CT,H′ Σ′
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E By assumption
(S,H,K,LI , LE) ∼ (DO,DD,DE) By assumption
∀` ∈ dom(S), Σ[`] = C<`′.d> Since Σ ` S
H [θ] = OC = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO
and ∀θ′j .dj ∈ θ
′.d K[θ′j .dj ] = Dj = 〈Didj , qual(θ
′
j.dj)〉 ∈ rng(DD)
and ∀di ∈ domains(C<θ′.d>)
K[θ.di] = Di = 〈Didi , C::di〉 {(OC , C::di) 7→ Di} ∈ DD By Df-Approx
∀`src ∈ dom(H), f ields(Σ[`src]) = Tsrc f
∀m. mtype(m,Σ[`src]) = T → TR
∀Tk ∈ {Tsrc} ∪ {TR}
H ;K;LI ;LE ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk)
E′k ∈ LI [(`src, θ)] E
′
k = 〈H [`src], H [θ], Ok, Imp〉 ∈ DE By Df-Approx
∀`dst ∈ dom(H), f ields(Σ[`dst]) = Tdst f
∀m. mtype(m,Σ[`dst]) = T → TR
∀Tk ∈ {Tdst} ∪ {T}
H ;K;LI ;LE ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk)
Ek ∈ LE[(θ, `dst)] Ek = 〈H [θ], H [`dst], Ok, Exp〉 ∈ DE By Df-Approx
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OC = 〈C`<D>〉 ∈ DO By sub-derivation of Ir-New
S′ = S[` 7→ C`<`′.d>(v)] By sub-derivation of Ir-New
H ′ = H [` 7→ OC ] By sub-derivation of Ir-New
∀i ∈ 1..|`′.d| Di = K[`
′
i.di] By sub-derivation of Ir-New
∀(domain dj) ∈ domains(C<`′.d>) Dj = DD[(OC , C`::dj)]
K ′ = K[`.dj 7→ Dj ] By sub-derivation of Ir-New
L′I = LI L
′
E = LE By sub-derivation of Ir-New
∃Σ′ ⊇ Σ and T ′ <: T s.t. ∅,Σ′, θ ` e′ : T ′ and Σ′ ` S′ By FDJ Type Preservation
Σ′[`] = C`<`′.d> By Σ
′ ` S′
(S′, H ′,K ′, L′I , L
′
E) ∼ (DO,DD,DE) By Df-Approx
This proves (1).
∅, ∅, G `O e
′ By Df-Loc, since e′ = `
This proves (2).
G `CT,H Σ By assumption
∀` ∈ dom(S),Σ[`] = C`<p> By sub-derivation of Df-Sigma
H [`] = O` = 〈C`<D`>〉 ∈ DO By sub-derivation of Df-Sigma
∀m. mbody(m,C`<p>) = (x : T , eR) By sub-derivation of Df-Sigma
{x : T , this : C`<p>}, ∅, G `O` eR By sub-derivation of Df-Sigma
OC = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO By sub-derivation of Ir-New
S′ = S[` 7→ C<p>(v)] By sub-derivation of Ir-New
H ′ = H [` 7→ OC ] By sub-derivation of Ir-New
∅, ∅, G `O e By assumption with e,Υ below
e = new C<`′.d>(v), and Υ = ∅
∀m. mbody(m,C<p>) = (x : T , eR) By sub-derivation of Df-New
C<D> 6∈ Υ =⇒
{x : T , this : C<p>},Υ ∪ {C<D>}, G `OC eR By sub-derivation of Df-New
{x : T , this : C<p>}, ∅, G `OC eR By Df-Strengthening Lemma
∀` ∈ dom(S′),Σ′[`] = C`<p>
H ′[`] = O` = 〈C`<D`>〉 ∈ DO
∀m. mbody(m,C`<p>) = (x : T , eR)
{x : T , this : C`<p>}, ∅, G `O` eR By above
G `CT,H′ Σ
′ By Df-Sigma with above H ′ and Σ′
This proves (3).
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Case Ir-Read: e = `.fi, and e′ = vi. We have:
e0 : C<p> (Tk fk) ∈ fieldDecls(C)
G `O import(C<p>, Tk)
Γ,Υ, G `O e0
Γ,Υ, G `O e0.fk
[Df-Read]
S[`] = C<p>(v) fields(C<p>) = T f
O = H [θ] O` = H [`] Ov = H [vi] Ti ∈ T
E = 〈O`, O,Ov , Imp〉 ∈ DE H ;K;LI ;LE ` Ov ∈ irLookup(Ti) L
′
I = LI [(`, θ) 7→∪ {E}]




G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 ∀` ∈ dom(S),Σ[`] = C<p> H [`] = O = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO




(1) (S′, H ′,K ′, L′I , L
′
E) ∼ (DO,DD,DE)
(2) ∅, ∅, G `O e′
(3) G `CT,H′ Σ′
θ ` e;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′;S′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By assumption
(S,H,K,LI , LE) ∼ (DO,DD,DE) By assumption
∀` ∈ dom(S), Σ[`] = C<`′.d> Since Σ ` S
H [θ] = OC = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO
and ∀θ′j .dj ∈ θ
′.d K[θ′j .dj ] = Dj = 〈Didj , qual(θ
′
j.dj)〉 ∈ rng(DD)
and ∀di ∈ domains(C<θ′.d>)
K[θ.di] = Di = 〈Didi , C::di〉 {(OC , C::di) 7→ Di} ∈ DD By Df-Approx
∀`src ∈ dom(H), f ields(Σ[`src]) = Tsrc f
∀m. mtype(m,Σ[`src]) = T → TR
∀Tk ∈ {Tsrc} ∪ {TR}
H ;K;LI ;LE ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk)
E′k ∈ LI [(`src, θ)] E
′
k = 〈H [`src], H [θ], Ok, Imp〉 ∈ DE By Df-Approx
∀`dst ∈ dom(H), f ields(Σ[`dst]) = Tdst f
∀m. mtype(m,Σ[`dst]) = T → TR
∀Tk ∈ {Tdst} ∪ {T}
H ;K;LI ;LE ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk)
Ek ∈ LE [(θ, `dst)] Ek = 〈H [θ], H [`dst], Ok, Exp〉 ∈ DE By Df-Approx
S′ = S,H ′ = H,K ′ = K,L′E = LE By sub-derivation of Ir-Read
S[`] = C`<p>(v) fields(C`<p>) = T f By sub-derivation of Ir-Read
O = H [θ] O` = H [`] Ov = H [vi] Ti ∈ T By sub-derivation of Ir-Read
E′ = 〈O`, O,Ov, Imp〉 ∈ DE H ;K;LI;LE ` Ov ∈ irLookup(Ti) By sub-derivation of Ir-Read
L′I = LI [(`, θ) 7→∪ {E
′}] By sub-derivation of Ir-Read
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∀`src ∈ dom(H
′), f ields(Σ′[`src]) = Tsrc f,
∀m. mtype(m,Σ′[`src]) = T → TR
∀Tk ∈ {Tsrc} ∪ {TR}
∀H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk)
E′k ∈ L
′
I [(`src, θ)] = 〈H
′[`src], H
′[θ], Ok, Imp〉 ∈ DE By above, since Σ
′ = Σ
(S′, H ′,K ′, L′I , L
′
E) ∼ (DO,DD,DE) By Df-Approx
This proves (1).
∅, ∅, G `O e
′ By Df-Loc, since e′ = vi
This proves (2).
G `CT,H Σ By assumption
S′ = S,H ′ = H By sub-derivation of Ir-Read
G `CT,H′ Σ
′ By Df-Sigma with the above H ′ and Σ′ = Σ
This proves (3).
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Case Ir-Write: e = `.fi = v, and e′ = v
We have:
e0 : C<p> (Tk fk) ∈ fields(C<p>)
e1 : C1<p′′> C1<p′′> <: Tk
G `O export(C<p>,C1<p′′>)
Γ,Υ, G `O e0 Γ,Υ, G `O e1
Γ,Υ, G `O e0.fk = e1
[Df-Write]
S[`] = C<p>(v) fields(C<p>) = T f
S′ = S[` 7→ C<p>([v/vi]v)]
O = H [θ] O` = H [`] Ov = H [v] H ;K;LI ;LE ` Ov ∈ irLookup(Ti) Ti ∈ T
E = 〈O,O`, Ov, Exp〉 ∈ DE L
′
E = LE [(θ, `) 7→∪ {E}]
θ ` `.fi = v;S ;H ;K;LI ;LE  G v;S




G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 ∀` ∈ dom(S),Σ[`] = C<p> H [`] = O = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO




(1) (S′, H ′,K ′, L′I , L
′
E) ∼ (DO,DD,DE)
(2) ∅, ∅, G `O e′
(3) G `CT,H′ Σ′
θ ` e;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′;S′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By assumption
(S,H,K,LI , LE) ∼ (DO,DD,DE) By assumption
∀` ∈ dom(S), Σ[`] = C<`′.d> Since Σ ` S
H [θ] = OC = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO
and ∀θ′j .dj ∈ θ
′.d K[θ′j .dj ] = Dj = 〈Didj , qual(θ
′
j.dj)〉 ∈ rng(DD)
and ∀di ∈ domains(C<θ′.d>)
K[θ.di] = Di = 〈Didi , C::di〉 {(OC , C::di) 7→ Di} ∈ DD By Df-Approx
∀`src ∈ dom(H), f ields(Σ[`src]) = Tsrc f
∀m. mtype(m,Σ[`src]) = T → TR
∀Tk ∈ {Tsrc} ∪ {TR}
H ;K;LI ;LE ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk)
E′k ∈ LI [(`src, θ)] E
′
k = 〈H [`src], H [θ], Ok, Imp〉 ∈ DE By Df-Approx
∀`dst ∈ dom(H), f ields(Σ[`dst]) = Tdst f
∀m. mtype(m,Σ[`dst]) = T → TR
∀Tk ∈ {Tdst} ∪ {T}
H ;K;LI ;LE ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk)
Ek ∈ LE[(θ, `dst)] Ek = 〈H [θ], H [`dst], Ok, Exp〉 ∈ DE By Df-Approx
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H ′ = H,K ′ = K,L′I = LI By sub-derivation of Ir-Write
S[`] = C`<p>(v) fields(C`<p>) = T f By sub-derivation of Ir-Write
S′ = S[` 7→ C`<p>([v/vi]v)] By sub-derivation of Ir-Write
O = H [θ] O` = H [`] Ov = H [v] Ti ∈ T By sub-derivation of Ir-Write
E = 〈O,O`, Ov, Exp〉 ∈ DE H ;K;LI ;LE ` Ov ∈ irLookup(Ti) By sub-derivation of Ir-Write
L′E = LE[(θ, `) 7→∪ {E}] By sub-derivation of Ir-Write
∃Σ′ ⊇ Σ and T ′ <: T s.t. ∅,Σ′, θ ` e′ : T ′ and Σ′ ` S′ By FDJ Type Preservation
Σ′[`] = C<`′.d> Σ′ ` S′
∀`dst ∈ dom(H
′), f ields(Σ′[`dst]) = Tdst f,
∀m. mtype(m,Σ′[`dst]) = T → TR




E ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk)
Ek ∈ L
′
E [(θ, `dst)] = 〈H
′[θ], H ′[`dst], Ok, Exp〉 ∈ DE By above
(S′, H ′,K ′, L′I , L
′
E) ∼ (DO,DD,DE) By Df-Approx
This proves (1).
∅, ∅, G `O e
′ By Df-Loc, since e′ = vi
This proves (2).
G `CT,H Σ By assumption
∀` ∈ dom(S),Σ[`] = C`<p>
H [`] = O` = 〈C`<D`>〉 ∈ DO
∀m. mbody(m,C`<p>) = (x : T , eR)
{x : T , this : C`<p>}, ∅, G `O` eR By sub-derivation of Df-Sigma
H ′ = H By sub-derivation of Ir-Write
S[`] = C`<p>(v) fields(C`<p>) = T f By sub-derivation of Ir-Write
S′ = S[` 7→ C`<(>[v/vi]v)] By sub-derivation of Ir-Write
G `CT,H′ Σ
′ By Df-Sigma with the above H ′ and Σ′ = Σ
This proves (3).
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Case Ir-Invk: e = `.m(v), and e′ = ` . [v/x, `/this]eR
We have:
` : C<`′.d> mtype(m,C<`′.d>) = T ′ → T ′R mtypeDecl(m,C) = Tf → TR
G `O import(C<`′.d>, TR)
∀k ∈ 1..|v| vk : Ta Ta <: T
′
k G `O export(C<`
′.d>, Ta)
Γ,Υ, G `O ` Γ,Υ, G `O v
Γ,Υ, G `O `.m(v)
[Df-Invk]
S[`] = C<p>(v) mbody(m,C<p>) = (x, eR)
O = H [θ] O` = H [`] mtype(m,C<p>) = T → TR
H ;K;LI ;LE ` Or ∈ irLookup(TR) E
′ = 〈O`, O,Or , Imp〉 ∈ DE L
′
I = LI [(`, θ) 7→∪ {E
′}]
∀k ∈ 1..|x| Ok = H [vk] H ;K;LI;LE ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk) Tk ∈ T
Ek = 〈O,O`, Ok, Exp〉 ∈ DE L
′
E = LE [(θ, `) 7→∪ {Ek}]






G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 ∀` ∈ dom(S),Σ[`] = C<p> H [`] = O = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO




(1) (S′, H ′,K ′, L′I , L
′
E) ∼ (DO,DD,DE)
(2) ∅, ∅, G `O e′
(3) G `CT,H′ Σ′
θ ` e;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′;S′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By assumption
(S,H,K,LI , LE) ∼ (DO,DD,DE) By assumption
∀` ∈ dom(S), Σ[`] = C<`′.d> Since Σ ` S
H [θ] = OC = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO
and ∀θ′j .dj ∈ θ
′.d K[θ′j .dj ] = Dj = 〈Didj , qual(θ
′
j.dj)〉 ∈ rng(DD)
and ∀di ∈ domains(C<θ′.d>)
K[θ.di] = Di = 〈Didi , C::di〉 {(OC , C::di) 7→ Di} ∈ DD By Df-Approx
∀`src ∈ dom(H), f ields(Σ[`src]) = Tsrc f
∀m. mtype(m,Σ[`src]) = T → TR
∀Tk ∈ {Tsrc} ∪ {TR}
H ;K;LI ;LE ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk)
E′k ∈ LI [(`src, θ)] E
′
k = 〈H [`src], H [θ], Ok, Imp〉 ∈ DE By Df-Approx
∀`dst ∈ dom(H), f ields(Σ[`dst]) = Tdst f
∀m. mtype(m,Σ[`dst]) = T → TR
∀Tk ∈ {Tdst} ∪ {T}
H ;K;LI ;LE ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk)
Ek ∈ LE[(θ, `dst)] Ek = 〈H [θ], H [`dst], Ok, Exp〉 ∈ DE By Df-Approx
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S′ = S H ′ = H K ′ = K By sub-derivation of Ir-Invk
S[`] = C`<p>(v) mbody(m,C`<p>) = (x, eR) By sub-derivation of Ir-Invk
H [θ] = O H [`] = O` By sub-derivation of Ir-Invk
mtype(m,C`<p>) = T → TR TR = CR<p′> By sub-derivation of Ir-Invk
∀Or.H,K,LI , LE ` Or ∈ irLookup(TR) E
′ = 〈O`, O,Or , Imp〉 ∈ DE By sub-derivation of Ir-Invk
L′I = LI [(`, θ) 7→∪ {E
′}] By sub-derivation of Ir-Invk
∀k ∈ 1..|x| Ok = H [vk] H ;K;LI ;LE ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk) Tk ∈ T By sub-derivation of Ir-Invk
Ek = 〈O,O`, Ok, Exp〉 ∈ DE L
′
E = LE[(θ, `) 7→∪ {Ek}] By sub-derivation of Ir-Invk
∃Σ′ ⊇ Σ and T ′ <: T s.t. ∅,Σ′, θ ` e′ : T ′ and Σ′ ` S′ By FDJ Type Preservation
Σ′[`] = C`<`′.d> Σ
′ ` S′
∀`src ∈ dom(H
′), f ields(Σ′[`src]) = Tsrc f,
∀m. mtype(m,Σ′[`src]) = T → TR




E ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk)
E′k ∈ L
′
I [(`src, θ)] = 〈H
′[`src], H
′[θ], Ok, Imp〉 ∈ DE By above
∀`dst ∈ dom(H
′), f ields(Σ′[`dst]) = Tdst f,
∀m. mtype(m,Σ′[`dst]) = T → TR




E ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk)
Ek ∈ L
′
E [(θ, `dst)] = 〈H
′[θ], H ′[`dst], Ok, Exp〉 ∈ DE By above
(S′, H ′,K ′, L′I , L
′
E) ∼ (DO,DD,DE) By Df-Approx
This proves (1).
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∅, ∅, G `O e By assumption
e = `.m(v) e0 = ` e = v By assumption
e′ = ` . [v/x, `/this]eR By assumption
∅,Σ, θ ` e : T By assumption
∃Σ′ ⊇ Σ and T ′ <: T s.t. ∅,Σ′, θ ` e′ : T ′ and Σ′ ` S′ By FDJ Type Preservation
e0 : T0 T0 = C`<p> By sub-derivation of Df-Invk
mtype(m,C`<p>) = T → TR By sub-derivation of Df-Invk
∅, ∅, G `O e0 By sub-derivation of Df-Invk
∅, ∅, G `O e By sub-derivation of Df-Invk
{x : T , this : C`<α, β>},Σ, θ ` eR : TR TR <: T By FDJ MethOK:
S[`] = C`<d, d′>(v) By sub-derivation of Ir-Invk
mbody(m,C`<d, d′>) = (x, eR) By sub-derivation of Ir-Invk
Σ[`] = C`<d, d′> = T0 Since e0 = `, by T-Store
e0 : C`<d, d′> Since e0 = `, by T-Store
mtype(m,C`<d, d′>) = T → TR Since e0 = `, by T-Store
v : Ta By inversion
Ta <: [v/x, `/this]T For some Ta and T
there are some D<d> and T ′R so that: By Method Lemma
T ′R <: TR and C`<d, d
′> <: D<d> By Method Lemma
so that {x : T , this : D<d>},Σ, θ ` eR : T
′
R By Method Lemma
there exists TS , TS <: T
′





R <: TR By above
TS <: TR By transitivity of <:
Take T = T ′ = TR in FDJ Preservation
{x : T , this : C`<d, d′>}, ∅, G `OC eR By Df-Sigma
OC = H [`] By Df-Sigma
∅, ∅, G `O ` By Df-Loc
∅, ∅, G `OC [v/x, `/this]eR By Df-Substitution Lemma
∅, ∅, G `O ` . [v/x, `/this]eR By Df-Context
This proves (2).
G `CT,H Σ By assumption
S′ = S,H ′ = H By sub-derivation of Ir-Invk
G `CT,H′ Σ
′ By Df-Sigma with the above H ′ = H and Σ′ = Σ
This proves (3).
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Case Ir-Context: e = ` . v, and e′ = v
We have:
OC = H [`] Γ,Υ, G `OC e
Γ,Υ, G `O,H ` . e
[Df-Context]
θ ` ` . v;S ;H ;K;LI ;LE  G v; S ;H ;K;LI ;LE
[IR-Context]
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 ∀` ∈ dom(S),Σ[`] = C<p> H [`] = O = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO
∀m. mbody(m,C<p>) = (x : T , eR) {x : T , this : C<p>}, ∅, G `O eR
G `CT,H Σ
[Df-Sigma]
Γ,Υ, G `O `
[Df-Loc]
To Show:
(1) (S′, H ′,K ′, L′I , L
′
E) ∼ (DO,DD,DE)
(2) ∅, ∅, G `O e′
(3) G `CT,H′ Σ′
(S,H,K,LI , LE) ∼ (DO,DD,DE) By assumption
S′ = S,H ′ = H,K ′ = K,L′I = LI , L
′
E = LE By sub-derivation of Ir-Context
This proves (1).
∅, ∅, G `O e
′ By Df-Loc, since e′ = v
This proves (2).
G `CT,H Σ By assumption
S′ = S,H ′ = H By sub-derivation of Ir-Context
G `CT,H′ Σ
′ Take Σ′ = Σ
This proves (3).
Case Irc-New: e = new C<p>(v1..i−1, ei, ei+1..n), and e′ = new C<p>(v1..i−1, e′i, ei+1..n).
We have:
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 O = Cthis<DO> ∀i ∈ 1..|p| G `O Di ∈ findD(Cthis::pi)
OC = 〈 C<D> 〉 {OC} ⊆ DO
G `O dparams(C,OC) {(OC , qual(pi)) 7→ Di} ⊆ DD
Υ, G `O ddomains(C,OC)
∀m ∈ md mbody(m,C<p>) = (x : T , eR)
C<D> 6∈ Υ =⇒ {x : T , this : C<p>},Υ ∪ {C<D>}, G `OC eR
Γ,Υ, G `O e
Γ,Υ, G `O new C<p>(e)
[Df-New]
θ ` ei;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
i;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E








G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 ∀` ∈ dom(S),Σ[`] = C<p> H [`] = O = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO




(1) (S′, H ′,K ′, L′I , L
′
E) ∼ (DO,DD,DE)
(2) ∅, ∅, G `O e′
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(3) G `CT,H′ Σ
′
θ ` ei;S;H ;K;LI ;LE  G e
′
i;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By sub-derivation of Irc-New
(S′, H ′,K ′, L′I , L
′
E) ∼ (DO,DD,DE) By induction hypothesis
This proves (1).
θ ` ei;S;H ;K;LI ;LE  G e
′
i;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By sub-derivation of Irc-New
∅, ∅, G `O e
′
i By induction hypothesis
∅, ∅, G `O new C<p>(v1..i−1, e
′
i, ei+1..n) By Df-New
This proves (2).
θ ` ei;S;H ;K;LI ;LE  G e
′
i;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By sub-derivation of Irc-New
G `CT,H′ Σ
′ By induction hypothesis, take Σ′ = Σ
This proves (3).
Case Irc-Read: e = e0.fk, and e′ = e′0.fk.
We have:
e0 : C<p> (Tk fk) ∈ fieldDecls(C)
G `O import(C<p>, Tk)
Γ,Υ, G `O e0
Γ,Υ, G `O e0.fk
[Df-Read]
θ ` e0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
0;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E
θ ` e0.fi;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G
e′0.fi;S




G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 ∀` ∈ dom(S),Σ[`] = C<p> H [`] = O = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO




(1) (S′, H ′,K ′, L′I , L
′
E) ∼ (DO,DD,DE)
(2) ∅, ∅, G `O e′
(3) G `CT,H′ Σ′
θ ` e0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
0;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By sub-derivation of Irc-Read
(S′, H ′,K ′, L′I , L
′
E) ∼ (G) By induction hypothesis
This proves (1).
θ ` e0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
0;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By sub-derivation of Irc-Read
∅, ∅, G `O e
′
0 By induction hypothesis




θ ` e0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
0;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By sub-derivation of Irc-Read
G `CT,H′ Σ
′ By induction hypothesis, take Σ′ = Σ
This proves (3).
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Case Irc-Write-Rcv: e = (e0.fk = e1), and e′ = (e′0.fk = e1).
We have:
e0 : C<p> (Tk fk) ∈ fields(C<p>)
e1 : C1<p′′> C1<p′′> <: Tk
G `O export(C<p>,C1<p′′>)
Γ,Υ, G `O e0 Γ,Υ, G `O e1
Γ,Υ, G `O e0.fk = e1
[Df-Write]
θ ` e0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
0;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E
θ ` e0.fi = e1;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G
e′0.fi = e1;S




G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 ∀` ∈ dom(S),Σ[`] = C<p> H [`] = O = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO




(1) (S′, H ′,K ′, L′I , L
′
E) ∼ (DO,DD,DE)
(2) ∅, ∅, G `O e′
(3) G `CT,H′ Σ′
θ ` e0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
0;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By sub-derivation of Irc-Write-Rcv
(S′, H ′,K ′, L′I , L
′
E) ∼ (DO,DD,DE) By induction hypothesis
This proves (1).
θ ` e0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
0;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By sub-derivation of Irc-Write-Rcv
∅, ∅, G `O e
′
0 By induction hypothesis
∅, ∅, G `O e1 By Df-Write
∅, ∅, G `O e
′
0.fk = e1 By Df-Write
This proves (2).
θ ` e0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
0;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By sub-derivation of Irc-Write-Rcv
G `CT,H′ Σ
′ By induction hypothesis, take Σ′ = Σ
This proves (3).
Case Irc-Write-Arg: e = (v.fk = e1), and e′ = (v.fk = e′1).
We have:
e0 : C<p> (Tk fk) ∈ fields(C<p>)
e1 : C1<p′′> C1<p′′> <: Tk
G `O export(C<p>,C1<p′′>)
Γ,Υ, G `O e0 Γ,Υ, G `O e1
Γ,Υ, G `O e0.fk = e1
[Df-Write]
θ ` e1;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
1;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E








G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 ∀` ∈ dom(S),Σ[`] = C<p> H [`] = O = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO





(1) (S′, H ′,K ′, L′I , L
′
E) ∼ (DO,DD,DE)
(2) ∅, ∅, G `O e′
(3) G `CT,H′ Σ′
θ ` e1;S;H ;K;LI ;LE  G e
′
1;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By sub-derivation of Irc-Write-Arg
(S′, H ′,K ′, L′I , L
′
E) ∼ (DO,DD,DE) By induction hypothesis
This proves (1).
θ ` e1;S;H ;K;LI ;LE  G e
′
1;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By sub-derivation of Irc-Write-Arg
∅, ∅, G `O e
′
1 By induction hypothesis






θ ` e1;S;H ;K;LI ;LE  G e
′
1;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By sub-derivation of Irc-Write-Arg
G `CT,H′ Σ
′ By induction hypothesis, take Σ′ = Σ
This proves (3).
Case Irc-RecvInvk: e = e0.m(e), and e′ = e′0.m(e).
We have:
e0 : C<p> mtype(m,C<p>) = T ′ → T
′
R mtypeDecl(m,C) = Tf → TR
G `O import(C<p>, TR)
∀k ∈ 1..|e| ek : Ta Ta <: T
′
k G `O export(C<p>, Ta)
Γ,Υ, G `O e0 Γ,Υ, G `O e
Γ,Υ, G `O e0.m(e)
[Df-Invk]
θ ` e0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
0;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E
θ ` e0.m(e);S;H ;K;LI;LE  G
e′0.m(e);S




G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 ∀` ∈ dom(S),Σ[`] = C<p> H [`] = O = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO




(1) (S′, H ′,K ′, L′I , L
′
E) ∼ (DO,DD,DE)
(2) ∅, ∅, G `O e′
(3) G `CT,H′ Σ′
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θ ` e0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
0;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By sub-derivation of Irc-RecvInvk
(S′, H ′,K ′, L′I , L
′
E) ∼ (DO,DD,DE) By induction hypothesis
This proves (1).
θ ` e0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
0;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By sub-derivation of Irc-RecvInvk
∅, ∅, G `O e
′
0 By induction hypothesis
∅, ∅, G `O e By Df-Invk




θ ` e0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
0;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By sub-derivation of Irc-RecvInvk
G `CT,H′ Σ
′ By induction hypothesis, take Σ′ = Σ
This proves (3).
Case Case Irc-ArgInvk: e = v.m(v1..i−1, ei, ei+1..n),and e′ = v.m(v1..i−1, e′i, ei+1..n).
We have:
e0 : C<p> mtype(m,C<p>) = T ′ → T
′
R mtypeDecl(m,C) = Tf → TR
G `O import(C<p>, TR)
∀k ∈ 1..|e| ek : Ta Ta <: T
′
k G `O export(C<p>, Ta)
Γ,Υ, G `O e0 Γ,Υ, G `O e
Γ,Υ, G `O e0.m(e)
[Df-Invk]
θ ` ei;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
i;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E








G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 ∀` ∈ dom(S),Σ[`] = C<p> H [`] = O = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO




(1) (S′, H ′,K ′, L′I , L
′
E) ∼ (DO,DD,DE)
(2) ∅, ∅, G `O e′
(3) G `CT,H′ Σ′
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θ ` ei;S;H ;K;LI ;LE  G e
′
i;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By sub-derivation of Irc-ArgInvk
(S′, H ′,K ′, L′I , L
′
E) ∼ (DO,DD,DE) By induction hypothesis
This proves (1).
θ ` ei;S;H ;K;LI ;LE  G e
′
i;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By sub-derivation of Irc-ArgInvk
∅, ∅, G `O e
′
i By induction hypothesis
∅, ∅, G `O v.m(v1..i−1, e
′
i, ei+1..n) By Df-Invk
This proves (2).
θ ` ei;S;H ;K;LI ;LE  G e
′
i;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By sub-derivation of Irc-ArgInvk
G `CT,H′ Σ
′ By induction hypothesis, take Σ′ = Σ
This proves (3).
Case Irc-Context: e = ` . e0, and e′ = ` . e′0.
We have:
OC = H [`] Γ,Υ, G `OC e
Γ,Υ, G `O,H ` . e
[Df-Context]
` ` e;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′;S′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E
θ ` ` . e;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G ` . e




G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 ∀` ∈ dom(S),Σ[`] = C<p> H [`] = O = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO




(1) (S′, H ′,K ′, L′I , L
′
E) ∼ (DO,DD,DE)
(2) ∅, ∅, G `O e
′
(3) G `CT,H′ Σ′
` ` e0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
0;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By sub-derivation of Irc-Context
(S′, H ′,K ′, L′I , L
′
E) ∼ (DO,DD,DE) By induction hypothesis
This proves (1).
` ` e0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
0;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By sub-derivation of Irc-Context
O` = H [`] By induction hypothesis
∅, ∅, G `O` e
′
0 By induction hypothesis




` ` e0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
0;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By sub-derivation of Irc-Context
G `CT,H′ Σ
′ By induction hypothesis, take Σ′ = Σ
This proves (3).
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9.2 Theorem: Dataflow Progress
If
∅,Σ, θ ` e : T
Σ ` S
G `CT,H Σ
∅, ∅, G `O e
(S,H,K,LI , LE) ∼ (DO,DD,DE)
then
either e is a value
or else θ ` e;S ;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′;S′ ;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E
Proof. We prove progress by derivation of ∅, ∅, G `O e, with a case analysis on the last typing rule used. The
most interesting cases are Df-New, Df-Read (page 198), Df-Write (page 201), and Df-Invk (page 203).
Case DF-NEW : e = new C<p>(e).
Subcase e = v that is e = new C<p>(v). Take e′ = `, then Ir-New can apply.
` 6∈ dom(S) S′ = S[` 7→ C<p>(v)]
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉
p = `′.d ∀i ∈ 1..|`′.d| Di = K[`
′
i.di]
`i ∈ dom(H) s.t. H [`i] = Oi Di = DD[Oi, qual(`
′
i.di)]
OC = 〈C<D>〉 OC ∈ DO H
′ = H [` 7→ OC ]
∀(domain dj) ∈ domains(C<p>) Dj = DD[(OC , C::dj)] K
′ = K[`.dj 7→ Dj ]
θ ` new C<p>(v);S ;H ;K;LI ;LE  G `;S
′ ;H ′;K ′;LI ;LE
[Ir-New]
Σ[`] = C<`′′.d> d ∈ domains(C<`′′.d>)
Γ; Σ; θ ` qual(`.d) = C::d
To show:
(1) ∀i ∈ 1..|`′.d| Di = K[`′i.di]
(2) OC = 〈C<D>〉 OC ∈ DO
(3) ∀i ∈ 1..|`′.d| H [`′i] = Oi Di = DD[(Oi, qual(`
′.di))]
(4) ∀dj ∈ domains(C<`′.d>) Dj = DD[(OC , C::dj)]
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(S,H,K,LI , LE) ∼ (DO,DD,DE) By assumption
∀` ∈ dom(S),Σ[`] = C<`′.d> Σ ` S
∀` ∈dom(S),Σ[`] = C<`′.d>
=⇒
H [`] = OC = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO
and ∀`′j .dj ∈ `
′.d K[`′j.dj ] = Dj = 〈Didj , qual(`
′
j.dj)〉 ∈ rng(DD)
and ∀di ∈ domains(C<`′.d>)
K[`.di] = Di = 〈Didi , C::di〉 {(OC , C::di) 7→ Di} ∈ DD
and ∀`src ∈ dom(H), f ields(Σ[`src]) = Tsrc f
∀m. mtype(m,Σ[`src]) = T → TR
∀Tk ∈ {Tsrc} ∪ {TR}
H ;K;LI;LE ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk)
E′k ∈ LI [(`src, `)] E
′
k = 〈H [`src], H [`], Ok, Imp〉 ∈ DE
and ∀`dst ∈ dom(H), f ields(Σ[`dst]) = Tdst f
∀m. mtype(m,Σ[`dst]) = T → TR
∀Tk ∈ {Tdst} ∪ {T}
H ;K;LI;LE ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk)
Ek ∈ LE[(`, `dst)] Ek = 〈H [`], H [`dst], Ok, Exp〉 ∈ DE
This proves (1,2).
∅, ∅, G `O new C<`′.d>(v) By assumption
∀i ∈ 1..|`′.d| G `O Di ∈ findD(Cthis::`
′
i.di) By sub-derivation of Df-New
OC = 〈 C<D> 〉 {OC} ⊆ DO By sub-derivation of Df-New
G `O dparams(C,OC) By sub-derivation of Df-New
{(OC , C::αi) 7→ Di} ⊆ DD αi ∈ params(C) By sub-derivation of AuxAlpha
{(OC , qual(`
′
i.di)) 7→ Di} ⊆ DD By sub-derivation of Df-New
∅, G `O ddomains(C,OC) By sub-derivation of Df-New
This proves (4). By Df-Domains Lemma
Sub-subcase `′i 6= θ, `
′
i.di is a domain of some object in the context of θ That is,
∃ n ∈ dom(H) such that :
DD[(H [n], Cn::di)] = Di
G `O H [n] ∈ lookup(Σ[n]) by subderivation of Aux-Find-Public
This proves (3). Take `i = n
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Sub-subcase `′i 6= θ, `
′
i.di substitutes the j
th formal domain parameters of Cthis,





DD[(O, qual(`′i.di))] = D
′
j by subderivation of Df-New
∀i ∈ 1..|`′.d| G `O Di ∈ findD(Cthis::`
′
i.di) By sub-derivation of Df-New
Di = DD[(O, qual(`
′
i.di)] = DD[(O,Cthis::αj)] = D
′
j By sub-derivation of Aux-FindD
This proves (3). Take `i = θ
Sub-subcase `′i = θ, `
′
i.di is a domain of θ
G `O Di ∈ findD(Cthis::`
′
i.di) By above
Di = DD[(O,C::di))] By sub-derivation of Aux-FindThis
di ∈ domains(Σ[`i])
qual(`′i.di) = C::di By inversion of Qual-Var
Di = DD[(O, qual(`
′
i.di))] By above
This proves (3). Take `i = θ
Sub-subcase di = ::shared
G `O Di ∈ findD(Cthis::`
′
i.di) By above
Di = Dshared = DD[(Oworld, ::shared)] By sub-derivation of Aux-FindShared
This proves (3).
Subcase e = new C<p>(v1..i−1, ei, ei+1..n) . Then Irc-New can apply.
θ ` ei;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
i;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E








Γ,Υ, G `O ei By sub-derivation of Df-New
θ ` ei;S;H ;K;LI ;LE  G e
′
i;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By induction hypothesis




′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By inversion of Irc-New
This proves the case.
Case DF-VAR : e = x.
Not applicable since variable is not a closed term.
Case DF-LOC : e = `.
e is a value.
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Case DF-READ : e = e0.fi. There are two subcases to consider depending on whether the receiver
e0 is a value.
Subcase e0 = `. Then e = `.fi
From Ir-Read:
S[`] = C<p>(v) fields(C<p>) = T f
O = H [θ] O` = H [`] Ov = H [vi] Ti ∈ T
E = 〈O`, O,Ov, Imp〉 ∈ DE H ;K;LI;LE ` Ov ∈ irLookup(Ti) L
′
I = LI [(`, θ) 7→∪ {E}]




(1) O = H [θ]
(2) O` = H [`]
(3) Ov = H [vi] Ti ∈ T H,K,LI , LE ` Ov ∈ irLookup(Ti) E = 〈O`, O, Cv, Imp〉 ∈ DE
G `CT,H Σ By assumption
∀`′ ∈ dom(S),Σ[`′] = C′<p> By sub-derivation of Df-Sigma
H [`′] = O′ = 〈C′<D′>〉 ∈ DO By sub-derivation of Df-Sigma
H [θ] = O = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO Since θ ∈ dom(S)
H [`] = O` = 〈C`<D`>〉 ∈ DO Since ` ∈ dom(S)
H [vi] = Ov = 〈Cv<Dv>〉 ∈ DO Since v ∈ dom(S)
this proves (1), and (2).
(S,H,K,LI , LE) ∼ (DO,DD,DE) By assumption
∀` ∈ dom(S), Σ[`] = C<`′.d> Since Σ ` S
H [θ] = OC = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO
and ∀θ′j .dj ∈ θ
′.d K[θ′j.dj ] = Dj = 〈Didj , qual(θ
′
j.dj)〉 ∈ rng(DD)
and ∀di ∈ domains(C<θ′.d>)
K[θ.di] = Di = 〈Didi , C::di〉 {(OC , C::di) 7→ Di} ∈ DD By Df-Approx
∀`src ∈ dom(H), f ields(Σ[`src]) = Tsrc f
∀m. mtype(m,Σ[`src]) = T → TR
∀Tk ∈ {Tsrc} ∪ {TR}
H ;K;LI;LE ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk)
E′k ∈ LI [(`src, θ)] E
′
k = 〈H [`src], H [θ], Ok, Imp〉 ∈ DE By Df-Approx
∀`dst ∈ dom(H), f ields(Σ[`dst]) = Tdst f
∀m. mtype(m,Σ[`dst]) = T → TR
∀Tk ∈ {Tdst} ∪ {T}
H ;K;LI;LE ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk)
Ek ∈ LE [(θ, `dst)] Ek = 〈H [θ], H [`dst], Ok, Exp〉 ∈ DE By Df-Approx
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∅, ∅, G `O `.fi By assumption
fields(Σ[`]) = T ′ f By FDJ T-Store
Since e0 = ` ∈ dom(H)
` : Σ[`] = C`<p> (T
′
i fi) ∈ fieldDecls(C`) By sub-derivation of Df-Read
G `O import(Σ[`], T
′
i ) By sub-derivation of Df-Read
∅, ∅, G `O ` By sub-derivation of Df-Read
G `O Oi ∈ lookup(Σ[`]) By sub-derivation of Aux-Import
G `Oi Oj ∈ lookup(T
′
i ) By sub-derivation of Aux-Import
〈Oi, O,Oj , Imp〉 ⊆ DE By sub-derivation of Aux-Import
∅,Σ, θ ` ` : Σ[`] By hypothesis
Σ[`] = C`<`′.d> H [`] = O` = 〈C`<D`>〉 ∈ DO
G `H[θ] H [`] ∈ lookup(Σ[`]) By Lookup Lemma
S[`] = C`<`′.d>(v),Σ[v] = Cv<v′.d> H [vi] = Ov = 〈Cv<Dv>〉 ∈ DO
T ′i = C
′
v<p> Cv <: C
′
v By sub-derivation of Df-Read
To show
∀pk ∈ p G `H[`] D
′
vk ∈ findD(C`::pk) D
′
vk = Dvk = K[v
′
k.dk]
pk is a domain parameter, local domain of ` or shared. Therefore we split the proof in cases
Case domain parameter: pk = αj
∃`′j .dj ∈ `
′.d s.t K[v′k.dk] = K[`
′
j.dj ] = Dj




j.dj ] By Params Lemma
Case local domain: pk = `.d
∃`′j .dj ∈ `
′.d s.t K[v′k.dk] = K[`
′
j.dj ] = Dj
Dvk = Dj = DD[(H [`], C`::dj)] = K[`.dj ] By sub-derivation of Df-New
Case local domain: pk = shared
Dvk = Dshared = DD[(H [`], ::shared)]
G `H[`] Dvk ∈ findD(C`::qual(v
′
k.dk)) By inversion of AuxFindD
G `H[`] H [vi] ∈ lookup(T
′
i ) By inversion of Aux-Lookup.Take Oi = H [`]
〈H [`], H [θ], H [v], Imp〉 ⊆ DE By above. Take O = H [θ] Oi = H [`] Oj = H [vi]
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H [v] = OCv = 〈Cv<D>〉 ∈ DO
and ∀v′j .dj ∈ v
′.d K[v′j .dj ] = Dj = 〈Didj , qual(v
′
j .dj)〉 ∈ rng(DD)
and ∀di ∈ domains(Cv<v′.d>)
K[v.di] = Di = 〈Didi , Cv::di〉 {(OCv , Cv::di) 7→ Di} ∈ DD By Df-Approx
H ;K;LI;LE ` H [v] ∈ irLookup(Σ[v]) By inversion of IR-Lookup
Take Tk = T
′
i ∈ T
′, this proves (3).
Subcase e0 = e
′
0.fi. That is, e0 is not a value
From Irc-Read:
θ ` e0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
0;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E
θ ` e0.fi;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G
e′0.fi;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E
θ ` e′0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′′
0 ;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By induction hypothesis
θ ` e′0.fi;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′′
0 .fi;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By Irc-Read
Take e′ = e′′0 .fi.
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Case DF-WRITE : e = (e0.fi = e1). There are three subcases to consider depending on whether
the receiver e0, and e1 are values.
Subcase e0 = `, and e1 = v. Then e = (`.fi = v)
From Ir-Write
S[`] = C<p>(v) fields(C<p>) = T f
S′ = S[` 7→ C<p>([v/vi]v)]
O = H [θ] O` = H [`] Ov = H [v] H ;K;LI ;LE ` Ov ∈ irLookup(Ti) Ti ∈ T
E = 〈O,O`, Ov, Exp〉 ∈ DE L
′
E = LE[(θ, `) 7→∪ {E}]





(1) O = H [θ]
(2) O` = H [`]
(3) Ov = H [vi] H ;K;LI ;LE ` Ov ∈ irLookup(Ti) E = 〈O,O`, Ov, Exp〉 ∈ DE
G `CT,H Σ By assumption
∀`′ ∈ dom(S),Σ[`′] = C′<p> By sub-derivation of Df-Sigma
H [`′] = O′ = 〈C′<D′>〉 ∈ DO By sub-derivation of Df-Sigma
H [θ] = O = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO Since θ ∈ dom(S)
H [`] = O` = 〈C`<D`>〉 ∈ DO Since ` ∈ dom(S)
H [v] = Ov = 〈Cv<Dv>〉 ∈ DO Since v ∈ dom(S)
this proves (1), and (2).
(S,H,K,LI , LE) ∼ (DO,DD,DE) By assumption
∀` ∈ dom(S), Σ[`] = C<`′.d> Since Σ ` S
H [θ] = OC = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO
and ∀θ′j .dj ∈ θ
′.d K[θ′j .dj ] = Dj = 〈Didj , qual(θ
′
j.dj)〉 ∈ rng(DD)
and ∀di ∈ domains(C<θ′.d>)
K[θ.di] = Di = 〈Didi , C::di〉 {(OC , C::di) 7→ Di} ∈ DD
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∅, ∅, G `O `.fi = v By assumption:
Since e0 = ` ∈ dom(H) e1 = v:
` : Σ[`] = C`<p> (T
′
i fi) ∈ fields(C`<p>) = T
′ f T ′i = Ci<p
′> By sub-derivation of Df-Write
v : Σ[v] = Cv<p′′> Σ[v] <: T
′
i By sub-derivation of Df-Write
G `O export(Σ[`],Σ[v]) By sub-derivation of Df-Write
G `O Oi ∈ lookup(Σ[`]) By sub-derivation of Aux-Export
G `O Oj ∈ lookup(Σ[v]) By sub-derivation of Aux-Export
〈O,Oi, Oj , Exp〉 ∈ DE By sub-derivation of Aux-Export
Σ[`] = C`<`′.d> H [`] = O` = 〈C`<D`>〉 ∈ DO
∅, ∅, G `O ` By sub-derivation of Df-Write
∅; Σ; θ ` ` : Σ[`] By Hypothesis
G `H[θ] H [`] ∈ lookup(Σ[`]) By Lookup Lemma
∅, ∅, G `O v By sub-derivation of Df-Write
∅; Σ; θ ` v : Σ[v] By Hypothesis
Σ[v] = Cv<v′.d> H [v] = Ov = 〈Cv<Dv>〉 ∈ DO
G `H[θ] H [v] ∈ lookup(Σ[v]) By Lookup Lemma
Σ[v] = Cv<v′.d> H [v] = Ov = 〈Cv<Dv>〉 ∈ DO
∀v′j .dj ∈ v
′.d K[v′j .dj ] = Dj ∈ rng(DD) By Df-Approx
Σ[v] <: T ′i By sub-derivation of Df-Write
H ;K;LI;LE ` H [v] ∈ irLookup(T
′
i ) By inversion of IR-Lookup
Take Tk = T
′
i ∈ T
′, this proves (3).
Subcase e0 = e
′




θ ` e0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
0;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E
θ ` e0.fi = e1;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G
e′0.fi = e1;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E
θ ` e′0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′′
0 ;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By induction hypothesis
θ ` e′0.fi = e1;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′′
0 .fi = e1;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By IRC-Write-Rcv
Take e′ = (e′′0 .fi = e1).
Subcase e0 = v, and e1 = e
′




θ ` e1;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
1;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E








Γ,Υ, G `O e1 By sub-derivation of Df-Write
θ ` e1;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
1;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By induction hypothesis
θ ` v.fi = e1;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G v.fi = e
′
1;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By IRC-Write-Arg
Take e′ = (v.fi = e
′
1).
Case DF-INVK : e = e0.m(e). There are three subcases to consider, depending on whether the
receiver e0, or the arguments e are values.
Subcase e0 = `, and e = v that is e = `.m(v)
From Ir-Invk:
S[`] = C<p>(v) mbody(m,C<p>) = (x, eR)
O = H [θ] O` = H [`] mtype(m,C<p>) = T → TR
H ;K;LI;LE ` Or ∈ irLookup(TR) E
′ = 〈O`, O,Or, Imp〉 ∈ DE L
′
I = LI [(`, θ) 7→∪ {E
′}]
∀k ∈ 1..|x| Ok = H [vk] H ;K;LI ;LE ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk) Tk ∈ T
Ek = 〈O,O`, Ok, Exp〉 ∈ DE L
′
E = LE[(θ, `) 7→∪ {Ek}]






(1) O = H [θ]
(2) O` = H [`]
(3) mtype(m,C`<p>) = T → TR ∀Or.H ;K;LI ;LE ` Or ∈ irLookup(TR) E′ = 〈O`, O,Or , Imp〉 ∈
DE
(4) ∀k ∈ 1..|T | Ok = H [vk] H ;K;LI ;LE ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk) Ek = 〈O,O`, Ok, Exp〉 ∈ DE
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G `CT,H Σ By assumption
∀`′ ∈ dom(S),Σ[`′] = C′<p> By sub-derivation of Df-Sigma
H [`′] = O′ = 〈C′<D′>〉 ∈ DO By sub-derivation of Df-Sigma
H [θ] = O = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO Since θ ∈ dom(S)
H [`] = O` = 〈C`<D`>〉 ∈ DO Since ` ∈ dom(S)
this proves (1), and (2).
H [θ] = OC = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO
and ∀θ′j .dj ∈ θ
′.d K[θ′j.dj ] = Dj = 〈Didj , qual(θ
′
j.dj)〉 ∈ rng(DD)
and ∀di ∈ domains(C<θ′.d>)
K[θ.di] = Di = 〈Didi , C::di〉 {(OC , C::di) 7→ Di} ∈ DD By Df-Approx
∀`src ∈ dom(H), f ields(Σ[`src]) = Tsrc f
∀m. mtype(m,Σ[`src]) = T → TR
∀Tk ∈ {Tsrc} ∪ {TR}
H ;K;LI;LE ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk)
E′k ∈ LI [(`src, θ)] E
′
k = 〈H [`src], H [θ], Ok, Imp〉 ∈ DE By Df-Approx
∀`dst ∈ dom(H), f ields(Σ[`dst]) = Tdst f
∀m. mtype(m,Σ[`dst]) = T → TR
∀Tk ∈ {Tdst} ∪ {T}
H ;K;LI;LE ` Ok ∈ irLookup(Tk)
Ek ∈ LE [(θ, `dst)] Ek = 〈H [θ], H [`dst], Ok, Exp〉 ∈ DE By Df-Approx
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∅, ∅, G `O `.m(v) By assumption
` : Σ[`] = C`<`′.d> By sub-derivation of Df-Invk
mtype(m,C`<`′.d>) = T ′ → T
′
R By sub-derivation of Df-Invk
mtypeDecl(m,C`) = Tf → TR By sub-derivation of Df-Invk
G `O import(Σ[`], TR) By sub-derivation of Df-Invk
G `O Oi ∈ lookup(Σ[`]) By subderivation of Aux-Import
G `Oi Oj ∈ lookup(TR) By subderivation of Aux-Import
E′ = 〈Oi, O,Oj , Exp〉 ∈ DE By subderivation of Aux-Import
θ ` H ;K;LI;LE , new C`<`′.d>(v) G `;S
′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By induction hypothesis
∅,Σ, θ ` ` : Σ[`] By hypothesis
∅, ∅, G `O ` By sub-derivation of Df-Invk
G `O H [`] ∈ lookup(Σ[`]) By Lookup Lemma
T ′R = Σ[`
′′] = CR<`′′′.d> TR = CR<p>
CR<`′′′.d> = [. . . `
′′′
j .dj/pj . . .]CR<p> By definition of mtype,mtypeDecl
∀H ;K;LI ;LE ` Or ∈ irLookup(T
′
R)
G `H[`] Or ∈ lookup(TR) To Show
Or ∈ rng(H) Or = 〈C
′<D′>〉 C′ <: CR By subderivation of IR-Lookup
∀`′′′j .dj ∈ `
′′.d D′′j = K[`
′′′




j By subderivation of IR-Lookup
To show
∀pj ∈ p G `H[`] D
′′







pj is a domain parameter, local domain of ` or shared. Therefore we split the proof in cases
Case domain parameter: pj = αi
∃`′i.di ∈ `
′.d s.t K[`′′′j .dj ] = K[`
′
i.di] = D`i D`i ∈ D` H [`] = O` = 〈C`<D`>〉




i.di] By Params Lemma
Case local domain: pk = `.dj
Dj = DD[(H [`], C`::dj)] = K[`.dj] By sub-derivation of Df-New
Case local domain: pk = shared
Dvk = Dshared = DD[(H [`], ::shared)]
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We showed
∀pj ∈ p G `H[`] D
′′





G `H[`] Or ∈ lookup(TR) By inversion of Aux-Lookup
∀Or, E
′ = 〈H [`], H [θ], Or, Imp〉 ∈ DE By above. Take Oi = H [`], O = H [θ]
∀i ∈ 1..|v| vk : Σ[vk] Σ[vk] <: T
′
k G `O export(Σ[`],Σ[vk]) By sub-derivation of Df-Invk
∅, ∅, G `O v By sub-derivation of Df-Invk
∅, ∅, G `O ` By sub-derivation of Df-Invk
G `O H [`] ∈ lookup(Σ[`]) By Lookup Lemma
∀vk ∈ v Σ[vk] = Ck<v′.d>
∅, ∅, G `O vk By sub-derivation of Df-Invk
G `O H [vk] ∈ lookup(Σ[vk]) By Lookup Lemma
E′ = 〈H [`], H [θ], H [vk], Exp〉 ∈ DE By subderivation of Aux-Import
Σ[vk] = Cv<v′.d> H [vk] = Ov = 〈Cv<Dv>〉 ∈ DO
∀v′j .dj ∈ v
′.d K[v′j .dj ] = Dj ∈ rng(DD) By Df-Approx
Σ[vk] <: T
′
k By sub-derivation of Df-Invk
H ;K;LI ;LE ` H [vk] ∈ irLookup(T
′
k) By inversion of IR-Lookup
This proves (4).
Subcase e0 = e
′




θ ` e0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
0;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E
θ ` e0.m(e);S;H ;K;LI;LE  G
e′0.m(e);S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E
θ ` e′0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′′
0 ;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By induction hypothesis
θ ` e′0.m(e);S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′′
0 .m(e);S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By IRC-RecvInvk
Take e′ = e′′0 .m(e).
Subcase e0 = v that is e = v.m(v1..i−1, ei, ei+1..n).
From IRC-ArgInvk:
θ ` ei;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
i;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E




′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E
Γ,Υ, G `O ei By sub-derivation of Df-Invk
θ ` ei;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
i;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By induction hypothesis




′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By IRC-ArgInvk




Case DF-CONTEXT : e = ` . e0. there are two subcases to consider, depending on whether e0 is
a value
Subcase e0 is a value that is e = ` . v.
From Ir-Context:
θ ` ` . v;S ;H ;K;LI ;LE  G v; S ;H ;K;LI ;LE
Then Ir-Context can apply. Take e′ = v.
Subcase e0 is not a value that is e = ` . e′0.
From Irc-Context:
` ` e;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′;S′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E
θ ` ` . e;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G ` . e
′;S′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E
` ` e0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G e
′
0;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By induction hypothesis
θ ` ` . e0;S;H ;K;LI;LE  G ` . e
′
0;S
′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E By Irc-Context
Take e′ = ` . e′0.
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θ ` e;S;H ;K;LI;LE  
∗
G e;S;H ;K;LI ;LE
[Df-Reflex]
θ ` e;S;H ;K;LI;LE  
∗
G e
′′;S ′′;H ′′;K ′′;L′′I ;L
′′
E
θ ` e′′;S ′′;H ′′;K ′′;L′′I ;L
′′
E  G e
′;S ′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E
θ ` e;S;H ;K;LI ;LE  
∗
G e




Figure 9.1: Reflexive, transitive closure of the instrumented evaluation relation
9.3 Theorem: Object Graph Soundness
If
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉
DO,DD,DE ` (CT, eroot)






(S,H,K,LI , LE) ∼ (DO,DD,DE)
where  ∗G relation is the reflexive and transitive closure of  G relation (Fig. 9.1). θ0 is the location of the
first object instantiated by eroot.
To prove the Object Graph Soundness theorem, we need to show:
(1) DO,DD,DE `CT,H Σ
(2) (S,H,K,LI , LE) ∼ (DO,DD,DE)
Proof. The proof is by induction on the  ∗G relation. There are two cases to consider:
1
Case Case Df-Reflex :
Since S = ∅ :
(S,H,K,LI , LE) ∼ G
Immediately, from Df-Sigma store constraint with S = ∅:
DO,DD,DE `CT,H Σ
Case Case Df-Trans :
By assumption:
θ0 ` e; ∅; ∅; ∅; ∅; ∅ ∗G e;S;H ;K;LI;LE
Since S = ∅ :
(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅) ∼ G
By inversion of Df-Trans:
θ0 ` e; ∅; ∅; ∅; ∅; ∅ ∗G e




(S′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E) ∼ G
By inversion of Df-Trans:
θ0 ` e′;S′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′
E  G e;S;H ;K;LI;LE
1The soundness proof follows similar steps to the one of points-to analysis [4].
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By preservation:
(S;H ;K;LI;LE) ∼ G
By assumption:
θ0 ` e; ∅; ∅; ∅; ∅; ∅ ∗G e;S;H ;K;LI;LE
Since S = ∅ :
(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅) ∼ G
By inversion of Df-Trans:
θ0 ` e; ∅; ∅; ∅; ∅; ∅ 
∗
G e





By inversion of Df-Trans:
θ0 ` e′;S′;H ′;K ′;L′I ;L
′




To prove the Progress and Preservation theorems, we use the following lemmas.
Df-Substitution Lemma.
If
Γ ∪ {x : Tf},Σ, θ ` e : T
Γ ∪ {x : Tf},Υ, G `O e
Γ,Σ, θ ` v : Ta where Ta <: [v/x]Tf
then
Γ,Σ, θ ` [v/x]e : T ′ for some T ′ <: [v/x]T
Γ,Υ, G `O [v/x]e
Proof. By induction on the Γ,Υ, G `O e relation.
Df-Weakening Lemma.
If
Γ,Υ, G `O e
then
Γ,Υ ∪ {C<D>}, G,`O e
Proof. By induction on the Γ,Υ, G `O e relation.
Df-Strengthening Lemma.
If
Γ, ∅, G `O new C<p>(v)
∀i ∈ 1..|p| Di = DD[(O, pi)]
Γ,Υ ∪ {C<D>}, G,`O′ e′
then
Γ,Υ, G,`O e




∅,Σ, θ ` e : T
Σ ` S
G `CT,H Σ
∅,Υ, G `O new C<p>(v)
(S,H,K,LI , LE) ∼ (DO,DD,DE)
Υ, G `O ddomains(C,OC)
∀i ∈ 1..|p| Di = DD[(OC , qual(pi))]
OC = 〈C<D>〉 {OC} ⊆ DO
then
∀dj ∈ domains(C<p>) Dj = DD[(OC , C::dj)]
Proof. By induction on the υ,G `O ddomains(C,OC) relation.
Case Aux-Dom :
∅,Υ, G `O new C<`′.d>(v) By assumption
CT (C) = class C<α, β> extends C′<α> {. . . dom; . . . ; } By sub-derivation of Df-New
G = 〈DO,DD,DE〉 By sub-derivation of Df - New
∀i ∈ 1..|`′.d| G `O Di ∈ findD(Cthis::`
′
i.di) By sub-derivation of Df-New
OC = 〈 C<D> 〉 {OC} ⊆ DO By sub-derivation of Df-New
G `O dparams(C,OC ) By sub-derivation of Df-New
{(OC , C::αi) 7→ Di} ⊆ DD αi ∈ params(C) By sub-derivation of AuxAlpha
{(OC , qual(`
′
i.di)) 7→ Di} ⊆ DD By sub-derivation of Df-New
Υ, G `O ddomains(C,OC) By sub-derivation of Df-New
OC = 〈C<D>〉 By sub-derivation of Df-Dom
Subcase reuse ODomain That is, ∃O′C = 〈C
′′<D′′>〉, C′′<D′′> ∈ Υ ∪ {C<D>} =⇒ C′′ =
C ∧Dj = DD[(O′C , C::dj)]
(domain dj) ∈ dom Dj = DD[(O
′
C , C::dj)] By sub-derivation of Df-Dom
{(OC , C::dj) 7→ Dj} ⊆ DD By sub-derivation of Df-Dom
dom ⊆ domains(C<p>) By definition of domains
Υ, G `O ddomains(C
′, OC) By sub-derivation of Df-Dom
Subcase fresh ODomain That is, ∀C′′<D′′> ∈ Υ ∪ {C<D>} =⇒ C′′ 6= C
(domain dj) ∈ dom Dj = 〈Didj , C::dj〉 By sub-derivation of Df-Dom
{(OC , C::dj) 7→ Dj} ⊆ DD By sub-derivation of Df-Dom
dom ⊆ domains(C<p>) By definition of domains
Υ, G `O ddomains(C
′, OC) By sub-derivation of Df-Dom
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Subcase C ′ 6= Object
by Induction hypothesis
Subcase C ′ = Object
domains(Object<α0>) = ∅ by definition of Aux-Domain-Obj
Case Aux-Obj1 : Is immediate.
Lookup Lemma
If ∅,Σ, θ ` ` : Σ[`]
Σ ` S
G `CT,H Σ
(S,H,K,LI , LE) ∼ (DO,DD,DE)
then
G `H[θ] H [`] ∈ lookup(Σ[`])
Proof.
Σ[`] = C<`′.d> By Σ ` S
H [`] = 〈C`<D>〉
To Show:
Take H [θ] = Cθ<Dθ> θ ∈ domain(H)
∀`′j .dj ∈ `
′.d, G `H[θ] D
′




j = Dj Dj ∈ D K[`
′
j.dj ] = Dj
Proof by generalized induction.
We first prove two base cases: (1) when dj is a locally declared domain and (2) when dj is a locally
declared domain of ` in the presence of recursive types.
Case `′j = θ. Local domains.
H [θ] = 〈Cθ<Dθ>〉 ∈ DO
∀dj ∈ domains(Σ[θ])
K[θ.dj ] = Dj = 〈Didj , Cθ::dj〉 {(H [θ], Cθ::dj) 7→ Dj} ∈ DD By Df-Approx
D′j = DD[(H [θ], Cθ ::dj)] = K[θ.dj ] By above
G `H[θ] D
′
j ∈ findD(Cθ :: this.dj) By inversion of Aux-FindThis
G `H[θ] D
′





D′j = K[θ.dj ] = K[`
′
j.dj ] = Dj By hypothesis and `
′
j = θ
Case `′j = `. Recursive types.
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H [`] = OC = 〈C<D>〉 ∈ DO
and ∀`′j .dj ∈ `
′.d K[`′j.dj ] = Dj = 〈Didj , qual(`
′
j.dj)〉 ∈ rng(DD)
and ∀di ∈ domains(C<`′.d>)
K[`.di] = Di = 〈Didi , C::di〉 {(OC , C::di) 7→ Di} ∈ DD
DD[(H [`], `.dj)] = Dj = K[`.dj ] By inversion of Df-New
The induction step.
Case `′j = n. dj is a public domain of n, but not a local domain of θ.
Assume that ∀`′ ∈ domain(H), G `H[θ] H [`
′] ∈ lookup(Σ[`′]) but ` 6∈ dom(H). Where domain means
the set of all keys stored in H .
To show:
K[n.dj] = Dj G `H[θ] Dj ∈ findD(Cθ::qual(n.dj))
n : Σ[n]
DD[(H [n], n.dj)] = Dj = K[n.dj] By Df-Approx, since dj ∈ domains(Σ[n])
G `H[θ] H [n] ∈ lookup(Σ[n]) By induction hypothesis
G `H[θ] Dj ∈ findD(Cθ::qual(n.dj)) By inversion of Aux-Find-Public
G `H[θ] H [`] ∈ lookup(Σ[`]) By induction
Params Lemma.
If ∅,Σ, θ ` ` : Σ[`]
Σ ` S
∅, ∅, G `O new C<`′.d>(v)
G `CT,H Σ
(S,H,K,LI , LE) ∼ (DO,DD,DE)
` ∈ domain(S) H [`] = C<D> Σ[`] = C<`′.d> S[`] = C<`′.d>(v)
CT (C) = class C<α> .... { T f ; dom; . . . ; md; }
then ∀`′i.di ∈ `
′.d DD[(H [`], qual(`′i.di))] = DD[(H [`], C::αi)] = Di = K[`
′
i.di]
Proof. By induction on the G `O dparams(C,OC) relation using subderivation of Df-New IR-New.
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The cost of security vulnerabilities in widely-deployed code, such as mobile applications,
is high. As a result, many companies are using Architectural Risk Analysis (ARA) to find
security vulnerabilities before releasing their applications. The existing analyses are focused
on finding local coding bugs such as a hard-coded password, rather than architectural flaws
such as bypassing the authentication component. During ARA, to find vulnerabilities that
are architectural flaws, security architects use a forest-level view of the runtime architecture
instead of reading the code. Unfortunately, such a view is often missing from the documen-
tation or is inconsistent with the code.
This thesis contributes Scoria, a semi-automated approach for finding architectural flaws
that uses a static analysis to extract from code with annotations an approximation of the
runtime architecture as an abstract object graph with dataflow edges that refer to abstract
objects. The annotations express local, modular hints about architectural tiers, logical con-
tainment, and strict encapsulation, such that the extracted object graph is hierarchical,
which provides architects with both high-level and detailed understanding of the runtime
architecture. Moreover, the abstract object graph is sound such that it has unique repre-
sentatives for all objects and dataflow communication that may exist at runtime. Architects
assisted by Scoria can write as machine-checkable constraints various security policies that
227
are documented only informally. The constraints are in terms of object provenance and
indirect communication and can find vulnerabilities missed by constraints that focus only
on the presence or the absence of communication, or constraints that track only information
flow from sources to sinks.
The evaluation consists of expressing several rules from the CERT Secure Coding Standard
for Java for which automated detection was previously unavailable. Scoria is also being
used to find information disclosure in open-source Android apps. Based on an existing
benchmark, Scoria performs better than commercial and research tools in terms of precision
and recall. Scoria is thus making Architectural Risk Analysis, which is today mostly manual
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